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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article inquires into whether the singular purpose of the Estab-
lishment Clause' is to secure individual rights, as is conventionally believed,
or whether its role is more properly understood as a structural restraint on
governmental power. If the Clause is indeed structural in nature, then its
task is to negate from the purview of civil governance all matters "respect-
ing an establishment of religion." Conceptualizing the role of the Estab-
lishment Clause as either rights-securing or structural has profound conse-
quences for the nation's constitutional settlement concerning the interrela-
tionship of government and religion.
The distinction between rights and structure within the overall Con-
stitution is commonplace. - For government to avoid violating a right3 is a
1. The Establishment Clause, combined with the Free Exercise Clause, reads "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.... U.S. CONSr. amend. I.
2, See, e.g., DAAN BRAVEMAN E" AL, CONSTITULIIONAl. LxIv: S I'RUGTURE AND RIGirIs IN
OUR FEDERAI. SYSTEM at v-vi, 53-60, 193, 257, 365-66 (3d ed. 1996) (making distinctions
between individual rights and the overall structure of the Constitution); GE-R,\I.D GuNr-tIER,
CON.sI'TUIIONA. L\W at xxxi - xxxv (12th ed. 1991) (devoting chapters 2-6 to governmental
structure and chapters 7-15 to individual rights); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONsTrrrtloN,\. Lwv §§ 2-1 to -4, at 18-22 (2d ed. 1988) (outlining the interplay between the
structure of the Constitution and substantive rights); see id. § 7-I, at 546 (noting the limited
protection for personal rights in the original body of the Constitution, except indirectly
through the structuring of a government with limited enumerated powers).
3. The terms "individual rights" and "personal rights" are used interchangeably in this
Article. Moreover, as used herein, individual or personal rights are akin to "group rights" of a
church or other religious entity where the entity has organizational standing to assert a rights
claim on behalf of its collective membership pursuant to the three-part test set out in Hunt v.
Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). See ERWIN
CIIEMNERINSKi', FF.DFnRAt.JURISDK7rION § 2.3, at 103-04 (2d ed. 1994) (explaining the Court's
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matter of constitutional duty owed to each individual within its jurisdiction.
On the other hand, for government to avoid exceeding a structural re-
straint is a matter of limiting its activities and laws to the scope of its pow-
ers. While individual rights can be waived, structural restraints cannot.4 The
distinction manifests itself in subtle but often useful ways that can prove
definitive.5 A structural clause, to be sure, can have a laudable effect on
individual rights by constraining the branches of government to act only
within the scope of their delegated powers.6 Nevertheless, the immediate
object of the Constitution's structure is the management of power: a divid-
ing, dispersing, and balancing of the various prerogatives of national sover-
eignty. "Separation of powers" and "federalism" are mere shorthand for
familiar forms of constitutional structure running horizontally and verti-
cally, respectively, within the three-branch federal government and the
multi-layered system of national, state, and local governments. Structural
clauses are helpfully thought of as power-conferring and power-limiting, so
long as it is understood that many such clauses serve both functions.7
This Article will show that the Supreme Court's case law is more easily
test in Hunt). The common feature of individual rights and group rights is that in both in-
stances there is no violation of a constitutional right in the absence of a showing of personal
"injury in fact." The violation of a structural clause need not be so attended. For further dis-
cussion, see infra text accompanying notes 127-33.
As used in this Article the term "group" is a collection of individuals with a common
cause. When a group (association, institution, organization, society) is imbued with certain
formalities we recognize them as jural entities. For discussion on whether there are group
rights for a religious entity over and above the aggregated individual rights of the entity's
membership, see infra notes 210-23 and accompanying text.
4. Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2109 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(stating that structural clauses cannot be voluntarily surrendered, yielded up, or abdicated by
Congress); Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
702-03 & n.10 (1982) (contrasting personal jurisdiction as an "individual liberty" that can be
waived, with a structural limitation that is a "restriction on... power... as a matter of sover-
eignty" and thus cannot be waived).
5. See, e.g., Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439 (1991) (holding that the Dormant Com-
merce Clause is a rights-securing clause rather than a power-limiting clause of the Constitu-
tion, and thus actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los
Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 107-08 (1989) (holding that the Supremacy Clause is not a rights-
securing clause, but a clause requiring that federal law prevail when there is a conflict with a
law based on state power, and thus not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); id. at 116 (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting) (distinguishing a constitutional right from "those interests merely result-
ing from the allocation of power" between government entities).
6. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2378 (1997) (explaining how individual
liberty flows consequentially from the Constitution's structure); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (explaining how structure has the object of preventing the accumulation
of excessive power in any single government or branch thereof, and the successful achieve-
ment of that object instrumentally ensures the protection of fundamental liberties); see also
infra notes 442-44 and accompanying text (discussing the symmetry between structure and
rights).
7. The Commerce Clause, for example, both confers power on Congress, see Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (upholding federally issued coasting license in the face of
a state-granted steamboat monopoly), and sets limits on that power, see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 550
(striking down federal law criminalizing possession of firearms near schools).
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understood when the Establishment Clause is conceptualized as a struc-
tural' restraint on the government's power to act on certain matters per-
taining to religion.' In 1947, the Supreme Court handed down Everson v.
Board of Education,'0 which made the Clause applicable to the actions of
state and local governments via the incorporation doctrine." Since Everson,
the Court has sub silentio given the Establishment Clause a far different
application than if its object were to guarantee individual religious rights.
The Court has done this (seemingly intuitively rather than by grand design)
by applying the Establishment Clause as if it works as a structural restraint
on government. As a separate and secondary point, the argument in this
Article is that the Court has been correct in doing so, albeit other mistakes
have been made along the way.
The Supreme Court's incorporation of the Establishment Clause in
Everson, as well as its application a year later in McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion,12 did not pass without early resistance. Objections arose from a chorus
of voices: historians, aware that federalist concerns so prominent in the
First Congress were being ignored; 3 defenders of justiciability doctrine,
8. Mere placement in what is popularly called the Bill of Rights does not foreclose the
possibility that the Establishment Clause is a structural restraint on governmental power rather
than an individual right. The Ninth Amendment, for example, does not create rights but
merely acknowledges the existence of rights other than those specifically enumerated. Like-
wise, the Tenth Amendment does not create rights but makes explicit what is implicit in the
original constitutional document: that the newly created central government is one of limited,
delegated powers. It cannot easily be denied that the Establishment Clause is different from
the rest of the Clauses in the first eight Amendments. Justice Brennan took note of the matter
this way:
Most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, even if they are not generally
enforceable in the absence of state action, nevertheless arise out of moral
intuitions applicable to individuals as well as governments. The Establish-
ment Clause, however, is quite different. It is, to its core, nothing less and
nothing. more than a statement about the proper role of government in the
society that we have shaped for ourselves in this land.
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 802 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
9. The Establishment Clause describes the powers that are restrained as the making of
laws "respecting an establishment of religion." The powers that fall within the scope of that
phrase (denied to government, hence within the province of religion) and the powers outside
that phrase (hence, residing in the civil government) await elaboration below. See infra Part
VII.B.
10. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
11. See id. at 8, 14-15 (applying the incorporation doctrine to the Establishment Clause).
Everson narrowly upheld a state law permitting local authorities to reimburse parents for the
cost of transporting their children to primary and secondary schools, including church-related
schools.
12. 333 U.S. 203 (1948). In McCollum, the Court struck down as violative of the Estab-
lishment Clause an Illinois school district's practice of offering elective classes in religion. The
Establishment Clause had been a part of the Constitution for 157 years when the McCollum
Court found, for the first time, that the Clause was violated.
13. See infra notes 51-60, 91-92 and accompanying text (describing the Clause's vertical
restraint on Congress and reactions to Everson).
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puzzled because standing limitations were being overlooked; 4 and theolo-
gians, worried that the Court was interpreting the no-establishment princi-
ple as imposing an article of religious faith on the nation, one at odds with
the beliefs of their own ecclesiastical communities. 5 These very disparate
objections had one common thread: disagreement over whether the Estab-
lishment Clause should be viewed as structural in nature.
The Supreme Court's view of the Establishment Clause as structural
can be most easily glimpsed by the manner in which the Court carved out
an exception to the law of standing. The Court generally requires "injury in
fact" of a rights claimant in order to have standing to sue.'6 Contrariwise,
the Court denies standing when the claimant can show no more than a
"generalized grievance," meaning that the plaintiff's asserted interest is no
more than that shared by most everyone desiring to live under a govern-
ment that itself obeys the law.' In cases pleading a no-establishment claim,
however, the Court dispensed with the requirement that the plaintiff show
concrete "injury in fact,"' 8 lest laws putatively unconstitutional are, none-
theless, insusceptible to challenge in the courts. This relaxation of standing
would be unnecessary if the Court regarded the Establishment Clause as
only securing individual rights, for the violation of a rights clause will in
due season produce a complainant with a concrete injury. The alteration of
the rules on standing to permit the filing of this type of non-Hohfeldian
claim 9 is a clear sign that the Court views the Establishment Clause as a
14. See infra text accompanying notes 17-19, 148-51 (describing the Court's treatment of
standing in no-establishment cases and the reaction of scholars).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 100-12 (describingJohn Courtney Murray's view of
the Establishment Clause).
16. See infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text; see generally CHI-IERINSKY, supra note
3, § 2.3.2, at 58-61.
17. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Conm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (de-
nying standing to plaintiff who claimed that the Incompatibility Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6,
cl. 2, prohibits members of Congress from holding an office in the executive branch); United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (denying standing to plaintiff who claimed that the
Account Clause, U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 9, cl. 7, requires Congress to disclose receipts and ex-
penditures of all public monies); Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (denying standing to
plaintiff who claimed that the Incompatibility Clause prohibits a member of Congress from
accepting an appointment in the judicial branch "the Emoluments whereof' having been
increased during the member's congressional term).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 134-47 (describing the Court's treatment of stand-
ing in Establishment Clause cases).
19. Claims that are not personal to an individual or association of individuals are referred
to as "non-Hohfeldian." See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 119 n.5 (1968) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting); Richard Fallon, OfJusticiability, Remedies and Public Lau' Litigation: Notes on the Juris-
prudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L REV. 1, 3 & n.12, 4 (1984). Alternative phrases used to convey a
similar meaning are "public-interest" actions, "ideological" claims, and "collective constitu-
tional rights." Usage of the term "non-Hohfeldian" persists because the substitutes have mul-
tiple and hence unclear meanings. The term comes from a venerable article setting forth
several types of legal rights. See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). Professor Hohfeld's article has a catalogue
of individual and proprietary rights. Hence, when a claim is not personal to a specific plaintiff
or association of plaintiffs, but an action in the public interest brought in a representative
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structural restraint.
An examination of the nature of the remedies the Supreme Court
awards in successful Establishment Clause cases reinforces the foregoing
observation concerning standing. Remedies tailored to relieving plaintiffs
of injuries actually suffered are indicative of an individual rights clause.
This is not the pattern in no-establishment cases, where courts have en-
joined government from acting in an entire field of concerns deemed to be
in the exclusive province of religion.2 The class-wide and impersonal na-
ture of these injunctions suggests a clause whose function is negating the
power of government, not the offering of relief tailored to the injuries of
the complainants actually before the court.2'
Examining the Court's dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
further reveals the Supreme Court's view of the Establishment Clause. Such
dismissals happen when a court is asked to resolve disputes on topics over
which the court deems itself as having no competence.2 2 These dismissals
occur in a line of cases involving such issues as church schisms over doc-
trine, ecclesiastical polity, and removal of a cleric from office. 23 Dispositions
for lack of jurisdiction presuppose that civil courts are without power to
even reach, let alone adjudicate, the matter on the merits. Once again the
no-establishment principle is tacitly applied as a power-limiting clause.
Conceptualizing the Establishment Clause as structural not only explains
why courts determine they do not have subject matter jurisdiction in these
cases, but it has the added benefit of integrating the church schism cases,
often regarded as a discrete and rather odd line of precedent, into a larger
general conception of the Clause.24
Another reason for viewing the Supreme Court's application of the
Establishment Clause as structural is that it solves the "two-definitions puz-
zle." The Court has implicitly adopted two definitions of religion, one for
capacity, it is called "non-Hohfeldian."
20. For example, public school officials have been found to have no power to read or
compose prayers for group recitation, Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992); School Dist.
of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,
430 (1962), conduct Bible devotions before classes of students, Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223, offer
classes in religious training, McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948), or display
religious codes for public veneration, Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (per curiam).
Concerning each of these matters within the purview of religion, the breadth of the Court's
order was to enjoin governmental power from acting on the matter in question when a more
narrowly tailored injunction was available that would relieve complainants of their constitu-
tional injury. Cf West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that
Jehovah's Witnesses children could not be compelled to salute the U.S. flag and recite a
pledge of allegiance at the beginning of the school day, but remedy awarded was a narrow
right to opt out while remaining in the classroom).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 154-62 (describing the class-wide nature of reme-
dies the Court awards in no-establishment cases).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 163-68.
23. See infra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 224-29.
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the Establishment Clause and another for the Free Exercise Clause. 5 This
is puzzling because the word "religion" appears only once in the text of the
First Amendment, applicable to both Clauses.
A now common urban conflict illustrates the problem of using two dis-
tinct definitions for religion. Assume a group of parishioners opens a shel-
ter for the homeless operated out of the basement of its church. Religion as
such gets only collateral mention at the shelter, the primary ministrations
being food, a shower, a bed, clean clothes, and kindness. When faced with a
municipal order to cease operations for noncompliance with zoning ordi-
nances, the church responds by asserting that the shelter's operation is
protected by the Free Exercise Clause because the work is an outgrowth of
religious belief. The claim is obviously plausible and, if sincere, will be rec-
ognized by the courts as satisfying one of the threshold requirements for
stating a claim by coming within the Free Exercise Clause's definition of
"religion. '2' Assume that a month later the city adopts social welfare legis-
lation opening several homeless shelters for operation by the municipality.
Is the city now "establishing" religion by its engagement in religious activ-
ity? Common sense says "no," yet how can the identical activity be religious
when carried out by the parish church but not religious when performed by
the municipality? -7 The Supreme Court's response, without specifically
saying so, has been that the same activity is religious for purposes of the
Free Exercise Clause but not religious for purposes of the Establishment
Clause.28
25. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-6, at 828 (lst ed. 1978);
William W. Van Alstyne, Constitutional Separation of Church And State: The Quest for a Coherent
Position, 57 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 865, 873-75 (1963); Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of
Religion, 91 HARV. L REv. 1056 (1978); Marc Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States: A
Turning Point?, 1966 Wisc. L. REV. 217, 265-67. But cf TRIBE, supra note 2, § 14-6, at 1186
n.53 (criticizing the two-definitions approach advocated in the first edition).
26. Ultimately the church may very well not prevail on the merits, see infra note 435, but
that is beside the point for purposes of this illustration.
27. This illustration is not explained away by simply arguing that there are two purposes
for operating the shelters (one religious, the other secular), not two definitions of religion. The
government does not circumvent the Establishment Clause simply by averring a secular pur-
pose behind its actions. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam); Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). Nor does the government circumvent the Establishment
Clause by persuading a court that its purpose is secular. Many a statutory scheme, notwith-
standing a judicial finding of a secular purpose, has fallen to the Clause because the statute
had the effect of advancing religion or unduly entangling itself therewith. See, e.g., Committee
for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Another suggestion is that the problem can be "solved not by defining 'religion' nar-
rowly for establishment clause purposes, but rather by defining narrowly what constitutes
'establishment."' KAIILEEN M. SULI.IVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LxW 468
(1999). This, too, is an unsatisfactory solution to the illustration. No one really believes that
the city's operation of the shelter is "doing religion" but religion that nonetheless falls short of
"an establishment" thereof. Rather, we intuitively believe the city's operation of the shelter is
secular, and our instincts in that regard are surely correct.
28. For example, Sunday-closing statutes were regarded as secular labor laws for Estab-
lishment Clause analysis in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442-45 (1961), but a Sunday
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Jurists critically examining the two-definitions approach have found it
an unsatisfactory hermeneutic. -9 However, the Court's approach is not ob-
jectionable-indeed, it seems naturally to follow-when the Establishment
Clause is conceptualized as structural. The logic is tied to the difference in
tasks between a structural clause and a rights clause. For a rights clause to
succeed in the task of securing personal religious liberty, the political ma-
jority must be compelled to adjust its police power objectives to the needs
of the religious minority or religious nonconformist. Thus, the Free Exer-
cise Clause's meaning of "religion" is necessarily broad to account for the
vast differences in human belief, the Framers fully appreciating that human
hearts vary widely in spiritual matters.
In contrast, the task of a structural clause is to manage sovereign
power. America's religious pluralism virtually guarantees that legislation,
even when nondiscriminatory in both text and purpose, will have disparate
effects across the spectrum of religions dotting the land. When these unin-
tended effects occur, the resulting burden on some religions but not others
cannot force an invalidation of the law due to the legislation exceeding the
government's power, that is, exceeding a structural restraint." This follows
because intrinsic to the structure of a written constitution is that the powers
day of rest was religious for purposes of the Free Exercise Clause in Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of
Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989). Likewise, a law restricting access to abortion was re-
garded as secular for purposes of the Establishment Clause in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,
319-20 (1980), but a woman having unrestricted access to abortion was a matter of a religious
conscious for purposes of Free Exercise Clause analysis, id. at 320-21.
29. In Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), Justice Rutledge wrote of the text
of the First Amendment:
"Religion" appears only once in the Amendment. But the word governs two
prohibitions and governs them alike. It does not have two meanings, one
narrow to forbid "an establishment" and another, much broader, for secur-
ing "the free exercise thereof." "Thereof" brings down "religion" with its
entire and exact content, no more and no less, from the first into the second
guaranty, so that Congress and now the states are as broadly restricted con-
cerning the one as they are regarding the other.
Id. at 32; see also Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 210-13 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring
in the result) (rejecting the two-definitions approach); TRIBE, supra note 2, § 14-6, at 1186
n.54 (collecting authorities).
30. The Establishment Clause is not violated merely because a law, neutral in purpose,
has an unintended effect on a particular religion or religious practice. See Hernandez v.
Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 696 (1989) (holding IRS regulation concerning deductibility of
contributions having unintended impact on religious groups that rely on sales of goods or
services as means of fund raising is not violative of Establishment Clause); Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 n.30 (1983) (finding that preference for religions whose
tenets do not oppose interracial marriage was the unintended effect of neutral IRS regulation
about racially discriminatory schools, hence the regulation did not violate the Establishment
Clause); Harris, 448 U.S. at 319-20 (regarding a law restricting access to abortion as secular for
purposes of the Establishment Clause); McGowan, 366 U.S. at 442-45 (regarding Sunday-
closing statutes as secular labor laws for Establishment Clause analysis); see also Larson v. Va-
lente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 n.23 (1982) (distinguishing laws that intentionally discriminate
among religions and are thereby unconstitutional from laws that have disparate impact on
certain religions and thus do not violate the Establishment Clause).
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delegated to (and withheld from) government remain fixed or constant.
Hence, a structural clause cannot be seen as varying case-by-case in the
scope of its delegation (or negation) to adjust for the individual needs of
religious nonconformists." If the Establishment Clause is structural, then
any such definition of "religion" would have to remain fixed and thereby
help demarcate the boundary at which the government's power comes to an
end and the purview of religion begins.
Moreover, any definition for no-establishment purposes has to be nar-
row in order not to overturn social welfare and moral-based legislation. The
case law confirms that this is indeed how the Clause has been applied. The
Supreme Court has said that legislation does not violate the Establishment
Clause just because the law has a disparate effect (beneficial or detrimental)
on particular religions. 2 To the Court, it is sufficient that the legislation
has, inter alia, a secular purpose, with the question of what is secular being
answered using a narrow, fixed definition of "religion." In summary, the
difference in function of the two Religion Clauses-free exercise is a right
and no-establishment is a structural restraint-is what causes the Supreme
Court to have a broad, flexible definition of religion for the Free Exercise
Clause and a narrow, fixed definition for the Establishment Clause.
Solving these doctrinal riddles (standing exceptions, class-wide reme-
dies, jurisdictional dismissals, and the two-definitions puzzle) validates the
principal thesis of this Article, namely that the Court has applied the Es-
tablishment Clause as structural. 3
31. Any structural boundary that sets limits on the government's ability to act or pass laws
has to be drawn in a manner that deals uniformly with all persons and all faiths, that is, with-
out regard to religion or lack thereof. If this was not so, the church-state boundary would be in
constant flux. A fixed boundary can he accomplished only if the definition of religion remains
fixed.
It would take a rights-based clause to trump otherwise valid legislation, and thereby
force the government to adjust its police power case-by-case to accommodate the personal
needs of religious nonconformity. This was the stated law of the Free Exercise Clause until it
was overturned in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). See infra note 435; see also
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down congressional legislation that had
sought to restore free exercise law as it existed before the Smith decision). Because the Estab-
lishment Clause operates independently of the Free Exercise Clause, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 441-46, and the focus here is on the former Clause, there is no need to take a
position in this Article on whether Smith was correctly decided.
32. See supra note 30.
33. A few commentators have noted in passing that the no-establishment principle is a
structural or power-limiting clause rather than a rights clause, but they then leave the idea
undeveloped. See REx E. LEE, A LAWYER LOOKS AT TIlE CONSTITUTION 129 (1981) (stating
that the Establishment Clause "deals with structural matters, specifically the relationships
between government and religious institutions or religious movements"); BERNARD H. SIEGAN,
TiHE SUPREME CouRT's CONSTITUTION: AN INQUIRY INTO JUDICIAL REVIEW AND ITs IMPAai
ON SOCIETY 118 (1987) (stating that the Establishment Clause is a limitation on the powers of
government being used to authorize the financing and supporting of religious programs);
Joseph M. Snee, Religious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954 WASH. U. LQ.
371, 373, 392-93, 406 (stating that the Establishment Clause places a political duty on the
federal government); Note, Rethinking the Incorporation of the Establishment Clause: A Federalist
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An important consequence of attributing structural characteristics to
the Establishment Clause is that it acknowledges the existence of a compe-
tency centered in religion that is on a plane with that of civil government.'
Stated differently, the Establishment Clause presupposes a constitutional
model consisting of two spheres of competence: government and religion. 5
The subject matters that the Clause sets apart from the sphere of civil gov-
ernment-and thereby leaves to the sphere of religion-are those topics
"respecting an establishment of religion," e.g., ecclesiastical governance,
View, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1700, 1710 (1992) (stating that the Establishment Clause is not an
individual liberty, but is a structural limit upon federal power and a reservation of authority to
the states).
34. William Clancy aptly framed the matter this way:
[T]he "wall of separation" metaphor is an unfortunate and inexact descrip-
tion of the American Church-State situation. What we have constitutionally
is not a "wall" but a logical distinction between two orders of competence.
Caesar recognizes that he is only Caesar and forswears any attempt to de-
mand what is God's. (Surely this is one of history's more encouraging exam-
ples of secular modesty.) The State realistically admits that there are severe
limits on its authority and leaves the churches free to perform their work in
society.
William Clancy, Religion as a Source of Tension, in RELIGION AND THE FREE SOCiETY 23, 27-28
(1958).
Max L. Stackhouse goes on to note just how remarkable it is that a government
should go beyond the protection of the rights of religious individuals and intentionally limit its
sovereignty by acknowledging a co-equal authority, an authority outside the state's control
when it comes to religious matters:
[The First] amendment to the Constitution acknowledges the existence of an
arena of discourse, activity, commitment, and organization for the ordering
of life over which the state has no authority. It is a remarkable thing in hu-
man history when the authority governing coercive power limits itself ....
However much government may become involved in regulating various as-
pects of economic, technological, medical, cultural, educational, and even
sexual behaviors in society, religion is an arena that, when it is doing its own
thing, is off limits. This is not only an affirmation of the freedom of individ-
ual belief or practice, not only an acknowledgment that the state is noncom-
petent when it comes to theology, it is the recognition of a sacred domain
that no secular authority can fully control. Practically, this means that at
least one association may be brought into being in society that has a sover-
eignty beyond the control of government.
Max L. Stackhouse, Religion, Rights, and the Constitution, in AN UNSEF'LED ARENA: RELIGION
AND'riIE BILL OF RiGrrs 92, 111 (Ronald C. White, Jr. & Albright G. Zimmerman eds., 1990).
35. In some respects the Court wields the Clause in a manner similar to a separation-of-
powers provision. Professor Garvey has stated: "[The Establishment Clause] speaks about
relations between institutions, not between individuals and government .... The clause thus
regulates affairs between government and the churches, much as the original Constitution
regulates affairs between government and the states." John H. Garvey, A Comment on Church
and State in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century America, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 275, 278 (1989).
However, neither a Separation-of-Powers Clause nor a federalism provision is an entirely apt
analogy to the Establishment Clause. Separation-of-powers and federalism clauses restrain the
various branches of government on both sides of a boundary. The Establishment Clause, in
contrast, polices only the government on the boundary between government and religion. See
infia note 44 and accompanying text.
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the resolution of doctrine, 6 the composing of prayers, and the teaching of
religion."
The Court's reluctance to openly acknowledge that it views the Estab-
lishment Clause as structural has caused legal doctrine to appear mud-
dled,38 thereby making the Court's holdings uncommonly vulnerable to
criticism. 9 More importantly, to continue to ignore the differences in ju-
ridical tasks between a rights-securing clause and a power-limiting clause is
to obscure the search for the proper scope of the Establishment Clause. For
example, courts are increasingly confronted with supposed "collisions" of
the Establishment Clause with other Clauses in the First Amendment that
force them to subordinate one Clause to give the other full play." This
makes no sense. Putting the Establishment Clause at war with the Free Ex-
ercise and Free Speech Clauses suggests that the Framers drafted a consti-
36. See infra notes 172-75.
37. See supra note 20.
38. Since the Everson decision in 1947, Justices on the Supreme Court have proposed all
manner of verbal formulae as encapsuling the prohibitions of the Establishment Clause.
Among them are a coercion test, County of Allegheny v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S.
573, 659 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part), a
nonpreferentialism test, Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing), a no-endorsement test, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring), and a purpose-effect test, School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 222 (1963), that later acquired a third element called "no-entanglement," Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971), only to have that entanglement element apparently
absorbed back into the effect element, Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). These judge-
made tests have proved to be of little use in predicting how actual cases before the Court will
be decided, as well as to be of limited durability, as the test in current favor waxes and wanes
even among individual Justices.
39. Professor Gedicks has collected commentary from fellow law professors:
The Court's decisions in this area have been described as "ad hoc," "eccen-
tric," "misleading and distorting," "historically unjustified and textually in-
coherent," and finally "riven by contradiction and bogged down in slogans
and metaphors."..... Steven Smith has observed that "in a rare and remark-
able way, the Supreme Court's establishment clause jurisprudence has uni-
fied critical opinion: people who disagree about nearly everything else in
the law agree that establishment clause doctrine is seriously, perhaps dis-
tinctively, defective."
FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE: A CRrICAL ANALYSIS OF
RELIGION CLAUSEJURISI'RUDENCE 1 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
40. See, e.g., Church on the Rock v. City of Albuquerque, 84 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir. 1996);
Hartman v. Stone, 68 F.3d 973 (6th Cir. 1995). The appeals court in Church on the Rock struck
down a congressional prohibition on private religious speech thereby permitting access to
senior citizen centers funded by the federal government. Community groups were welcomed
at the center. A local church sought the same access to conduct worship services for the resi-
dents. The government unsuccessfully argued that denial of the church's right under the Free
Speech Clause was required by the Establishment Clause. In Hartman, the appeals court ana-
lyzed a U.S. Army program that paid local providers for child care services selected by service
personnel. However, program regulations disallowed payments to faith-based child care pro-
viders. The regulation was struck down as violative of the Free Exercise Clause. The govern-
ment unsuccessfully argued that the discrimination against the free exercise of religion by
service personnel was required by the Establishment Clause.
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tutional Amendment that contradicts itself.4 A major cause of this imag-
ined "tension" is the uncritical assumption that the Establishment Clause is
rights-based. If the object of that Clause really was to secure a freedomfrom
religion (and the Free Exercise Clause doubtlessly secures some right to
exercise religion) then of course the two Clauses would frequently be found
on a collision course. 2 These "battles of the Clauses" would not occur if the
Establishment Clause were openly acknowledged as structural."
Part II of this Article examines the text of the Establishment Clause
and revisits the manner in which the First Congress wove into its fabric two
ordering principles: first, the vertical dimension between national and state
governments; and, second, the horizontal dimension between the new na-
tional government and religion. The least strained reading of the text, as
well as a natural and plausible interpretation of the sociopolitical context
that gave rise to the Clause in 1789-1791, points to no-establishment as
structural along both these dimensions.
Part III jumps to 150 years later and explores what transpired when
the Establishment Clause was incorporated through the Fourteenth
Amendment. It was at this juncture that the structural dimension of na-
tional government-state governments was dropped out of the Clause,
whereas structure along the dimension of national government-religion
was expanded to cover state and local governments as well. Part IV takes up
the subjects of standing, scope of remedies, church autonomy cases, and the
nondelegation rule. Each is shown to be a lens through which the Supreme
Court unmistakably applies the Establishment Clause as structural.
If taken as given that the Supreme Court views the Establishment
Clause as structural, then the Clause's primary role is to police the bound-
ary between government and religion looking to arrest overreaching by
government, whether national, state, or local."4 Part V relates in the Court's
41. See infra notes 361-63, 365-68, 384-87 and accompanying text.
42. Alexander Meiklejohn has noted the analytical difficulty when a single constitutional
Clau~e tries to do service as both protecting personal religious liberty and affording a freedom
from religion. "[A]II discussions of the First Amendment are tormented by the fact that the
term 'freedom of religion' must be used to cover 'freedom of nonreligion' as well. Such a
paradoxical usage cannot fail to cause serious difficulties, both theoretical and practical."
Alexander Meiklejohn, Educational Cooperation Between Church and State, 14 LW & CONTMP.
PROMS. 61, 71 (1949).
The analytics of the problem still leads modem scholars into thinking that the "ten-
sion" between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses is inherent and irreconcilable. See,
e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: Paradox Redux, 1992 SuP. CT. REV. 123, 123-25, 129-30.
However, when "freedom from religion" is removed from the Establishment Clause side of the
ledger as a personal right, the "tension" falls away. Such a move does not leave "freedom from
religion" without constitutional protection. It does mean, however, that "freedom from relig-
ion" is protected as a by-product of the structural limitation on governmental power laid down
by the Establishment Clause.
43. See infra notes 414-17 and accompanying text.
44. As with all legal "negatives" found in the Bill of Rights, the Establishment Clause does
not act as a limitation on what private individuals, churches, or other religious organizations
may do. The Clause polices only the government. Richard John Neuhaus has written:
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own words its explanation for fixing that boundary where it does. The oft-
stated rationale is two-fold: to avoid governmental interactions with relig-
ion that cause either a fracturing of the body politic (the civitas) along re-
ligious lines,45 or an undermining of the integrity of religion (religare)46 or
religious organizations (the ekklesia).47 Neither of these two injuries, to the
The religion clause of the First Amendment is entirely a check upon gov-
ernment, not a check upon religion. Even if a particular religion were to
agitate successfully .to have itself officially established, it is the government
that would have to do the establishing. And that is what the government is
forbidden to do. As wrongheaded as it would be, religions are perfectly free
to agitate to have themselves established, for that too is part of religious
freedom. What is prohibited by the First Amendment is the [use] of govern-
ment power in giving in to such agitations .... The religion clause is not
then, as some claim, a check upon both government and religion, nor is it a
provision in which two clauses are to "balanced" against one another. The
religion clause is not to protect the state from the church but to protect the
church from the state. Similarly, in press-state relations, the First Amend-
ment is not to protect the state from the press but to protect the press from
the state. The "great object" of the Bill of Rights, Uames] Madison most ex-
plicitly said when introducing his draft to the House [of Representatives],
was to "limit and qualify the powers of Government."
RichardJohn Neuhaus, Establishment is Not the Issue, in 4 THE RELIGION & SOcIETY REPORT 1,
3 (June 1987).
45. These harms are of the type often associated with England and Continental Europe
during the religious conflicts that followed from the Reformation. See Douglas Laycock, Conti-
nuity and Change in the Threat to Religious Liberty: The Reformation Era and the Late Twentieth
Century, 80 MINN. L. REv. 1047, 1049-66 (1996) (summarizing the religious wars of post-
Medieval England and Continental Europe, as well as the motives of the primary actors, both
political and religious). That subject is explored at infra notes 401-02 and accompanying text.
It is the government's official actions causing political strife along sectarian lines that
rise to an Establishment Clause harm, not the resulting private actions of citizens reflecting
such division or strife. No-establishment does not limit such private actions, only governmen-
tal actions. See supra note 44. Indeed, these private actions are likely protected by the Free
Speech Clause as citizens make their opinions known in the public square. The subject is ex-
plored at infra notes 364-75 and accompanying text.
46. "Religion" derives from the Latin religare, which means "to bind." XIII THIE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 568 (2d ed. 1989).
47. Ekklesia is the Greek word for a gathering of persons who were called out from the
larger society for a specified purpose. EkkIesia comes from ek meaning "out of' and kiesis
meaning "a calling." Ekklesia is translated into English as "church." The word was used in early
New Testament writings to denote an assembly or gathering. As such, ekklesia was preceded by
an adjective like "believers" or "saints" to indicate an assembly of Christians. The adjective was
dropped in later New Testament writings. This is taken as indicating that usage of the noun
ekklesia, when appearing in the absence of a modifying adjective, came to mean an assembly of
Christians.
Ekklesia was used in the New Testament writings in two senses. One sense was as a
reference to a church at a specific geographic location, as in "the church at Corinth." In its
second sense, ekklesia was a reference to the world-wide church comprised of Christians. The
word was not used to refer to a building where worship took place. DAVID L SMITH, ALL GOD'S
PEOPLE: A THEOLOGY OF TIlE CHURCH 242-46, 320-39 (1996); VINE'S ExPOsrrOR"
DIT'IONARY OF NWv TFSIAMENT VORDS 85-86 (W.E. Vine ed., 1985); THE ZONDERVAN
PICT1ORIAL BIBLE DICTIONARY 170-71 (Merrill C. Tenney ed., 1963).
In this Article ekkiesia is used in both senses. I additionally use the term to refer to not
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civitas or to religare/ekklesia, is a personal or individualistic harm. Rather, the
harms are to collective or class-wide interests that are non-Hohfeldian in
character.4 8 The prevention of such harms is the expected focus of a con-
stitutional Clause that is structural as opposed to rights-based. Part VI be-
gins to sort out where that clarification leads. The Free Exercise Clause, as
a safeguard of individual rights, is differentiated from the Establishment
Clause in Part VII. That Part then concludes with the Court's division, one
rooted in the Western tradition as received on this side of the Atlantic and
uniquely altered here, between those topics within the province of civil gov-
ernment and those matters that remain in the exclusive sphere of religion.
It is the "sphere of religion" matters that the Establishment Clause negates
as proper objects of governmental power.
II. THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
From the time of its ratification by the states, the Establishment Clause
worked as a dual restraint on national sovereignty." The use of the double-
only Christian assemblies world-wide, but also the congregations and confessional communi-
ties of all religions. Finally, I include in the meaning of ekkesia religious groups and organiza-
tions that are consciously religious but do not claim to be a church in the narrow sense of an
organization attended by clergy and performing worship, sacramental, and sacerdotal func-
tions. These latter groups are sometimes call "parachurch" organizations. Familiar parachurch
organizations are faith-based colleges, charities, health care organizations, religious publishing
houses, evangelistic associations, and mission societies.
48. See supra notes 17, 19; infra note 442. Because the interest in not having government
undermine the integrity of religion is non-Hohfeldian, no religious harm need befall a specific
individual for there to be a transgression of a structural restraint. Where there is no personal
religious harm, the Free Exercise Clause affords no remedy. See infra note 436 and accompa-
nying text. However, in the Court's view the Establishment Clause does afford a remedy for
this class-wide interest in religion remaining uncorrupted by too close a tie with government.
See infra notes 293-307 and accompanying text. In summary, the Free Exercise Clause alone
grants a remedy for personal religious harms, but the Establishment Clause-in its task of
limiting governmental power--does protect religion from being undermined by the civil state.
In this sense, then, it is proper to say that the Establishment Clause is about protecting, inter
alia, religious liberty. But the religious liberty protected by the Establishment Clause is not
individualistic or specific to any one person, but non-Hohfeldian in character.
Some commentators are puzzled that the Court invokes the Establishment Clause to
protect class-wide religious interests. See infra note 256. They assume that the job of protecting
religion is exclusively that of the Free Exercise Clause, and they attribute to the Establishment
Clause the sole task of keeping religion in check. But if the Establishment Clause is structural,
its task of limiting governmental power redounds to the benefit of all in civil society who enjoy
the blessings of a constitutional democracy, see infra notes 282-92 and accompanying text,
including religion not being compromised by government, see infra notes 293-307 and accom-
panying text.
49. To those approaching the text of the Establishment Clause, historian Thomas J.
Curry offers sage advice concerning the state of mind of those now revered as the Framers:
In endeavoring to determine the exact significance (the First] Congress and
the [ratifying] states attached to the opening segment of the First Amend-
nient, one must bear in mind the overall context of its enactment and ratifi-
cation. Its guarantees did not represent the triumph of one particular party
or specific viewpoint over a clear or entrenched opposition, but rather a
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edged word "respecting" in the Clause had the effect of denying to the new
central government the power to make laws in two dimensions: a state (or
vertical) restraint and a national (or horizontal) restraint. Keeping distinct
these two dimensions is important because only the horizontal restraint
survives today.50
The vertical restraint on the power of the new central government was
that Congress5' could not enact legislation operable at the state level on
certain matters pertaining to ("respecting") religion.52 Because "mak[ing)..
.law respecting an establishment" was a power denied to Congress, the new
central government was without competence to abolish state religious es-
tablishments. Likewise, the national government was without power to undo
state laws that had earlier disestablished a church. The Second Congress,
consequently, could have no more disestablished the Congregational
Church in the parishes of Connecticut than it could have re-established the
consensus of Congress and nation ....
Americans in 1789... agreed that the federal government had no power
in [religious] matters, but some individuals and groups wanted that fact
stated explicitly. Granted, not all the states would have concurred on a sin-
gle definition of religious liberty; but since they were denying power to
Congress rather than giving it, differences among them on that score did
not bring them into contention.
... The fact that Congress was not trying to resolve concrete disputes, but
merely strengthening safeguards against possible future adversity, helps ex-
plain at least some of the inattentiveness and absentmindedness attendant
upon Americans' enactment of the First Amendment.
THiOMAsJ. CURRY, TIHE FiRsT FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICATO THE PASSAGE OF
THE FIRsTAMENDMENT 193-94 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
50. See infra text accompanying notes 89-98. Some scholars have noted only the vertical
dimension, thus overlooking the horizontal dimension. See, e.g., STEVEN D. SMITH,
FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QuEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM 25-27 (1995) (arguing that the First Amendment Religion Clause was purely a fed-
eralist decision); Note, supra note 33, at 1704 (arguing that the Framers of the Establishment
Clause sought only to preserve the sovereignty of the states over religion).
51. Because the text of the First Amendment is specifically addressed to "Congress," it
might be asked whether the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses were intended to bind
only Congress and not the Executive and Judicial Branches of the new central government.
For a closely reasoned argument concluding that all three branches were intended to be
equally bound by the Religion Clauses, see Robert A. Destro, The Structure of the Religious Lib-
erty Guarantee, 11 J.L. & RELIGION 355, 371-76 (1994-95); see also EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE
BILL OF RIGFrrS AND WHAT IT MEAIs TODAY 104 (1957) ("It seems likely that the reference to
Congress was meant to contrast the powers of that body with those of the state governments,
rather than with those of other branches of the federal government.").
52. The word "respecting" in the Establishment Clause is synonymous with "pertaining
to" or "concerning." ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT
AND CURRENT FICTION 9 (1982); DANIEL L. DREISBACK, REAL THREAT AND MERE SIIADOW:
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 79-80 (1987). ChiefJustice Burger was mis-
taken when, without any authority, he remarked that "respecting" meant "a step that could
lead to" an establishment. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1973).
The difficult task of determining the precise topics that fall within the meaning of the
phrase "respecting an establishment of religion"-and hence the subject matter placed out of
the reach of the government's power-is addressed infra Parts VI and VII.B
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Anglican Church in Virginia.53
The vertical restraint was born of federalism,' a concern that the new
national government be kept from intermeddling in a matter that was con-
sidered the sole prerogative of each state.55 There was more to this re-
straint, however, than a continued vesting of power in the states to deal
with the nettlesome matter of religion.' It was also a public proclaimation
of sorts. The First Congress was laying to rest latent but widespread fears
about the new central government by declaring the popular sentiment:
53. DUMBAULD, supra note 51, at 104 ("[E]ven a law prohibiting establishment would be
invalid.").
54. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 32-42
(1998) [hereinafter AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS]; WILBER G. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN
CONSTITrrlONS 9, 11 (1964); Akhil Reed Amar, Some Notes on the Establishment Clause, 2 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1996) [hereinafter Amar, Establishment Clause]; Mark DeWolfe Howe,
The Constitutional Question, in RELIGION AND THE FREE SoCiETY 49, 51-52, 55-57 (1958); Clifton
B. Kruse, The Historical Meaning and Judicial Construction of the Establishment of Religion Clause of
the First Amendment, 2 WASHBURN U. 65, 83-85 (1962); Philip B. Kurland, The Irrelevance of the
Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL I REv. 3,
9 (1978); William K. Lietzau, Rediscovering the Establishment Clause: Federalism and the Rollback of
Incorporation, 39 DEPAUL L REv. 1191, 1201-02, 1204-07 (1990); Michael A- Paulsen, Religion,
Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 317 (1986); William W. Van Alstyne, What is 'An Establishment of
Religion'?, 65 N.C. L. REV. 909, 910-11 (1987).
55. This also meant that the federal courts had no subject matterjurisdiction to hear First
Amendment claims brought against states said to have violated the religious liberty of their
citizens. In one of the first religious liberty cases to come before the Supreme Court, the Court
showed that it understood this limitation on its own power. In Permoli v. Municipality No. 1, 44
U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845), the Court held that neither the First Amendment nor the Constitu-
tion ab initio protected individuals from state restrictions on the exercise of religious beliefs or
practices. The Court first acknowledged that nothing in the Constitution authorized the na-
tional government-the Supreme Court in this instance-to protect individual religious rights
at the state level: "The Constitution makes no provision for protecting the citizens of the re-
spective States in their religious liberties; this is left to the State constitutions and laws .... Id.
at 609. Second, the Court recognized that nowhere in the Constitution (for example, it does
not appear in Article I, Section 10, which collects several structural limits on the states) was
there a structural clause, one parallel to the Establishment Clause restraint on Congress, that
denied to states the authority to legislate or otherwise act on the matter of religion: "[Nlor is
there any inhibition imposed by the Constitution of the United States in this respect on the
States," Id. The Court dismissed the case as raising issues not within its subject matter jurisdic-
tion. Id. at 610.
56. It is important to remember that the constitutions of the states are fundamentally
different from that of the United States:
The government of the United States is one of enumerated powers; the na-
tional Constitution being the instrument which specifies them, and in which
authority should be found for the exercise of any power which the national
government assumes to possess. In this respect it differs from the constitu-
tions of the several States, which are not grants of powers to the States, but
which apportion and impose restrictions upon the powers which the States
inherently possess.
Ti-OM,%s M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH RESr UPON
TIlE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF TI IE S'I* VI'ES OF TIHE AMERICAN UNION 11 (7th ed. 1903) (footnote
omitted).
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although there were state-by-state disagreements concerning official sup-
port for religion, the national government was one of limited delegated
powers and hence had no say in the matter." Accordingly, the resolution of
these thorny disagreements was left to each state, which in 1789-1791 were
experimenting with a variety of arrangements concerning religion.58 Those
still retaining a form of state church were taking tentative steps in the gen-
eral direction of disestablishment.59 Other states were well along in the
progression from toleration of nonconformists to a thoroughgoing sever-
ance of any institutional dependence between church and state.'
The horizontal restraint put in place by the Establishment Clause was
that Congress could not enact legislation operable at the national level6
pertaining to "an establishment of religion."'62 In 1789-1791, a minimalist
57. CURRY, supra note 49, at 193-94, 215-16.
58. Id. at 134-62.
59. Id. at 162-92.
60. Id. at 209-13, 219-22.
61. At the national level the original text of the Constitution already restrained Congress
from requiring any religious test for federal public office. U.S. CONST. art. VI, ci. 3. The states,
however, could impose a religious test for holding state and local offices, and most did so in
the years 1787-1791. CURRY, supra note 49, at 221-22. It was not until Torcaso v. Watkins, 367
U.S. 488 (1961), that the Supreme Court struck down state-imposed religious tests as violative
of the First Amendment.
62. Also at the national level, the Free Exercise Clause required that Congress refrain
from "prohibiting" individual religious exercise. However, in its use of powers delegated else-
where in the Constitution, Congress might inadvertently burden a religious belief or practice.
Examples of such other powers are those to establish and regulate post offices, to regulate
commerce with the Indian Tribes, and to make rules for the regulation of members of Con-
gress. If that happened, Congress-being made aware of the burden--could choose to exempt
the religious nonconformists from the regulatory burden. But the power to exempt would not
derive from the Free Exercise Clause. See DutMBAULD, supra note 51, at 105 ("[N]either the
First Amendment nor any other part of the Bill of Rights operates as a grant of power, either
expressly or by implication; rather it is a restriction upon the exercise of powers already
granted elsewhere.").
Assume, by way of illustration, that in 1791 Congress enacted a law regulating con-
scription into the Army and Navy. Assume also that the Free Exercise Clause did not require a
religious exemption. In exercising its power to oversee the armed forces, U.S. CONST. art. I, §
8, cl. 14, nothing prevented Congress from providing exemptions from the draft for religious
pacifists. Specifically, such an exemption was not barred by the Establishment Clause. See
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450-60 (1971) (holding that limiting the draft exemp-
tion to those objecting to all war does not violate Establishment Clause); The Selective Draft
Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 389 (1918) (upholding the constitutionality of exempting clergy,
theology students, and members of pacifist sects from combat service). Because the power to
adopt such an exemption is not conferred by the Free Exercise Clause, the First Congress
would have had to rely on its powers in Article I, Section 8, Clause 14, to support the exemp-
tion.
As a second illustration, assume that the 1791 Congress enacted legislation to hasten
the delivery of domestic mail. One provision requires that private-sector contract carriers
transit the mail seven days a week. However, employee work schedules are to be adjusted,
upon timely request, to enable an employee's attendance at worship services. Again, nothing
in the Free Exercise Clause warrants such an exercise of power by Congress. Rather, power to
make such a law, including the religious exemption, would have to lie elsewhere, presumably
in Article I, Section 8, Clause 7 of the U.S. Constitution.
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understanding of "an establishment" was a church ordained by law, much
like the Church of England familiar to members of the First Congress. 3
Thus, the most straightforward application of the national-level restraint
was that Congress had no authority to set up a national church, or even to
support financially the full spectrum of American religions on a nonprefer-
ential basis."4
Religious pluralism, albeit a Protestant pluralism, was widespread in
America even in 1791, so there was no more prospect then than now of
Congress actually establishing a national church. However, absent the Es-
tablishment Clause, the possibility of Congress adopting laws within its pur-
view that overly involved the national government with religion could not
be ruled out entirely. So adoption of the horizontal restraint was not an
empty gesture, but a hedge against possible future abuses.
The meaning of laws "respecting an establishment" surely included a
ban at the national level on the sort of legal supports that were closely at-
tendant to a national church. In the popular understanding of the day, an
established church was associated with tax assessments explicitly earmarked
for the support of religion, a parliamentary role in the appointment of
bishops, magisterial enforcement of church discipline, licensure of non-
conformist preachers or their meeting houses, and the imposition of test
oaths and creeds for civil office holders.6 5 These and similar resentments
were first directed at the Church of England and later at colonial estab-
lishments in New England and the southern colonies. 6
These resentments were likely thought within the scope of the Estab-
63. CURRY, supra note 49, at 192, 197-98, 210.
64. Some argue that the Establishment Clause, while prohibiting the establishment of a
single national church, nevertheless authorized Congress to support all religious denomina-
tions on a nonpreferential basis. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 98 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); CORD, supra note 52, at 15; MICHAELJ. MALBIN, RELIGION AND PoLrrics: TiE
INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRsr AMENDMENT 14-17 (1978); Rodney K. Smith,
Nonpreferentialism in Establishment Clause Analysis: A Response to Professor Laycock, 65 ST. JOHN'S
L. R v. 245 (1991). It is unlikely that this was the Framers' intent. In composing the First
Amendment, the Framers were almost exclusively negative in their intent, detailing what the
new central government could not do rather than what it could do. See supra note 49. Non-
preferentialists also argue from the text of the Clause, noting that what is prohibited is legisla-
tion concerning "an" establishment, leaving open the possibility of multiple establishments.
See DUMIBAULD, supra note 51, at 105-06 (noting the argument but finding it unconvincing).
There is a second argument based on originalism. It does not proceed from a claim
that the Establishment Clause affirmatively authorized Congress to aid all religions equally.
Rather, the argument is that in situations where the Constitution elsewhere grants Congress
the power to aid religion on a nonpreferential basis, nothing in the Establishment Clause
prohibits it. This second argument for a limited nonpreferentialism is more difficult to refute.
The Supreme Court first rejected nonpreferentialism in McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tlion, 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948). See also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 612-18 (1992) (Souter,
J., concurring); Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original
Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875 (1988).
65. BERNARD BAILYN, TItE IDEOLOGICAL ORI;INS OFIIE AMRIC.N REVOI.UTION 247-71
(enlarged ed. 1992); CURRY, supra note 49, at 197-221.
66. CURRY, supra note 49, at 197-221.
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lishment Clause's national-level restraint, or so it would originally appear.
However, the new national government was small and preoccupied with
trade, westward expansion, and complicated foreign relations (even foreign
invasions), and thus the scope of this horizontal restraint faced few tests in
the new Republic. The actions of the first generation of federal officials
bound by the Clause demonstrate that certainly all did not believe them-
selves disabled when it came to "mak[ing] ... law [operable at the national
level] respecting.., religion." Both Congress and Presidents took actions
which, at least by present standards, appear establishmentarian. Well-
known examples are land grants in the territories for religious purposes,
the funding of congressional chaplains, Thanksgiving Day prayers and
proclamations, and Indian treaties that paid for education at church-
operated mission schools. 7 These actions throw into confusion the original
scope of the national-level restraint in the Establishment Clause.68
67. See ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICAT'ED TO RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERrAGE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 21-31 (1990) (noting
presidential proclamations for Thanksgiving and national fast days); CHESTERJ. ANTIEAU E71-
AL, FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISI IMENT: FORMATION AND EARLY HIS'TORY OF TIlE FIRST
AMENDMENT RELIGIOUS CLAUSES 159-88 (1964) (noting congressional chaplains, land grant
for Baptist church, and Ihdian treaties that provided money for churches and priests); GERALD
V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 97-104 (1987) (noting congressional
chaplaincies, Thanksgiving proclamations, reenactment of the Northwest Ordinance with its
reservation of land for religious purposes, and missions to Indians); CORD, supra note 52, at
27-47, 51-80 (noting congressional chaplains, Thanksgiving day proclamations, Indian trea-
ties, and land grants for religious societies); I ANSON PHELPS SrOKES, CHURCII AND STIWrE IN
THE UNITED STATES 483-517 (1950) (same).
In contrast to the foregoing congressional aid to religion, President James Madison
vetoed a bill reserving federal land for a Baptist church, which had, through a surveying error,
been built on federal land.
James Madison was a member of the House of Representatives when a chaplaincy was
established. And, as President, he issued Thanksgiving Day proclamations. However, late in
his life, Madison disapproved of congressional chaplains and Thanksgiving Day proclama-
tions. Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in IX THE WRrrINGS
OF JAMES MADISON 98, 100 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) [hereinafter WRrrINGS OF JAMES
MADISON].
Thomas Jefferson, while President, was asked to declare a national day of fasting and
prayer. Jefferson refused, using power-limiting argumentation to the effect that the national
government was "interdicted by the Constitution from intermeddling with religious institu-
tions, their doctrines, discipline, or exercises." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Rev. Samuel
Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), in XI TIE VRrrINGS OF TIIOMASJEFFERSON 428-30 (Andrew A. Lip-
scomb ed., 1905); see also ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra, at 23, 25; LEONARD NV. LEIVY, TIlE
ESABLISIIMENT CLUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRsr AMENDMENT 97-100 (1986) (marshalling
evidence that Madison opposed congressional chaplancy, as well as executive proclamations
on Thanksgiving and fast days). As to the actions of his predecessors, Washington and Adams,
having decreed such days, Jefferson replied that their example was borrowed from state gov-
ernors without careful examination of the differences in the power of the state and federal
governments. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Rev. Samuel Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), in XI TilF
WRITINGS OF THOMASJEFFERSON 428-30 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1905).
68. Stuart D. Poppel framed the question well. First noting that numerous scholars at-
tribute to the Establishment Clause its state-level (federalism) restraint and nothing more,
Poppel continued:
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In order to reconcile words with deeds, some have suggested that the
Framers had in mind a near absolutist restraint on national power by the
phrase "respecting an establishment," but that there soon followed a gap
between lofty principle and actual practice.69 Others have noted that these
departures were few and thus should not be taken as setting a general
rule." Still others suggest that Congress's most problematic deeds were in
the territories and federal "enclaves" over which congressional power was
untempered by state federalism.? Finally, concerning events such as
Thanksgiving proclamations or chaplaincy prayer, there may have been a
failure to distinguish between sentiments the culture found most agreeable
and the promotion of religion, specifically Protestant Christianity.72 It
would have been natural for many to have thought a few such pieties were
religiously neutral, those common to Protestantism generally, in a society
where Catholics and Jews were marginalized and other religions effectively
nonexistent. So it could be argued that any lack of sensitivity to religious
diversity in the early Republic should not set a precedent. 71 Others counter
that the most straightforward explanation is that to its authors in the First
Congress "an establishment" had little scope beyond prohibiting a national
church. 4
This leaves us with a dilemma: how to fashion standards for the national
government that accounts for these early actions by Congress, if in fact these
actions can be legitimated. In short, if religion was to be no business of the
national government, then what justified the actions of the first few Con-
gresses?
Stuart D. Poppel, Federalism, Fundamental Fairness, and the Religion Clauses, 25 CUMB. L. REV.
247, 287-88 (1994-95) (footnotes omitted).
69. Historian Thomas J. Curry harmonizes the disparity in the actions of the First Con-
gress with more separatistic notions of church-state relations as the not-uncommon gap be-
tween declared principle and actual practice. CURRY, supra note 49, at 217-19, 221; see also
Thomas C. Berg, Religion Clause Anti-Theories, 72 NOTRE DAME L REv. 693, 716-18 (1997);
Laycock, supra note 64, at 913-14.
Garry Wills interjects the interesting thought that disestablishment was so new and
experimental in the history of state building that Congress, having just promulgated this novel
principle, was understandably slow "to sift the dangers and the blessings of the new arrange-
ment, to learn how best to live with it, to complete the logic of its workings." GARRY WILLS,
UNDER GOD: RELIGION AND AMERIcAN POLIrIcs 383 (1990).
70. LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 265 (2d ed. 1967); see also Kurt T. Lash,
The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARiz.
SI. L.J. 1085, 1096-98 (1995) (suggesting an interpretation of these congressional actions as
not an exercise of legislative power over the subject of religion; hence, the actions were not
necessarily inconsistent with an "interpretation of the Establishment Clause as representing no
power to the federal government and reserving the same to the states").
71. AMAR, BILL. OF RIGIHTIS, supra note 54, at 248-49.
72. See CURRY, supra note 49, at 219 ("The vast majority of Americans assumed that theirs
was a Christian, i.e. Protestant, country, and they automatically expected that government
would uphold the commonly agreed on Protestant ethos and morality.").
73. Douglas Laycock, Original Intent and the Constitution Today, in Tilm FIRS' FREEDOM:
REI.IGION &'rle BILLOF RIcmr s 87, 103-05 (James E. Wood,Jr. ed., 1990).
74. BRADLEY, supra note 67, at 3; JAMES M. O'NEILL, RELIGION AND EDUQ'I'ION UNDER
TIHE CONSTIUTI'U'ON 56 (1949); Mark E. Chopko, Intentional Values and the Public Interest-A
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These competing ways of interpreting official acts during America's
early nationhood have led to considerable debate, the results of which are
inconclusive. The resolution of that debate, however, does not affect the
argument of this Article: namely, from its inception the Establishment
Clause-whatever the intended scope of its national-level restraint-had
the role of a structural clause rather than a rights-based clause.
Although scholars debate which laws were barred to national action by
the Establishment Clause, there is greater agreement concerning the nature
of past harms that supporters of the Clause sought to prevent.7" That is,
Plea for Consistency in Church-State Relations, 39 DEPAUL L REv. 1143, 1165 (1990); Willaim C.
Porth & Robert P. George, Trimming the Ivy: A Bicentennial Re-Examination of the Establishment
Clause, 90 W. VA. L REV. 109, 136-37 (1987).
75. In a helpful simplification of the historic moment when the no-establishment princi-
ple was adopted, Professor Witte notes that there were essentially two opposing religious
groups (the Congregational Puritans and the Protestant pietists) and two opposing political
philosophies (the civic republicans and the Enlightenment rationalists).
Both religious groups believed that a moral and self-disciplined people were vital to
the preservation of the young Republic, and that religion was the primary source of these
citizen virtues. However, Puritans believed that the government therefore had a vital interest
in fostering the work of the church. Contrariwise, the Protestant pietists believed that a genu-
ine and uncorrupted religion required that government not interfere in the work of the
church.
The civic republicans-like the Puritans-urged that the government take an active
role in religion because stability of the new Nation depended on a high morality nurtured by
the church. On the other hand, Enlightenment rationalists focused on the potential of sectari-
anism to divide the civic polity and sought a government directed by reason. So the rationalists
sought an end to political disruption caused by religious disagreement, whereas the Protestant
pietists sought to halt the government's interference in religious affairs.
The adoption of a Constitution that made no reference to God and required that
there be no religious test for federal office, and the adoption of the Establishment Clause two
years later, were unquestionably victories for the allied efforts of Protestant pietists and En-
lightenment rationalists. The rationalists and pietists sought the same means, namely dises-
tablishment, to achieve different ends. Both got their way. But it is easy to overstate the effect
of this accomplishment. Because the Puritans and civic republicans were not driven from the
field of engagement, all four of these forces continued to exert considerable influence during
the early Republic.
At a minimum the victories of the pietists/rationalist alliance, initially accomplished at
the level of the laws of the states, were indelible markers laid down along a path of gradual
evolution from established church to the institutional separation of church and state. John
Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American Constitutional Experiment, 71
NOIRE DAME L. REV. 371, 377-88 (1991). No figure better stands as the great synthesizer of
the two views of pietism and rationalism than James Madison, borrowing as he did from both
schools of thought. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: Ti 1E AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 61-91 (1998) (profiling the life and thought of Madison
on religious freedom and church-state relations); see also DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH-
STATE CONSTrFUTIONAL ISSUES: MAKING SENSE OF TIlE ESTABI.ISItMENT CLAUSE 55-58 (1991)
(stating that Enlightenment thinkers, allied with Baptists and Quakers, sought the same politi-
cal result but for different reasons); Berg, supra note 69, at 709-13, 730-34 (urging the adop-
tion of "voluntarism," the theory that arose out of Protestant pietists' views formulated in
resistance to establishmentarianism); Douglas Laycock, The Benefits of the Establishment Clause,
42 DEPAUL L. RFV. 373, 374 (1992) ("It is important to remember that the votes for disestab-
lishment came from evangelicals. The votes came from Baptists, Presbyterians, Methodists,
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there is more agreement when the focus is not on the offenses peculiar to
the period of 1789-1791, but on the broader concern over the harms that
had made the interaction of political society and religion difficult as West-
ern civilization emerged from the Middle Ages. 76 Those harms were two-
fold: the political tyranny and civil-sectarian divisions that accompany the
establishment of a single church, and the loss of integrity in religion (and
its ecclesiastical organizations) when it becomes dependent on govern-
mental support." These are the previously mentioned twin harms to the
civilas and religare/ekklesia,78 to which this Article returns later.79
In the early Republic, the word "establishment" gradually assumed a
broader popular definition (as opposed to its definition for First Amend-
ment purposes) than that of a church formally ordained by law. This evolu-
tion in meaning was entirely at the state and local level, where nearly all the
debate and change were taking place. Indeed, in the year the First
Amendment was ratified, the struggle for disestablishment in the states was
already in midstride. That grassroots struggle spanned a hundred years
from the First Great Awakening to the final disestablishment by Massachu-
setts in 1833.80
and Quakers.").
76. Much the same idea was articulated by Justice Brennan in School Dist. of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963), as he explained his counsel against "too literal
a quest for the advice of the Founding Fathers" as follows:,
A more fruitful inquiry... is whether the practices here challenged.., tend
to promote the type of interdependence between religion and state which
the First Amendment was designed to prevent. Our task is to translate the
majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights, conceived as part of the pattern of
liberal government in the eighteenth century, into concrete restraints on
officials dealing with the problems of the twentieth century ....
Id. at 236 (internal quotation and footnote omitted).
77. 1 WILLIAM G. McLOUGFII.IN, NEWv ENGLAND DISSENr 1630-1833: THE BAPTISTS AND
THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND S'IWrE 613-84 (1971); WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE FIRST1"
LIBERTY: RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 153-90 (1986); MARK A. NOLL, ONE
NATION UNDER GOD? CHRISTIAN FArrTH AND POLrlcAL ACTION IN AMERICA 65-67 (1988);
Laycock, supra note 45, at 1049-66; Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Under-
standing of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L REV. 1410, 1436-43 (1990).
Mark DeWolfe Howe's slim volume, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 5-19, 25-31
(1965), is responsible for bringing to the attention of modem scholars the essential role of
Protestant pietists in securing the Establishment Clause in the First Amendment. Professor
Howe properly criticized the Supreme Court of the 1950s and early 1960s for attributing this
achievement to the Enlightenment rationalists alone. Id. at 135-57, 167-76.
78. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 252-60, 400-13 and accompanying text.
80. ADAMS & EMMERICI, supra note 67, at 7-20; HOWE, supra note 77, at 8-9; see also
WILLIAM H. MARNE.L, TIlE FIRST AMENDMENT: THE HISrORY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN
AMERICA 93-104, 116-44 (1964) (noting the slow and often painful process of disestablishment,
especially in New England); 1 McLOUGI[LIN, supra note 77, at xvi ("f]his pietistic version of
separation was essentially a pragmatic not an absolutist one; that it evolved slowly and almost
opportunistically over the two centuries from 1630 to 1830, gradually expanding its position
both legally and theoretically as historical circumstances permitted or required."); PFEFFER,
supra note 70, at 141 (dating the completion of the "evolution of the American principle" to
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During the nineteenth century, the progressive opinion in state gov-
ernments regarded religion as an institution that should be supported vol-
untarily and thus not subject to the heavy hand of governmental involve-
ment.81 Religion was deregulated from ecclesiastical control as well, and-
no longer controlled by elites-became classless and thereafter spread
mightily among common people.8 2 Although religion had been disestab-
lished, state leaders were not taking a stand against religion. Indeed, the
free exercise of religion warranted, in their view, specific state constitu-
tional protection. Not inconsistent with these progressive sentiments to
limit any official role for religion in government was the widely held belief
that a democracy could endure only if composed of an educated and moral
citizenry, and that religion was the primary source of the needed moral
teaching.83 By midcentury, the meaning of "establishment" at the state-law
level, especially state constitutional law, had evolved into notions of indi-
vidual freedom and equality among sects.84 Formal institutional ties be-
tveen religion and the state governments had been severed and many mu-
tual dependencies were dissolved. Yet state and local governments re-
mained highly subject to the influence of religion-albeit indirectly so and
from the ground up.
8 5
the Massachusettes amendment adopted in 1833); 1 STOKES, supra note 67, at 358-444 (setting
forth an account of the ongoing struggle for disestablishment in the states).
81. CURRY, supra note 49, at 222; DRAKEMAN, supra note 75, at 83-89; Witte, supra note
75, at 378-88. Writing in 1832, James Madison surveyed and commented favorably concerning
this progress from established church to voluntarism in the middle states, New England, and
the Southern states. Letter from James Madison to Rev. Adams, in IX WRrrINGS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 67, at 484, 486.
82. NATIHAN 0. HArCH, THE DEMOCRATIZrAION OF AMERICAN CIIRISTIIANrrY 4-16, 21-27,
35 (1989).
83. ADAMS & EMMERICII, supra note 67, at 72; ANTIrEAU ET AL, supra note 67, at 187-88;
CURRY, supra note 49, at 203, 219; MILLER, supra note 77, at 244-46; NOLL, supra note 77, at
64-69; STOKES, supra note 67, at 555-56.
84 AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 54, at 246-54 (acknowledging that the Establish-
ment Clause initially was a structural restraint embodying federalism, and arguing that the
nineteenth century perception of "respecting an establishment" at the territorial and state-law
level had evolved away from federalism and vaguely toward individual freedom and equality).
85. Alexis de Tocqueville captured the sense of the matter when he observed in the
America of the 1830s:
Religion in America takes no direct part in the government of society, but it
must be regarded as the first of their political institutions . . . . I do not
know whether all Americans have a sincere faith in their religion-for who
can search the human heart?-but I am certain that they hold it to be indis-
pensable to the maintenance of republican institutions. This opinion is not
peculiar to a class of citizens or to a party, but it belongs to the whole nation
and to every rank of society.
The Americans combine the notions of Christianity and of liberty so inti-
mately in their minds that it is impossible to make them conceive the one
without the other ....
On my arrival in the United States the religious aspect of the country was
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Until the first third of the twentieth century, the state-level restraint
and the national-level restraint were still securely tucked away in the inter-
stices of the Establishment Clause. However, the slow but steady acceptance
of greater institutional separation of religion and government at the state
level was uncritically projected onto the federal Establishment Clause and
assumed to be the meaning of "an establishment" at the national level as
well.' Thus, the understanding of "establishment" in the First Amendment
was expanded following the pattern that had already occurred in many
states. The practical effect of this development was quite limited, however,
because the national-level restraint in the Clause was rarely brought into
contention during the first half of this century.8' The record of a mere
handful of pre-Everson lawsuits in which the Establishment Clause was in-
the first thing that struck my attention; and the longer I stayed there, the
more I perceived the great political consequences resulting from this new
state of things. In France I had almost always seen the spirit of religion and
the spirit of freedom marching in opposite directions. But in America I
found they were intimately united and that they reigned in common over the
same country. My desire to discover the causes of this phenomenon in-
creased from day to day. In order to satisfy it I questioned the members of
all the different sects .... I found that [American Catholic clergy] all attrib-
uted the peaceful dominion of religion in their country mainly to the sepa-
ration of church and state. I do not hesitate to affirm that during my stay in
America I did not meet a single individual, of the clergy or the laity, who
was not of the same opinion on this point.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 305-08 (Francis Bowen & Phillips Bradley
eds., Knopf 1945) (1851).
86. For operative examples of this "projecting onto," consider the arguments in two turn-
of-the-century cases: Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908) (upholding a congressional dis-
bursement of Indian tribal funds held in trust by the federal government for the operation on
a reservation, and Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (upholding the use of federal funds
for the construction of new buildings at a religious hospital located in the District of Colum-
bia). In both cases the complainants argued that the Establishment Clause was violated by
congressional funding of programs operated by religious organizations. In reply, the United
States attorney made no attempt to defend the federal government's actions by arguing that
the meaning of "establishment" was limited to a national church and its auxiliary props such as
religious taxes and test oaths. See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text. Rather, litigants
on both sides, and the Supreme Court as well, simply presumed the broader definition of
"establishment." These two cases were won by the federal government on the far narrower
basis that the Establishment Clause did not extend to the particular forms of financial support
then before the Court.
87. National-level conflicts involving the Establishment Clause have been so few that it
was not until the mid-1980s when the Court first struck down an act of Congress as violative of
the Establishment Clause. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (holding unconstitutional
the delivery of special education services on the campus of independent religious schools).
This is the only instance of congressional legislation fMlling to the Court's no-establishment
analysis, and Aguilar was recently overruled in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). It is
extraordinary that, as things stand today, the Supreme Court has only once struck down as
violative of the Establishment Clause an action of a federal official or an act of Congress, and
that one instance has since been overruled. Thus, Congress has a perfect win-loss record vis-A-
vis the Establishment Clause.
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voked against the national government bears this out."8 At the time of Ever-
son the New Deal, with.its growth in federal domestic programs, was still
being adjusted to. Most legislation that really touched people where they
lived was that of states and municipalities. Thus, citizens practiced their
religion and were affected, if at all, by local school boards, local city coun-
cils, and local judges. For citizens who took religion seriously, these local
officials were also their like-minded neighbors and often fellow parishion-
ers.
This is where matters stood approaching the middle of this century. It
was 1947 when the Supreme Court handed down Everson, a decision that
continues to roil relations between government and religion to this day.
III. THE INCORPORATION DEBATE
The state-level (or vertical) restraint dropped out of the Establishment
Clause when the Clause was incorporated through the "liberty" provision in
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 The Supreme
Court accomplished this, without debate or even seeming appreciation of
what it was doing," when it ignored the federalist limitation in the frame-
88. In The Selective Draft Law' Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918), the Court summarily rejected an
argument that religious exemption from the military draft for ministers and theological stu-
dents, as well as for members of certain pacifistic sects, was an establishment of religion. Id. at
389-90. In Watson v.Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871), the Court held that courts must defer
to the decrees of ecclesiastical adjudicatories concerning the resolution of religious disputes.
Without explicitly referring to the Establishment Clause, the Wason Court said that "the rule
of action which should govern the civil courts [is] founded in a broad and sound view of the
relations of church and state under our system of laws." Id. at 727. These two holdings yield
limited insight into the Clause's meaning.
Five of the Court's opinions before Everson gave only passing reference to the Estab-
lishment Clause in obiter dicta. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943); Min-
nersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 593 (1940); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
303 (1940); Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 265-66 (1934) (Cardozo,
J., concurring); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 345 (1890). But these five cases shed no light
on the Clause's meaning.
Hence, prior to the Everson decision in 1947, in only two cases had the Supreme
Court squarely addressed the meaning of the Establishment Clause. In Quick Bear, 210 U.S. at
81-82, the Court sustained a congressional use of Indian tribal funds, held in trust by the
government and disbursed to pay for expenses at a Roman Catholic mission school chosen by
the parents of the Indian students. In Bradfield, 175 U.S. at 295-300, the Court upheld the use
of federal funds for constructing a building for a Roman Catholic hospital located in the Dis-
trict of Columbia.
89. The Due Process Clause provides, "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
90. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). Legal historian, Mark DeWolfe
Howe, stated the matter this way:
By its re-examination of the purposes of the First Amendment [in Everson
and McCollum] the Court imposed, perhaps quite properly, special limita-
tions on the powers of the national government which . . . gain their
strength from concepts of federalism rather than from principles of individ-
ual liberty. Yet it then proceeded, without discussion, to make those special,
non-libertarian limitations on the national government effective against the
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work of the Clause."' Despite the criticism that ensued immediately after
Everson was handed down,92 sixteen years passed before one of the Court's
Justices even sought to mount a serious defense of the incorporation of the
Establishment Clause." Ignoring federalism in the Clause was an act of
sheer judicial will which is still debated by academicians today.94
Unlike the impact on federalism, the restraint in the Establishment
Clause operable at the national (or horizontal) level survived the incorpo-
states as if they were essential to the scheme of ordered liberty prescribed by
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court did not
seem to be aware of the fact that some legislative enactments respecting an
establishment of religion affect most remotely, if at all, the personal rights
of religious liberty.
Howe, supra note 54, at 55.
91. In his dissent in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 310
(1963), Justice Stewart was resigned to incorporation of the Establishment Clause, but he
noted that "it is not without irony that a constitutional provision evidently designed to leave
the States free to go their own way should now have become a restriction upon their auton-
omy."
92. JOSEPH H. BRADY, CONFUSION TWICE CONFOUNDED: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND
THE SUPREME COURT, AN HISTORICAL STUDY 51-126 (1955); HOwE, supra note 77, at 138-39;
Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3,
14-21 (1949); Howe, supra note 54, at 55; Snee, supra note 33, at 400-05; see also supra note 54.
93. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 253-58 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan argued
that the religious liberty protected by the Free Exercise Clause (incorporated and made appli-
cable to the states in Cantwell, 310 U.S. 296) would not be fully realized if the Establishment
Clause prohibited only establishments by Congress. Thus, he concluded, the no-establishment
principle must also be incorporated and applied to the states. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 257-58
(Brennan, J., concurring). This makes no sense. An individual can most assuredly enjoy a full
and equal right to religious liberty in a nation with an established church. Citizens of the
United Kingdom, for example, have done so since the late seventeenth century. See also PAUL
G. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 56-57 (1964) (arguing that the Fourteenth
Amendment may only prevent states from passing religious laws that violate personal or prop-
erty rights); SIEGAN, supra note 33, at 122 (maintaining that Justice Brennan's view that any
government support of religion is a violation of individual freedom is incorrect).
94, See, e.g., CORD, supra note 52, at 84-101; DREISBACH, supra note 52, at 77-82, 89-96;
LEVY, supra note 67, at 165-85; SIEGAN, supra note 33, at 118-23; RODNEY K. SMITH, PUBLIC
PRAYER AND THE CONSTITUTION: A CASE STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 133-70
(1987); Amar, Establishment Clause, supra note 54, at 1-14; Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General
Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 1115, 1140-42 (1988); Lietzau, supra note
54; Paulsen, supra note 54, at 321-23; Note, supra note 33.
While conceding that the Establishment Clause when adopted was not an individual
liberty, Professor Lash has argued that in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted, the congressional understanding of the Clause was reconceptualized as a personal
right. Lash, supra note 70. Accordingly, concludes Lash, it was proper for the Everson Court to
incorporate the no-establishment principle as a liberty. Lash's thesis is challenged in Jonathan
P. Brose, In Birmingham They Love the Governor: Why the Fourteenth Amendment Does Not Incorpo-
rate the Establishment Clause, 14 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1 (1998). After review of the relevant history
in the post-Civil War Congress concerning the text and purpose of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, as well as debate in that Congress over other religion questions, Brose concludes that
no-establishment continued to be viewed as a power-limiting clause rather than as a rights
clause. Id. at 17-29. Brose takes up each of Professor Lash's points and finds them far less
plausible than a straightforward reading of the statements of the Amendment's floor managers
and supporters. Id. at 20 n.83, 21 n.86.
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ration process, indeed, did so without being watered down. The horizontal
restraint's survival was not a foregone conclusion. The Due Process Clause
incorporates only "libert[ies]" that are deemed by the Court to be funda-
mental rights. Accordingly, in order to make a power-limiting clause suit-
able for absorption into the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court had to
strain in order to squeeze a structural clause into a "liberty" mold. 5 The
critics again objected, this time to the Court's ham-handed treatment of the
fundamental-rights principle" as if a power-limiting clause was inter-
changeable with a rights-based clause such as freedom of speech or free
exercise of religion.97
The national-level restraint did not merely survive incorporation
through the Due Process Clause at full strength, its field of operation vastly
expanded. The original task of the Establishment Clause-to separate the
competencies of the new national government from matters within the
95. Justice Brennan, concurring in Schempp, 374 U.S. at 256, sought to rationalize the
dressing up of a structural clause in the garb of a personal right by pointing out that the no-
establishment restraint also protects individual liberty. It is true, of course, that structure can
protect personal rights. But structure achieves this result only as a by-product of pursuing its
task of limiting power. Structure and rights function quite differently. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 442-46. Accordingly, it does not follow that a power-limiting clause can be treated
the same as a rights-conferring clause.
96. Corwin, supra note 92, at 9-10, 19; Daniel L Dreisbach, Everson and the Command of
History: The Supreme Court, Lessons in History, and the Church-State Debate in America, in EVERSON
REvISTED: RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND LAW AT THE CROSSROADS 23, 32 (Jo Rene Formicola
& Hubert Morken eds., 1997) ("The Everson Court, critics complained, turned this principle
[of federalism] on its head by incorporation (or nationalizing) the nonestablishment provision
into the word 'liberty' in the Fourteenth Amendment due process of law clause .... "); Howe,
supra note 54, at 53-57, 61; Kruse, supra note 54, at 127-30; Kurland, supra note 54, at 9-10;
Snee, supra note 33, at 406; Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., Establishment According to Engel, 76
HARV. L. REV. 25, 41 (1962) ("To get the establishment clause 'incorporated' into [the Four-
teenth Amendment's] words calls for quite a constructional wrench."). Although the words
"rights" and "liberties" are not interchangeable, they are closely related. Liberty expresses the
belief that individuals (including groups of individuals) have a right to be protected from
certain fundamental restrictions. To call something a "right" means that the government will
recognize and enforce one's belief that you have a liberty. Rights and liberties are not to be
confused with a structural restraint on congressional power.
97. More conciliatory critics argued for incorporation of no-establishment only insofar as
the Clause had the effect of indirectly protecting individual religious rights. See Howe, supra
note 54, at 55-57, 61; see also Schempp, 374 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (appearing to
suggest such an approach). This approach accepts the Court's overlooking the federalism
element to the Establishment Clause, but rejects the extension of the structural restraint to the
states.
One problem with the conciliatory approach is that it waters down the Establishment
Clause. Moreover, in some measure, it reduces the operation of the Establishment Clause to
securing rights already protected by the Free Exercise Clause. The Free Exercise Clause was
incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Cantwell, 3 10
U.S. 296. It makes little sense to also incorporate the Establishment Clause if it is superfluous
to rights already protected by the Free Exercise Clause. The only type of case that this wa-
tered-down Establishment Clause could remedy that a Free Exercise Clause could not remedy
is coercion directed at atheists and agnostics as in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). See
infra note 425.
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competency of religion-had grown. Added to its tasks was that of separat-
ing the comparable acts of state and local governments from religion. Ac-
cordingly, following Everson, what has been called here the "national-level
restraint," most commentators termed "separation of church and state" (or
simply "separationism").9s Implied in separationism is a model of dual ju-
risdictions: a structural clause separates two competencies and thereby or-
ders relations between religion (including ecclesiastical orgainzations) and
government (national, state, and local).
At the level of local governmental affairs, especially public schooling
and ceremonial theism in civic life, separationism in its more absolutist
forms hardly represented a well-grounded American consensus in 1947.'
Moreover, because separationism was being extended to state and local law
in a nondemocratic fashion (that is, by judicial decision), opposition quickly
arose. Early criticism of incorporation came from those who saw in Everson,
and the decision a year later in McCollum v. Board of Education, an extreme
view of government-religion relations---a separationism tantamount to its
own religious creed. An influential spokesman for this criticism, Father
98. The term "separationism" is used here advisedly. It carries considerable baggage, not
the least of which is that "separationism" is confused with a militantly secular separationism
that would wholly privatize religion and disenfranchise religious values in governmental af-
fairs. Nevertheless, use of "separationism" is so longstanding that it is hard to avoid. So I opt
to use the term, but then endeavor to clarify what separationism does not mean along with its
proper implications. To begin, the "separation of government and religion" has never meant
the separation of religious values from lawmaking and the formation of public policy. The
Founders contemplated just the opposite. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 213 ("The fact that the
Founding Fathers believed devoutly that there was a God and that the unalienable rights of
man were rooted in Him is clearly evidenced in their writings, from the Mayflower Compact to
the Constitution itself."); supra text accompanying note 83.
99. In mid-twentieth century America, prayer and other forms of ceremonial theism were
very much a part of the political and social culture. See, e.g., Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in
America, 96 DAEDALUS 1 (1967). Moreover, in many American communities public education
reflected Protestant values and schools often engaged in prayer and Bible-reading. See 1
STOKES, supra note 67, at 551-53 (discussing congressional chaplains, Thanksgiving Day proc-
lamations, and grants for religious societies). See generally ROBERT T. HANDY, A CHRISTIAN
AMERICA: PROTESTANT HOPES AND HISTORICAL REALITIES 185-203 (2d ed. 1984).
100. Those who opposed Everson and McCollum immediately saw that the task of the Es-
tablishment Clause, as defimed by the Supreme Court, went to matters other than the protec-
tion of individual religious freedom. Their response was to argue that Everson and McCollum
were mistaken because no-establishment was merely instrumental (a means to an end) to indi-
vidual religious freedom. See Wilber Katz, The Case of Religious Liberty, in RELIGION IN AMERICA
95, 97 (John Cogley ed., 1958) ("The principle of church-state separation is an instrumental
principle."); John Courtney Murray, Lau' or Prepossessions?, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 32
(1949) [hereinafter Murray, Prepossessions] ("[S]eparation of church and state ... appears as
instrumental to freedom, therefore as a relative, not an absolute in its own right."); Thomas B.
Keehn, Church-State Relations, SOC. ACTION, Nov. 15, 1948, at 31 ("Separation of church and
state, then, is simply a means, a technique, a policy to implement the principle of religious
freedom."); George E. Reed, Separation of Church and State-Its Real Meaning!, CATH. ACTION,
Mar. 1949, at 10 ("Unless the current doctrinaire formula of separation of Church and State is
abandoned as a basis for judicial and legislative action, we may ultimately witness the death of
religious liberty and with it separation of Church and State in the true meaning of the term,
for it is conditioned upon religious liberty.").
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John Courtney Murray, opposed the doctrinaire separationism explicated
by Justices Black, Rutledge, and Frankfurter, each of whom wrote sepa-
rately in at least one of these two cases. Murray insisted that the Establish-
ment Clause did not codify a Protestant pietistic notion of relations between
government and religion.'"'
Murray began by assuming that these three Justices accurately charac-
terized the views of James Madison on government-religion relations, 2 a
proposition that others have later cast doubt upon.'03 Murray then pro-
ceeded to reject Madison's views as having "poured into the First Amend-
ment" of 1789-1791 a perspective on church and state that Murray called
"an irredeemable piece of sectarian dogmatism.""° The prepossessions to
which Murray objected were that religion is a wholly private and individu-
alistic matter, that religion (now privatized) is not necessary for political
society to be a "good" society, that there should be neither aid to religion
nor any form of official relations between religion and government, and
that any contributions, however small, of support to churches is harmful to
religion because religion is worthy of respect only when "free" of govern-
mental aid and its attendant restrictions.'0 5
These views threatened Murray's perspective, rooted as it was in Ro-
man Catholicism. Murray argued that the Establishment Clause took no
doctrinaire position on the proper role of relations between religion and
government,'ta and it certainly did not make of the church a mere volun-
tary association subordinate to the state.107 He blamed Baptists and other
Protestant pietists,"'0 along with the latter-day secularists and their natural-
101. Murray, Prepossessions, supra note 100, at 23. Father Murray later elaborated on this
theme in JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON
THEAMERICAN PROPOSITION 58-85 (1964) [hereinafter MURRAY, TRUTHS).
102. Murray, Prepossessions, supra note 100, at 27-28.
103. See MILLER, supra note 77, at 134-35, 217-21, 290-91. Professor Miller gives an ac-
count of Father Murray when both were participants in conferences held under the auspices of
The Fund for the Republic. A balanced reading of James Madison, unlike that of the Court in
Everson and McCollum, would not have placed Madison in the camp of the secularists given
their anticlericalism and near hostility to traditional religion. Id. at 134-35.
104. Murray, Prepossessions, supra note 100, at 30.
105. Id. at 28-29.
106. MURRAY, TRUTHS, supra note 101, at 63, 79-84.
107. Id. at 60, 62, 76-79.
108. The Baptist cause for religious liberty is sympathetically accounted for by a denomi-
national historian in WILLIAM R. ESTEP, REVOLUTION WITHIN THE REVOLUTION: THE FIRST
AMENDMENT IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 1612-1789 (1990). Additional accounts of the views of
Protestant pietists are found at ELWYN A. SMITH, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE UNITED STATES:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHURCH-STATE THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 15-26
(1972); William G. McLoughlin, The Balkcom Case (1782) and the Pietistic Theory of Separation of
Church and State, 24 WM. & MARY Q. 267 (1967). Modem statements of the Protestant pietistic
view of religious freedom and church-state relations are found in STEWART A. NEWMAN, A
FREE CHURCH PERSPECTIVE: A STUDY IN ECCLESIOLOGY (1986); Franklin H. Littell, The Basis of
Religious Liberty in Christian Belief 6J. CHURCH & ST. 132 (1964); Niels H. Soe, The Theological
Basis of Religious Liberty, 10 ECUMENICAL REV. 40 (1958).
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istic humanism, for trying to hijack the Establishment Clause."°9 Murray
maintained that during 1789-1791 the Founders were not responding to
theological presuppositions but to the pragmatic necessity of forming a new
nation from a religiously diverse people." The First Amendment, he ar-
gued, was a common pact in which Americans agreed to work out religious
differences peacefully, utilizing the available machinery of dialogue and
democratic government. In a memorable turn of phrase,. Murray summa-
rized his case: the Establishment Clause does not embody articles of faith
but articles of peace."' It would be ironic, Murray insisted, if the Establish-
ment Clause became the vehicle for imposing a new "piece of ecclesiology"
on Americans, for then "the very article that bars any establishment of re-
ligion would somehow establish one.""' 2
The Supreme Court later backed away from Everson's and McCollum's
absolutist rhetoric, such as faith being a wholly private matter" 3 best sepa-
109. MURRAY, TRUTHS, supra note 101, at 59-63; see also Nancy H. Fink, The Establishment
Clause According to the Supreme Court: The Mysterious Eclipse of Free Exercise Values, 27 CATH. U. L
REV. 207, 260 (1978) ("To the extent that the establishment clause continues to be infused
with the Protestant ideal of complete separation of public and private spheres of activity the
establishment clause will stand as a barrier to true religious freedom for millions of [non-
Protestant] Americans.").
110. MURRAY, TRUTHS, supra note 101, at 67-69, 72-75.
11 I. Id. at 58, 60, 68-70, 85; see also MILLER, supra note 77, at 134-35, 218-21 (discussing
Father Murray and offering a gentle rebuke of Murray's argumentation). Murray, whose views
rejected those held by the Roman Catholic Church in the 1950s, was influenced by his Ameri-
can experience with religious freedom as shaped by Protestantism. George Weigel, Religious
Freedom: The First Human Rights, in THE STRUCTURE OF FREEDOM: CORRELATIONS, CAUSES &
CAUTIONS 34, 46 (Richard John Neuhaus ed., 1991). The Roman Church since Murray and
Vatican II has evolved yet further in the direction of acknowledging the free will of persons
capable of deciding for themselves matters of faith. Id. at 47-49. "[I]n one sense, we can say
that the magisterium of the Roman Catholic Church is catching up with Roger Williams." Id.
at 52.
112. MURRAY, TRUTHS, supra note 101, at 60, 63; see also Neuhaus, supra note 44, at 1
(arguing that the no-establishment principle was intended to be subordinate to religious lib-
erty within a single religion clause). Father Neuhaus's view makes no-establishment instru-
mental to the free exercise of religion. See also Murray, Prepossessions, supra note 100, at 30,41.
Implicit in Father Neuhaus's essay is that the Supreme Court has not confined the
Establishment Clause to the protection of religious liberty, as he would prefer. He is correct
that the Court has often applied the Clause to protect economic and other nonreligious inter-
ests. See infra notes 423-25, 431-33 and accompanying text (describing such cases). Father
Neuhaus concluded from this observation that the Court has erred. This Article argues that
the Court is not mistaken in viewing the Establishment Clause as having a task independent of
the Free Exercise Clause. See infra notes 441-46 and accompanying text. This follows because
the Clause is structural, limiting the power of government to cross the boundary into sphere of
religion. What does not necessarily follow, of course, is agreement that in its modem cases the
Court has always correctly located that boundary between government and religion. See infra
notes 345-55 and accompanying text (describing how Jimmy Swaggert Ministries v. California Bd.
of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990), would be decided differently under a view that the Estab-
lishment Clause is structural). That is, I agree with the Court that no-establishment is struc-
tural, without agreeing with where the Court has located that boundary in all its decisions.
113. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384
(1993) (striking down school policy that denied a church the use of public facilities for showing
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rated from civil society and public affairs, that there can be no official acts
that take religion (as distinct from nonreligion, or even irreligion) into spe-
cial account,"' and that "not one pence" is to be spent in aid of religion." 5
Later scholars have brought balance to the Court's historical accounts re-
garding James Madison and Thomas Jefferson. 116 Nevertheless, Everson's
expansion of the scope of the no-establishment principle to state and local
concerns was profound because separationism is not neutral as to either
political theory (the nature and role of the state) or ecclesiology (the nature
and role of the church). Rather, an Establishment Clause that parses society
into dual competencies necessarily embodies a substantive choice. Inherent
within this choice is a value-laden judgment that certain areas of the human
condition best lie within the purview of religion, that other areas of life
properly lie within the power of civil government, and that still others are
shared by religion and government or remain with the people."
17
This Article does not argue for a reversal of the Supreme Court's in-
corporation decision in Everson. For purposes of my argument, reversal is
neither required nor is it obviously desirable." 8 The Court, in any event,
a religious film); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (striking down state university re-
strictions on student religious organizations meeting on-campus for prayer and worship);
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (striking down state prohibition on clergy holding
public office).
114. See, e.g., Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding
an exemption for religious organizations from nondiscrimination requirements in employ-
ment laws); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (upholding a religious exemption
from military draft for those who oppose all war).
115. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (upholding federal funding of faith-
based counseling centers addressing teenage sexuality); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs.
for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (upholding vocational rehabilitation aid to a blind individ-
ual attending a religious school of higher education to become a youth pastor); Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding a state income tax deduction for parochial school edu-
cational expenses).
116. See ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 67, at 21-26 (discussing Jefferson and Madison);
BRADY, supra note 92, at 17-26 (discussing Madison); id. at 26-29, 174-84 (discussing Jeffer-
son); Daniel L. Dreisbach, In Pursuit of Religious Freedom: Thomas Jefferson's Church-State Viwus
Revisited, in RELIGION, PUBLIC LIFE, AND THE AMERICAN POLrrv 74 (Luis E. Lugo ed., 1994)
(discussing Jefferson); Charles J. Emmerich, The Enigma ofJames Madison on Church and State,
in RELIGION, PUBLIC LIFE, AND THE AMERICAN POLITY, supra, at 51 (discussing Madison);
Meiklejohn, supra note 42, at 68-71 (discussing Jefferson); MILLER, supra note 77, at 79-150
(discussing Madison); A. JAMES REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 89-96. (dis-
cussing Jefferson and Madison);.
117. The nonneutral character of an Establishment Clause that is structural in character is
explored infra text accompanying notes 224-29 (discussing unique legal status of churches),
infra text accompanying notes 261-81 (discussing voluntarism), and infra notes 450, 472-77
(discussing the admitted bias toward Western tradition).
118. Reversing the incorporati6n decision would be highly disruptive to the settled law of
half a century. The aphorism that, "You can't go home again," is most apt. A rollback of in-
corporation may do as much harm as good to all sides of the First Amendment debate. It is
not just secular liberals but also religious traditionalists who now invoke the Establishment
Clause in support of efforts to fend off state intervention into religious matters. Conservative
religious interests can be found in the resistance to state intervention into intrachurch dis-
putes, see infra notes 169-203, the preventing of regulatory burdens on religious organizations,
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has shown no interest in rolling back incorporation." 9 Rather, the aim of
this Article is more modest: to undo the doctrinal confusion that results
when the no-establishment restraint is mistakenly regarded as a rights-
based clause. Notwithstanding its awkward incorporation as a "liberty"
through the Due Process Clause, the Establishment Clause still retains its
original character as a structural limit on power. 20 When its structural na-
ture is forgotten, confusion soon follows.
America is paradoxical: it is both modem and religious.' 2' When the
Establishment Clause was made applicable to state and local governments
in Everson, all the ingredients for controversy were present.122 History was
not to disappoint. From 1947 to the present, America's factions, contend-
ing as they do over the role of religion in public life, have sought to enlist
the federal courts to play a central part in their skirmishes. The wider cul-
ture war soon followed, turning the Establishment Clause into a major kill-
ing field for Americans doing battle over the meaning of America.
123
see infra notes 329-55, and in not allowing the delegation of civil power to a religious body, see
infra notes 238-47.
119. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 44-49 (1985) (rebuffing suggestion that incorpo-
ration of the Establishment Clause should be reversed).
120. A possible response is to concede that since Everson the Supreme Court has indeed
applied the Establishment Clause as structural, as this Article maintains, but that the Court has
been wrong to do so. The argument is that the Court took a wrong turn in Everson and has
been speeding along the wrong path ever since. The right path, in this view, is that the Estab-
lishment Clause is instrumental to individual religious liberty and hence is in service of and
subordinate to the Free Exercise Clause. See infra note 441. That is a plausible position, but
the weight of history is against it. See supra note 75. Moreover, the position requires expanding
the interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause far beyond the task of redressing individual
religious injury, see infra notes 434-40 and accompanying text, which would cause yet other
analytical difficulties.
121. UNSECULAR AMERICA (Richard J. Neuhaus ed., 1986) (documenting that Americans
are as religious in the present as they have been thought to be in the past, probably more so);
ALAN WOLFE, ONE NATION, AFTER ALL 39-87 (1998) (religion has not declined in the 1990s
and Americans think it has a role in politics, but religious belief is more internal, diverse, and
tolerant).
122. It might be asked why controversy followed from incorporation of the Establishment
Clause when the understanding of "establishment" at the national level was much influenced
by progressive developments that had already expanded its meaning in the states. See supra
text accompanying notes 80-88. But this misplaces the cause of the ensuing controversy. The
consequences that flowed from Everson's incorporation that were so profound were that: (1)
states had more frequent contact with religion than did the federal government, hence the
number of governmental activities subject to First Amendment scrutiny increased many times;
and (2) when the Supreme Court decided an Establishment Clause case, the decision was not
confined to a single state but affected the entire nation, thereby vastly speeding up the rate of
change in less urban regions of the nation.
123. See JAMES D. HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA 254-55,
261-71 (1991). See generally Os GUINNESS, THE AMERICAN HOUR: ATIME OF RECKONING AND
THE ONCE AND FUTURE ROLE OF FAITH 4-20 (1993) (arguing that as religion recedes in its
hold on citizensthe Republic drifts into a crisis of vitality, for democracy in America is neither




IV. WINDOWS TO THE CLAUSE AS STRUCTURAL: STANDING, REMEDIES,
CHURCH AUTONOMY, AND THE NONDELEGATION RULE
The Supreme Court's unusual treatment of certain Establishment
Clause cases proves to be a window through which the Court can be seen as
applying the no-establishment principle as a structural restraint. To verify
the structuralist view, this Part takes up the subjects of standing, class-wide
remedies, church autonomy, and the nondelegation rule.
A. STANDING TO SUE
That the object of the Establishment Clause is to patrol the boundary
between government and religion, and not to protect individual rights as
such, is manifested in the Supreme Court's standing cases. The structural
character of the Clause is most obvious in the line of cases involving federal
taxpayer standing, but it is evident in other cases as well.
Normally a claimant with standing to assert a constitutional right must
have suffered a personal, concrete injury that is remediable by judicial pro-
cess.' 4 Because the government's violation of a right will sooner or later
result in a concrete injury, the putative constitutional wrong will not be long
lived before someone is able to file a justiciable claim. Conversely, the
Court denies standing to sue when a claimant has suffered no more than a
"generalized grievance,"' ' 25 that is, the plaintiffs requested remedy is simply
that the government follow the law, an interest shared by all people within
the government's jurisdiction.'
2 6
In United States v. Richardson,'2 7 for example, the Court denied stand-
ing to a plaintiff who claimed that the Account Clause12' required Congress
to disclose the appropriation of all public monies. The plaintiff sought dis-
124. Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312, 2317 (1997) (holding that standing requires that
plaintiffs allege some personal injury fairly traceable to the defendants' alleged conduct and
seek a remedy that is judicially cognizable).
125. CIIEMIERINSKY, supra note 3, § 2.3.5, at 88-97; cf. Federal Election Comm'n v. Akins,
118 S. Ct. 1777, 1785-86 (1998) (stating that a "generalized grievance" lacks the necessary
concreteness not because the alleged injury is widespread, but because of the abstract nature of
the asserted interest or injury).
126. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 485-86 (1982):
Although [they] claim that the Constitution has been violated, [plaintiffs]
claim nothing else. They fail to identify any personal injury suffered by
[plaintiffs] as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error, other than the
psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct
with which one disagrees. That is not an injury sufficient to confer standing
under Article III, even though the disagreement is phrased in constitutional
terms.
Id.
127. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
128. The Account Clause provides that "a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts
and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time." U.S. CONsr. art.
I, § 9, cl. 7.
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closure of the Central Intelligence Agency budget, which, if brought to
light, would have revealed covert operations and other secrets of state.'29
Although the government ostensibly exceeded its power by classifying the
CIA budget, no one suffered a personalized injury as a result of the viola-
tion. Therefore, the absence of a concrete injury required dismissal of the
lawsuit for lack of standing. 0 The Court specifically rejected the plaintiff's
twin arguments that he had standing as a United States citizen and as a
federal taxpayer.' 3' 1
Foundational to the Richardson Court's refusal to reach the merits is
that the constitutional clause in dispute, the Account Clause, is structural as
opposed to rights-based.' In cases like Richardson, the Court's distinction
between rights and structure is implicit. A violation of a right will result in
an individualized injury and thereby produce a claimant with standing to
sue. The exceeding of a structural limit, however, will not necessarily result
in an individualized injury. Hence, where overstepping a structural re-
straint is involved, there may not be an individual claimant with standing to
sue. Richardson is illustrative. The Court, interpreting the scope of its Article
III jurisdiction, has consistently reached results where a rights violation is
jvsticiable whereas exceeding a structural restraint, absent .a showing of
individualized injury, is nonjusticiable.' 35
Of interest here is the Court's general refusal to grant standing in in-
129. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 175 n.8.
130. Id. at 180.
131. Id. at 176-80; see also Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,
228 (1974) (denying standing to plaintiff who claimed that the Incompatibility Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2, prohibits members of Congress from holding an office in the executive
branch); Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (per curiam) (denying standing to plaintiff who
claimed that the Incompatibility Clause prohibits a member of Congress from accepting an
appointment in the judicial branch "the Emoluments whereof' having been increased during
the member's congressional term).
132. See CHIEMERINSKY, supra note 3, § 2.3.5, at 96-97 (discussing how the structure of
some clauses makes them "enforceable only through the political process").
133. The weight of scholarly opinion is that the Supreme Court is mistaken when it refuses
to adjudicate claims that other branches of the government have exceeded their constitutional
powers. To adjudicate is the Court's duty, it is argued, if it is to retain its rightful place as a
coordinate branch of the national government. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE
CONsTITUTION 97-105 (1987); Donald Doernberg, "We the People'" John Locke, Collective Con-
stitutional Rights, and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CAL L REV. 52, 93-95 (1985)
(arguing that expansion of standing will eviscerate the Court's power); Gene R. Nichol, Jr.,
hzjury and the Disintegration ofArticle III, 74 CAL. L REv. 1915 (1986) (comparing-the individual
injury standard with a more general view of injury under Article III); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.,
Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L REV. 393, 472-90
(1996) (discussing the general historical justifications for the individualized injury require-
ment); Eric J. Segall, Standing Between the Court and the Commentators: A Necessity Rationale for
Public Actions, 54 U. Prrr. L REv. 351, 375-403 (1993) (stating that a limitless standing doc-
trine threatens to erode democracy). The Court, however, has given little indication that it will
depart from its present course of remedying only "injuries in fact" suffered by individuals. See
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (holding that an organization's failure to
demonstrate a concrete injury prevents the Court from assuming jurisdiction). There is no
reason for this Article to take sides in that debate.
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stances of structural violations that result in no "injury in fact." If the Es-
tablishment Clause is structural, one would expect instances where the
Clause is violated but no claimant has the individualized injury required for
standing. To adjudicate such a claim the Court would have to radically de-
part from its rule of requiring personalized injury. That it made a dramatic
move to do so in Flast v. Cohen'" bolsters my claim that the Court indeed
conceptualizes the Establishment Clause as structural.
The Flast Court carved out an exception to the "injury in fact" re-
quirement. Although stated in broader terms, in practice the Flast excep-
tion applies only when the plaintiffs are federal taxpayers and the claim
invokes the Establishment Clause. 35 When government provides a financial
benefit to religious organizations, such as parochial schools and church-
related colleges, no one suffers coercion, a burden on religious practice, or
other personalized injury.'36 Flast nevertheless allowed federal taxpayers
standing to plead a violation of the Establishment Clause. This is a narrow
exception, permitting judicial examination on the merits of participation
by religious organizations in federal spending programs. With such claims,
the requested remedy is neither a tax refund nor a tax reduction. The la-
ment is not that claimants have suffered an injury because a few cents in
general tax revenues were misspent. The putative harm is not that claim-
ants are being coerced against conscience to pay for the religion of others-
for that would be attempting to assert a rights-based violation where the
Court has consistently ruled there is no such right.'37 Rather, "monetary
134. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
135. See also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618-20 (1988); Valley Forge Christian Col-
lege v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464 (1982). In Valley Forge, the Court narrowed the Flast
exception to only Establishment Clause challenges to congressional spending programs. Id. at
479-80. Kendrick extended the Flast test to no-establishment claims brought by federal taxpay-
ers challenging actions of the executive branch. 487 U.S. at 618-20.
136. Public schools may fear a diminution in their funding, but they could never prove a
causal link between a slowdown in their funding and passage of a program to aid parochial
schools. Certainly parochial schools and their students are unlikely to complain about the
government's assistance, which in any event is not being forced upon them.
137. A common assertion by no-aid separationists is that the First Amendment secures a
right, as a matter of conscience, to not have tax revenues appropriated for religious purposes.
The Court, however, has taken up the claim as to both Religion Clauses and has disagreed.
The plaintiffs in Flast claimed that payment of a general federal tax, the monies of which were
appropriated to religious schools, was religious coercion in violation of the Free Exercise
Clause. Flast, 392 U.S. at 103, 104 n.25. The Court chose to defer deciding whether that aver-
ment stated a claim, and declined to decide whether a federal taxpayer even had standing to
raise such a claim. In Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), the Court returned to the issue
and held that a federal taxpayer's claim of religious coercion did not state a cause of action
under the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 689. In Valley Forge, 454 U.S. 464, claimants challenged
as violative of the Establishment Clause the transfer of government property at no charge to a
religious college. Several asserted bases for standing were unsuccessful because claimants
lacked the requisite "injury in fact." One of the rejected arguments was that claimants had a
"spiritual stake" in not having their government give away property for a religious purpose or
to act in any other way contrary to no-establishment values. The Court held that a "spiritual
stake" in having one's government comply with the Establishment Clause was not a cognizable
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damages" in the form of an indeterminant (and surely de minimis) amount
of taxes are a surrogate for the non-Hohfeldian nature of the injury caused
by a misordering of the relationship between government and religion.
Accordingly, the claimants' real harm has its basis in the notion that the two
"powers" of organized religion and the offices of government must be kept
"separate" as required by the Establishment Clause, and, when they are not
so separated, taxpayers suffer a non-Hohfeldian injury due to the misor-
dering of these two centers of power.
3 8
Even in Establishment Clause cases not brought by federal taxpayers,
less rigorous standing rules apply. For example, in state-taxpayer claims
the Supreme Court enforces less rigorously the "injury in fact" require-
ment. 3 9 A showing that the expenses of the "public fisc" are increased as a
injury. Id. at 486 n.22; see also United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982) (requiring Amish
employer to pay Social Security tax in violation of his religious beliefs); United States v.
American Friends Serv. Comm., 419 U.S. 7 (1974) (per curiam) (holding that Quakers facing
federal income tax liability did not have a free exercise right that overrode a provision in anti-
injunction act barring claimants from suing to enjoin the government from collecting the tax).
As citizens, we are taxed to support all manner of policies and programs with which we dis-
agree. Tax dollars pay for weapons of mass destruction that some believe are evil. Taxes pay
for abortions and the execution of capital offenders, which some believe are acts of murder by
the state. Taxes pay the salaries of public officials whose policies we despise and oppose at
every opportunity. None of these complaints give rise to judicially cognizable "harms" to fed-
eral taxpayers. And there is no reason that a taxpayer's claim of "religious coercion" is any
different.
138. Although Flast permits federal taxpayer standing in Establishment Clause claims, the
Court has not permitted citizen standing. Nevertheless, because the claimant is a mere surro-
gate for the body politic, and the payment of general taxes has nothing to do with either the
merits or the remedy, citizenship standing does make more sense than the focus on a de
minimis tax. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 115-16 (Fortas, J., concurring) (stating opinion that citizen
standing is acceptable); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE LJ. 221, 269
(1988) (arguing that there is no need to be concerned with flooding the courts with taxpayer
suits). Circuit Judge Arlin Adams characterized the non-Hohfeldian nature of a no-
establishment claim brought by a citizen as a "shared individuated right to a government that
shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion." Americans United v. United States
Dep't of Health Educ. & Welfare 619 F.2d 252, 261 (3d Cir. 1980) (allowing citizen standing),
rev'd sub nom. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464 (1982). Judge
Adam's characterization is closer to describing what is going on behind the scenes than Fl=st's
fiction that the injury is misspent taxes, but he is still off the mark. The real character of the
injury is that the structural limit imposed on relations between government and religion has in
some manner been transgressed such that the body politic, the integrity of religion, or both
are harmed. See infra notes 400-13 and accompanying text (laying out the Court's explanation
for protecting against these two types of injuries).
139. In claims by state or local taxpayers challenging state or local laws as violative of the
Establishment Clause, the leading case is Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952); see
also School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 380 n.5 (1985) (collecting prior cases
in which state taxpayer standing was allowed). In Doremus, the Court allowed a state taxpayer
to challenge a law only when the law was "[slupported by any separate tax or paid for from any
particular appropriation or that it adds any sum whatever to the cost of conducting" the gov-
ernment's program. Doremus, 342 U.S. at 433. Unlike the rule in Flast, under Doremus claim-
ants must show more than that they are taxpayers. They must show that the program or of-
fending activity is actually costing tax monies. See also School Dist. of Abingt Tonuship v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 266 n.30 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing the impact of
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result of the offending program is all that is required for a claimant to have
standing to sue. 4 ' Reduced-rigor standing rules also apply in claims alleg-
ing that religious symbols on government property endorse religion in a
manner violative of the Clause.' 4 ' In such cases, the Court only requires a
plaintiff who is in the primary zone of exposure to the offending expres-
sion. 142 This is not as stringent an injury-in-fact requirement as the Court
insists on generally,'43 but it is more rigorous than that required of federal
taxpayers in Flast.1
44
Although federal taxpayer standing emerged in the late 1960s, the
structural character of the Establishment Clause can be seen in earlier cases
as well. Without any discussion of standing, the Everson Court allowed a
taxpayer to pursue a no-establishment claim challenging a New Jersey law
that permitted local governments to reimburse parents for bus fare paid to
Doremus).
140. Doremus, 342 U.S. at 433.
141. Concerning a claim that governmental expression is endorsing religion, Justice
O'Connor has essentially identified the nature of the harm as non-Hohfeldian. In describing
the no-establishment, offense, she uses languagelike "sends a message to nonadherents that
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying mes-
sage to adherents that they are insiders" and making "religion relevant to a person's standing
in the political community." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Yet, this indi-
vidual is not the claimant at bar but an "objective observer." That is, the injury befalls some
abstracted, well-informed fictional plaintiff constructed by the Court as the proxy to represent
the interests of the body politic generally. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette,
515 U.S. 753, 778-82 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (describing the "objective observer" as
a class representative of the body politic). Hence, the Establishment Clause does not give relief
for any religious "offense," for that is too subjective. The borderline sepirating church and
state has to be fixed, not dependent upon the sensitivity of the self-appointed plaintiff to mul-
tifarious religious practices.
142. See Robinson v. City of Edmond, 68 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S.
1201 (1996). In Robinson, the circuit court had permitted the claimant standing to challenge as
violative of Establishment Clause a city seal that included a Latin cross. The plaintiff often
observed the city seal but did not allege its avoidance caused any alteration in his conduct.
ThreeJustices dissented from the denial of certiorari, noting a split in the circuits concerning
how much exposure to a religiously offensive symbol was required for standing to raise a no-
establishment claim. 517 U.S. at 1202-03 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (collecting authorities in
the circuits, a majority of which permit standing, without more, upon direct exposure to the
religious symbol in question); see also Suhre v. Haywood County, 131 F.3d 1083, 1086-88 (4th
Cir. 1997) (allowing standing to challenge display of the Ten Commandments in courthouse
based on claimant's alleged unwelcome direct contact with a display that is apparently en-
dorsed by the government); Liddle v. Corps of Engineers, 981 F. Supp. 544, 556-57 (M.D.
Tenn. 1997) (collecting authorities in a case where nearby landowners were denied standing to
challenge lease between Army Corps of Engineers and religious organization for operation of
summer camp as violative of Establishment Clause).
143. See supra notes 124-26.
144. The public school prayer cases could also be conceptualized as reduced-rigor stand-
ing cases. Students need not be coerced into reciting a prayer or observing a moment of si-
lence in order to have standing. It is sufficient that students are in the primary zone of expo-
sure. The Supreme Court's treatment of public school prayer is discussed at infira notes 149-51
and accompanying text.
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transport their children to school (including religious schools).'45 The
Court reached the merits without even attempting to first identify the na-
ture of the claimant's personal stake in the litigation. This indifference to
standing was repeated a year later in McCollum.146 The Court there pro-
ceeded to rule on a parental challenge to a public school district's practice
of allowing teachers from local churches to offer religious instruction thirty
minutes a week. Notwithstanding that the courses were elective, and in any
event not attended by claimants' children, the majority opinion proceeded
to the merits without even addressing the absence of individualized
harm. 1
47
No sooner had Everson and McCollum been decided than connenta-
tors began questioning the standing of the complainants in those cases.148 A
second round of criticism over the Court ignoring normative standing re-
quirements followed the school prayer cases of Engel v. Vitale14' and School
District ofAbinglon Township v. Schempp 5° in the early 1960s.' The students
in Engel and Schempp were exposed to unwanted prayer and devotional
Bible reading, but the Court conceded that no students were coerced into
145. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1947).
146. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
147. Id. at 206; see also id. at 233-34 (Jackson, J., concurring) (discussing the standing
problem in McCollum without offering any resolution). This pattern of not enforcing regular
standing rules was repeated in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (reaching the merits in
case challenging off-campus release-time program for students to attend religion classes,
notwithstanding that classes were optional and not attended by claimants' children).
148. See Corwin, supra note 92, at 5-9 (criticizing McCollum for failing to address standing);
Louis L Jaffe, Standing to SecureJudicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARv. L REv. 1265, 1310-12
(1961) (citing Everson as an example of failure to consider standing); Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr.,
Due Process and Disestablishment, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1306, 1329-44 (1949) (citing McCollum and
Everson as examples of the Court "stretching"standing).
149. 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (striking down practice of teacher-led prayer in public schools
even though there was no official coercion inducing student participation).
150. 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (striking down program of classroom prayer and Bible reading in
public school even though there was no official coercion inducing student participation); see id.
at 224 n.9 ("[T]he requirements for standing to challenge state action under the Establishment
Clause, unlike those relating to the Free Exercise Clause, do not include proof that particular
religious freedoms are infringed."); see also id. at 266 n.30 (Brennan, J., concurring) (strug-
gling with the Court's grant of standing to parents of public school students raising an Estab-
lishment Clause claim when neither parents nor students suffer economic harm).
151. E.g., ErnestJ. Brown, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?-The School-Prayer Cases, 1963 Sup.
Cr. REV. 1; Envin N. Griswold, Absolute Is in the Dark-A Discussion of the Approach of the Supreme
Court to Constitutional Questions, 8 UTAH L. REV. 167 (1963) (rejecting Supreme Court's view of
Establishment Clause as going beyond protection of religious rights); Paul G. Kauper, Prayer,
Public Schools and the Supreme Court, 61 MICH. L REV. 1031, 1056-64 (1963); Philip E. Kurland,
The Regents' Prayer Case: "Full of Sound and Fury, Signifying... ," 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 19-22;
Robert G. McCloskey, Principles, Powers and Values: The Establishment Clause and the Supreme
Court, in RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 3 (Donald A. Giannella ed., 1964); Sutherland,
supra note 96, at 25; see, e.g., Norman Dorsen, The Arthur Garfield Hays Civil Liberties Conference:
Public Aid to Parochial Schools and Standing to Bring Suit, 12 BUFF. L. REV. 35 (1962) (reporting
on a conference discussion about the propriety of standing in no-establishment cases by, inter
alia, Professors Norman Dorsen, Leo Pfeffer, Louis L. Jaffe, Kent Greenawalt, Gerald Gun-
ther, and Norman Redlich).
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participation or forced by the school to profess a religious belief.
Commentators were correct to point out that the complainants in the
prayer cases had no concrete injury and, hence, no standing to claim a loss
of personal religious liberty. Where the critics went wrong was in assuming
that what was at issue in Everson, and eventually remediated in McCollum,
Engel, and Schempp, was a personal constitutional right. These cases did not
rest on the Free Exercise Clause. Rather, in each the Court impliedly held
that the government had exceeded its power by overstepping the structural
restraint laid down in the Establishment Clause. However, in order for the
Court to reach the merits and adjudicate a claim that a constitutional limi-
tation on power had been exceeded, the normal requirement of "injury in
fact" had to be abandoned. The alternative was that no one had standing to
sue and, hence, a violation of the Establishment Clause would not (and
could not) be corrected by the federal judicial branch.
A further illustration of the confusion that can flow by misconceiving a
power-limiting clause as a rights-based clause is found in criticism that the
Court allows standing by public-school enthusiasts (as taxpayers) to bring
suits challenging governmental aid to religious schools. Particularly vexing
to the critics is that the Court allows these public-school boosters to suc-
cessfully argue that governmental assistance to religious schools should be
struck down because the financial aid will undermine the autonomy of the
parochial schools. It is illogical, insist parochial school authorities, to allow
public-school supporters-who care not about the well being of religious
schools-the standing to argue that government aid (and the regulation
that follows with the aid) harms religion:
It is simply bizarre to say that hindering church operations with
intrusive regulation is an establishment. Yet that is what the Court
has said, at least in the context of entanglement arising from fi-
nancial aid to churches.... [B]y making entanglement an estab-
lishment-clause doctrine and tying it to financial aid, the Court
has created standing for opponents of churches to assert the
church's right to be left alone. The churches cannot take this
money, say the opponents of financial aid, because if they did the
government would have too much say in their affairs. The
churches are not complaining, but their opponents are. The
Court has never explained why persons not hurt by entanglement
have standing to raise entanglement claims. An atheist plaintiff
asserting a church's right to be left alone even at the cost of losing
government aid is the best possible illustration of why there are
rules on standing.1
52
152. Douglas Laycock, The Right to Church Autonomy as Part of Free Exercise of Religion, in
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS II 28, 38 (Dean M. Kelley ed., 1986)
(footnote omitted); see also Mark E. Ghopko, Religious Access to Public Programs and Governmental
Funding, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 645, 662-63 (1992).
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But, again, taxpayer standing is a mere surrogate for vesting in a non-
Hohfeldian litigant the requisite access to the courthouse in order that
the federal courts may adjudicate a structural violation as set out in the
Establishment Clause. Because the claim is non-Hohfeldian, there is no
one with individualized injury caused by the violation. Rather, the true
injury is class-wide and is comprised of either strife along sectarian lines
to the injury of the body politic (the civitas) or official action that under-
mines the integrity of religion (the religar/ekklesia). In the example of re-
ligious-school funding, the undermining-of-religion injury arises via en-
tangling or otherwise compromising regulations that divert the school
from its central religious mission. 153 Once again, when the Establishment
Clause is conceptualized as a structural restraint rather than an individ-
ual right, the fog of confusion lifts. Another doctrinal riddle is solved
once it is understood why the Court is led to grant standing to a non-
Hohfeldian claimant.
B. NON-HOHFELDIAN REMEDIES
Examining the character of the remedies in successful cases provides
additional proof that the Court views the Establishment Clause as struc-
tural. When constitutional rights are vindicated against a government en-
tity, awards are normally tailored to redress the individual harm to plain-
tiffs and nothing more. In Establishment Clause cases, however, the Court
often awards class-wide remedies. The orders are typically injunctions that
give relief from the sort of non-Hohfeldian or collective harms that occur
when the government exceeds its power. For example, government has
been found to have no authority to recite or compose prayers," conduct
classes in religious training,'55 display a religious code for veneration,'56 or
sponsor stand-alone religious symbols.' 57 These are subject matters that are
inherently religious. Hence, the no-establishment principle negates the
153. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 620-21 (1971); id. at 649 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring); see Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 53 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("The
great condition of religious liberty is that it must be maintained free from sustenance. . . by
the state. For when it comes to rest upon that secular foundation it vanishes with the resting.").
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409-10, 414 (1985), and School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball,
473 U.S. 373, 383 (1985), also relied upon the rationale that no-establishment, inter alia,
protected religious schools from the secularizing tendencies of state finding. AlthoughAguilar
and Ball were recently overruled, Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), this rationale was
not repudiated by the Court. Id. at 243 (Souter, J., dissenting).
154. E.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (concerning voluntary school prayer);
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (concerning prayer and biblical devotions); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (concerning prayer).
155. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (concerning voluntary religion
classes).
156. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (concerning the posting of the Ten
Commandments in public school classrooms).
157. County of Allegheny v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (concerning a
nativity ofJesus Christ at Christmas).
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government's power to act concerning subjects, such as these, that are in
the purview of religion.
To illustrate, in Schempp and Engel the remedy was to enjoin all school
prayer rather than to order school authorities to permit the student-
plaintiffs to opt out of the prayer.' 58 Compare that relief with West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette,'59 where the children of Jehovah's Wit-
nesses were compelled to salute the United States flag and recite a pledge
of allegiance at the beginning of the public school day. The Barnette Court
held that the compulsory exercise violated freedom of belief, an aspect of
that package of rights secured by the Free Speech Clause. The remedy,
however, was a mere right to opt out while remaining in the classroom as
the other students daily performed the exercise. The constitutional offense
was "stopped," in the Court's view, when the Jehovah's Witnesses no longer
had to salute and recite. Because the scope of the remedy did not go be-
yond the person of the claimants, the children were not spared any hu-
miliation as a result of their nonconformity."u The difference is that in
Schempp and Engel the constitutional violation did not "stop" until the gov-
ernment stopped the exercise for every student attending the school. In-
deed, the injunction even swept into its scope those students who wanted to
continue praying. 161
158. School authorities insisted the prayer was voluntary. Engel, 370 U.S. at 430. There
may, of course, have been peer pressure brought to bear on the student-plaintiffs. Id. at 431.
But the Supreme Court said lack of evidence of coercion was irrelevant. This was not a free
exercise claim, where a showing of governmental compulsion is part of the prima facie case.
Rather, the Court said that in an Establishment Clause claim there was no need to even show
that the offending law operated directly on the nonobserving plaintiffs. Id. at 430-3 1.
159. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
160. See Brown, supra note 151, at 28 ("The right to dissent does not usually involve the
right to be spared the occasions for dissenting.") (footnote omitted).
161. In cases involving a "facial" challenge to the constitutionality of a law, courts can enter
an injunction that has the effect of benefiting more than just the actual claimants. For exam-
ple, claimants may seek an order striking down a municipal ordinance requiring a parade
permit because the ordinance "facially" discriminates on the basis of speech content. See, e.g.,
Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992). A victory for the actual claim-
ants obviously benefits a class of individuals not before the court, namely conjectural claimants
who are having their right to obtain a parade permit "chilled" by the unconstitutional ordi-
nance. The actual claimants have standing to complain about the ordinance "as applied" to
them, or they have third-party standing to raise the rights of the conjectural claimants.
That the actual claimants in the parade-permit illustration obtain relief for the con-
jectural claimants does not negate the argument in the text. There is more going on in Estab-
lishment Clause cases than the granting of injunctive relief that has a beneficial effect on the
rights of individuals not before the court. That is, in no-establishment cases the government is
being ordered to do more than not "chill" the rights of conjectural daimants. In cases like
Schempp and Engel, for example, so far as the record showed only a few students were ag-
grieved by the prayer. Many students were ambivalent about the prayer, and some students no
doubt wanted the prayer to continue. Nevertheless, the Court's remedy enjoined the prayer as
to all the students in the school district. The ambivalent students got a remedy from the Court
without any evidence that they were aggrieved or considered their rights "chilled," and the
students who wanted to continue praying got just the opposite relief from the Court. The only
explanation for the broad scope of the remedies in Schempp and Engel is that the Court was
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Soon after the school prayer cases came down, those who would con-
fine the Establishment Clause to redressing personal religious harm, and
nothing more, complained of the lack of correlation of the injunctive relief
with the student-plaintiffs' actual injuries.6 2 These critics would be correct
to complain if the Clause did indeed have as its object the securing of an
individual right. But the criticism was not well founded if the Clause's ob-
ject is to restrain governmental power. The real constitutional injury, in the
Court's view, was not that the student-plaintiffs in Schempp and Engel were
exposed to unwanted prayer. Rather, the injury was that the government
exceeded its power when public school authorities became involved in the
inherently religious activity of prayer. The injury of having one's govern-
ment overly involved with religion is an undifferentiated or generalized
grievance, that is, non-Hohfeldian in character. It is an injury shared by
virtually everyone who has an interest in their government obeying the law
by staying within its constitutional limits. That, in turn, explains why the
injunctions in Schempp and Engel take on their non-Hohfeldian character
and run against the government rather than in favor of the individual
complainants.
C. CHURCHAUTONOMY
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Dismissals
Many courts, facing cases involving intrachurch disputes, determine
that they cannot hear the matter because adjudication will inevitably entail
resolving questions of religious doctrine. These courts dispose of the case
by dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or otherwise abstain-
ing.'63 A jurisdictional dismissal is a concession that the issue in dispute,
namely one of religious doctrine, is not within the court's constitutional
ordering the government to keep its activities within the sphere of its delegated powers and
consequently out of the sphere reserved to religion. This sort of power-limiting injunction
could only come about if the Court viewed the Establishment Clause as structural.
162. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 151, at 31.
163. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713-14 (1976)
(holding that courts have no authority to decide ecclesiastical issues); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 679, 732-33 (1871) (same); Bell v. Presbyterian Church, 126 F.3d 328 (4th Cir.
1997) (stating that decisions of religious association about the appointment and removal of
employees in positions of theological significance are not within the subject matter jurisdiction
of courts). The Supreme Court does not always use the word 'jurisdiction" in its rationale, but
its language of dismissal carries the same meaning. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445-47 (1969) [hereinafter Hull
Church] ("[It is] wholly inconsistent with the American concept of the relationship between
church and state to permit civil courts to determine ecclesiastical questions"; hence the First
Amendment's "language leaves the civil courts no role in determining ecclesiastical questions
in the process of resolving property disputes."); Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 13 1,
139 (1872) ("This is not a question of membership of the church, nor of the rights of members
as such. It may be conceded that we have no power to revise or question ordinary acts of
church discipline, or of excision from membership.").
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power and thus, the court should abstain."M
These courts are correct to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or otherwise
abstain, provided that the Establishment Clause is structural. Jurisdiction,
of course, concerns the scope of a court's power as defined by the Constitu-
tion.'65 These courts could just as well have "reached the merits" and held
that the Establishment Clause bars courts from resolving an intrachurch
dispute. By "reaching the merits" these courts do not actually hand down a
substantive resolution of the spiritual issue dividing the litigants. Rather,
the courts conclude that the Establishment Clause denies them the power
to adjudicate the dispute."
In announcing these dismissals or abstentions, courts do not attribute
their lack of subject matter jurisdiction to Article III of the Constitution.
This is proper, for there is nothing in Article III that limits a federal court's
power in this regard. Rather, the limitation is imposed by the Establish-
ment Clause. 6 ' This explains why state courts, although not subject to Arti-
cle III constraints, still refrain from hearing intrachurch dispute claims.'68
164. See Kenneth R. O'Brien & Daniel E. O'Brien, Separation of Church and State in Restate-
ment of Inter-Church-and-State Common Law, 7 JURIST 259, 265-78 (1947) [hereinafter O'Brien &
O'Brien, Separation]; Note,Judicial Intervention In Disputes Over The Use Of Church Property, 75
HARV. L. REV. 1142, 1184-86 (1962). See generally Kenneth R. O'Brien & Daniel E. O'Brien,
Freedom Of Religion in Restatement of Inter-Church-and-State Common Law, 6 JURIST 503 (1946)
[hereinafter O'Brien & O'Brien, Freedom] (arguing that evangelist's right to enter private
property to proselytize is within exclusive jurisdiction of the state); Kenneth R. O'Brien &
Daniel E. O'Brien, Restatement Of Inter-Church-and-State Common Law, 5 JURIST 73 (1945)
[hereinafter O'Brien & O'Brien, Restatement] (arguing that effect of marriage on ability to take
sacraments or re-marry is within exclusive jurisdiction of the church, whereas temporal effects
of marriage on rights such as property ownership, succession and heredity, and dower are
within exclusive jurisdiction of the state).
165. James Madison once wrote of the Establishment Clause as denying jurisdiction to all
three branches of the federal government and then went on to regret two instances where
Congress departed from that rule. WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON, supra note 67, at 98, 100
("[A] favorite principle" with Madison is "the immunity of Religion from civil jurisdiction.").
166. A federal court, of course, always has sufficient jurisdiction to determine its jurisdic-
tion. In order to determine that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, a court will first have to
examine the merits to the extent necessary to determine whether the Establishment Clause
prohibits the government-including its civil courts-from assuming the power to resolve a
religious dispute. Thus, a determination that the Establishment Clause prohibits adjudication
of an intrachurch dispute and a determination that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
are just different ways of expressing the same conclusion of law.
167. State courts, of course, are not bound by Article III. But since Everson's incorporation
of the Establishment Clause in 1947, state courts have been restrained by the no-establishment
principle.
168. See, e.g., Music v. United Methodist Church, 864 S.W.2d 286 (Ky. 1993) (determining
that a claim that a church violated the terms of employment contract was outside the subject
matter jurisdiction of the court); Parish of the Advent v. Diocese, 688 N.E.2d 923, 933-34
(Mass. 1997) (dismissing for lack of a jurisdiction claim disputing authority of bishop and
diocesan convention to determine how members could be elected and whether some members
of parish remained members after voting to secede); Schoenhals v. Mains, 504 N.W.2d 233,
235-36 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that Establishment Clause barred review of church
members' defamation claim relating to church disciplinary matters); Howard v. Covenant
Apostolic Church, No. C-960844, 1997 WL 602906 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 19, 1997), app. denied,
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The Supreme Court stated the heart of this matter in Kedroff v. Saint
Nicholas Cathedral."9 The First Amendment confers, said the Kedroff Court,
"a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an independence from
secular control or manipulation-in short, power to decide for themselves,
free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those
of faith and doctrine."'70 It is helpful to envision the scope of this jurisdic-
tional bar as a sphere within which the Supreme Court has stated that
churches may operate free of civil constraints.'' A survey of the cases sug-
gests that there are at least four subject areas within which courts will ab-
stain from civil adjudication: (1) questions of doctrine, changes in doctrine,
and the resolution of doctrinal disputes; 72 (2) the choice of organizational
structure or polity and its administration, including interpretation of a
church's organic documents, bylaws, and traditions;'73 (3) the selection,
promotion, discipline, and terms of employment concerning clerics and
other ecclesiastics; 17 and (4) the admission, guidance, expected moral be-
688 N.E.2d 1043 (Ohio 1998) (holding claims by parishioner for wrongful termination of
church membership, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Tran v. Fiorenza, 934 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996)
(holding that First Amendment barred action for defamation against church diocese); Pritzlaff
v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 789-91 (Wis. 1995) (holding that First Amend-
ment barred action against archdiocese for negligence in hiring, retaining, training, and su-
pervising a priest).
169. 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
170. Id. at 116.
171. There are limits to a church's actions even when falling within this well-defined
sphere of ecclesiastical autonomy. The Supreme Court has repeatedly said that the line is to be
drawn at instances such as fraud or collusion. See e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 609 n.8
(1979); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976). Fraud and
collusion are of a type of civil-law claim that involves intentional conduct that is malum in se.
172. See Maryland & Va. Eldership v. Church of God, 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (per cu-
riam) (stating that courts will not resolve religious controversies); Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440,
449-51 (1969) (rejecting a rule of law that discourages changes in doctrine); Watson v. Jones,
80 U.S. (15 Wall.) 679, 725-33 (1872) (rejecting the implied-trust rule because of its departure-
from-doctrine inquiry); see also Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981) (holding
that courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation); Order of St. Benedict v. Steinhauser,
234 U.S. 640, 647-51 (1914) (holding that religious practices concerning vow of poverty and
communal ownership of property are not contrary to individual liberty and will be enforced by
the courts).
173. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 708-24 (holding that civil courts may not probe into church
polity); Hull Church, 393 U.S. at 451 (holding that civil courts are forbidden to interpret and
weigh church doctrine); Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190, 191 (1960) (per
curiam) (holding the First Amendment prevents the judiciary, as well as the legislature, from
interfering in the ecclesiastical governance of the Russian Orthodox Church); Kedroff, 344 U.S.
at 119 (same); Shepard v. Barkley, 247 U.S. 1, 2 (1918) (mem.) (holding that courts will not
interfere with the merger of two Presbyterian denominations).
174. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 708-20 (holding that civil courts may not probe into the
defrocking of a cleric); Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116 (holding that courts may not probe into clerical
appointments); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929) (declining to
intervene on behalf of a petitioner who sought an order directing the archbishop to appoint
petitioner to ecclesiastical office); see also NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 501-04
(1979) (refusing to force collective bargaining on a parochial school because of interference
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havior, and excommunication of church members."
These case results are most easily attributed to the proper ordering of
government-religion relations and hence to the Establishment Clause. This
makes sense when the no-establishment principle is conceptualized as
structural, operating to define the boundary between the respective com-
petencies of government and religion. In Watson v. Jones, 76 the Supreme
Court first laid down the broad principles ofjudicial abstention concerning
matters of dispute within religious bodies over polity and doctrine. This
post-Civil War case involved a struggle between two factions of a local Pres-
byterian church for control of the church building. Title to the property was
in the name of the trustees of the local church. However, the deed and
charter of the local church "subjected both property and trustees alike to
the operation of [the general church's] fundamental laws."' 77 The general
church was the Presbyterian Church of the United States. Its governing
body was called the General Assembly. The ecclesiastical rules of the Gen-
eral Assembly stated that the Assembly possessed "the power of deciding in
all controversies respecting doctrine and discipline."'17' Following the Civil
War, the General Assembly ordered the members of all local congregations
who believed in a divine basis for slavery to "repent and forsake these
sins." 17' A majority of the local church was willing to comply with the direc-
tive. A minority faction, however, deemed the resolution of the Assembly a
departure from the doctrine held at the time the local church first joined
the general church. The minority's legal theory was that the general church
held an interest in the property of the local church subject to an implied
trust. A condition of the implied trust was that the church adhere to its
original doctrines. Any departure from doctrine by the general church
with the relationship between church superiors and lay teachers); Rector of Holy Trinity
Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 472 (1892) (refusing to apply general law preventing
the employment of aliens to a church's appointment of a cleric); Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S.
(15 Wall.) 131, 137 (1872) ("It is not to be overlooked that we are not now called upon to
decide who were church officers. The case involves no such question."); Cummings v. Missouri,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1872) (holding that it is unconstitutional to prevent a priest from as-
suming his ecclesiastical position because of his refusal to take a civil oath).
175. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 733 (holding there is no court jurisdiction as to church
discipline or the conformity of members to the standard of morals required of them); cf Stein-
hauser, 234 U.S. at 647-51 (holding that so long as an individual voluntarily joined a religious
group and is free to leave at any time, religious liberty is not violated when members are
bound to the rules consensually entered into, such as a vow of poverty and the communal
ownership of property). As the Court noted in Bouldin, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 139-40:
This is not a question of membership of the church, nor of the rights of
members as such. It may be conceded that we have no power to revise or
question ordinary acts of church discipline, or of excision from membership
.... [W]e cannot decide who ought to be members of the church, nor
whether the excommunicated have been regularly or irregularly cut off.
Id.
176. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679.
177. Id. at 683.
178. Id. at 682.
179. Id.at691.
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meant a breach of trust and a resulting forfeiture of its interest in the prop-
erty occupied by the local church. Accordingly, the minority faction claimed
that the majority relinquished any right to control the property when the
general church repudiated the original, proslavery stance. Claiming they
were the "true church," the minority faction maintained that they should
control the local church real estate. 8
The implied-trust theory, with its origin in English law' and the es-
tablished Church of England, was rejected by the Supreme Court because
its departure-from-doctrine feature required civil adjudication of a religious
question. The Watson Court gave several rationales for refusing to involve
itself in internal church affairs. 2 These reasons are rooted, said the Court,
in the American political system that-unlike the English system-separates
the institutions of church and state, thereby sharply limiting civil courts'
involvement in the affairs of religious bodies.'83
180. Id. at 694-95.
181. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727-28.
182. The Court offered three rationales. First, civil jqdges are unschooled in religious
doctrine, and thereby not competent to resolve disputes concerning religious doctrine nor to
properly interpret church documents and canon law. Id. at 729, 732.
Second, for the civil law to award the property to the faction adhering to original
doctrine would entail the government "taking sides," thereby "establishing" one confessional
position over another while inhibiting future changes in religious doctrine. Id. at 730.
Third, both clerics and lay members of a church had voluntarily joined the entire
church, the general as well as the local body, thus giving implied consent to the polity of the
entire church and its internal administration. Id. at 729; see also Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese
v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 714-20 (1976) (discussing consent to ecclesiastical decisions). On
this third point, the Supreme Court has held that consent to be governed by the church polity
and its authorities is sufficient to protect an individual's right to conscience, so long as the
individual has the unmitigated right to leave the church at any time. Order of St. Benedict v.
Steinhauser, 234 U.S. 640, 647-51 (1914). Withdrawing from a church, of course, means a
cleric or church member leaves behind the "work of one's hands," both spiritual and material.
But being willing to leave behind one's spiritual and material works is what was impliedly
consented to at the outset when one voluntarily joins both the church-wide units and a local
congregation of a denomination. See Douglas Lavcock, Towards a General Theoy of the Religion
Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L REV.
1373, 1403 (1981).
183. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727-30. The Watson Court clearly premised its holding in
terms of lack ofjurisdiction or power:
But it is a very different thing where a subject-matter of dispute, strictly and
purely ecclesiastical in its character-a matter over which the civil courts ex-
ercise no jurisdiction-a matter which concerns theological controversy,
church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the mem-
bers of the church, to the standard of morals required of them-becomes the
subject of its action. It may be said here, also, that no jurisdiction has been
conferred on the tribunal to try the particular case before it, or that, in its
judgment, it exceeds the powers conferred upon it, or that the laws of the
church do not authorize the particular form of proceeding adopted; and, in
a sense often used in the courts, all of those may be said to be questions of
jurisdiction. But it is easy to see that if the civil courts are to inquire into all
these matters, the whole subject of the doctrinal theology, the usages and
customs, the written laws, and fundamental organization of every religious
[1998]
ESTABLISHMENT CLA USE
The elevation of Watson to a principle of First Amendment stature be-
gan with Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral."8 The Kedroff Court struck down
a New York statute that transferred control of the Russian Orthodox
Churches from the central governing hierarchy located in the Soviet Union
to a church organization limited to the diocese of North America. The felt
need to transfer control of ecclesiastical authority was linked to opposition
to Communism and concern over whether the Moscow-based hierarchy was
"a true central organization of the Russian Orthodox Church capable of
functioning as the head of a free international religious body."' '85 Because
the statute did more than just "permit the trustees of the Cathedral [in New
York City] to use it for services consistent with the desires of the members"
and instead transferred control over domestic churches by legislative fiat,'86
the Court held that the statute violated the "rule of separation between
church and state."'87
In Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presyterian
Church,188 the rule in Watson was unequivocally elevated to a First Amend-
ment principle. 9 Hull Church presented a dispute between a general
church and two of its local congregations over the right to control the local
churches' properties in Georgia. The controversy began when the local
churches claimed that the general church had violated the organization's
constitution and had departed from accepted doctrine and practice."9°
Georgia followed the implied-trust rule with its requisite fact finding into
alleged departures from doctrine. On the basis of a jury finding that the
general church had abandoned its original doctrines, the Georgia courts
entered judgment for the local congregations. On appeal, the Supreme
Court held that the First Amendment does not permit a departure-from-
doctrine standard as a substantive rule of decision. The "American concept
denomination may, and must, be examined into with minuteness and care,
for they would become, in almost every case, the criteria by which the validity
of the ecclesiastical decree would be determined in the civil court. This
principle would deprive these bodies of the right of construing their own
church laws ... and would, in effect, transfer to the civil courts where prop-
erty rights were concerned the decision of all ecclesiastical questions.
Id. at 733-34.
184. 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952). In Watson, the federal trial court had diversity jurisdiction.
The rule of decision was based on federal common law rather than the First Amendment
because Watson was decided prior to Erie Railway Company v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In
following the old rule of Suift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), federal courts sitting in
diversity could deviate from state substantive law.
185. Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 106.
186. Id. at 119.
187. Id. at 110.
188. 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
189. The Watson Court had repudiated the English implied-trust rule used to sanction the
departure-from-doctrine standard, but only as a matter of federal common law. See supra note
184. A number of states continued to follow the implied-trust rule as a matter of their own
common law. Kedroff clearly foreshadowed the sweeping aside of the common law in those
states still following the English rule. It took Hull Church, however, to complete the task.
190. Hull Church, 393 U.S. at 442 n.1.
84 IOWA LAW REVIEW
of the relationship between church and state ... leaves the civil courts no
role in determining ecclesiastical questions in the process of resolving
property disputes."'' If "civil courts undertake to resolve [doctrinal] con-
troversies in order to adjudicate the property dispute, the hazards are ever
present of inhibiting the free development of religious doctrine and of im-
plicating secular interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern."' 92
Thus, the departure-from-doctrine rule worked to "establish" the status quo
within the church by penalizing any correction or change in doctrine.
In a dispute more akin to the ecclesiastical differences in Kedroff, the
Supreme Court in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich95 rejected
a bishop's resistance to the reorganization of the American-Canadian Dio-
cese of the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church and his removal from office.
Milivojevich involved the concerns of internal church administration and
clerical appointment, matters insulated from civil review by the First
Amendment." The state court decided in favor of the defrocked bishop
because, in its view, the church's adjudicatory procedures had been applied
in an arbitrary manner.' On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected an "ar-
bitrariness" exception to the judicial-deference rule of Watson when the
question concerned church polity or administration. " The :'[c]onstitutional
concepts of due process, involving secular notions of 'fundamental fair-
ness"' cannot be borrowed from the civil law as if they were twigs to be
grafted onto a church's polity and thereby "modernize" the church.'97 The
Supreme Court also reversed the state court's enjoining the diocesan reor-
ganization, holding that the Illinois Supreme Court had impermissibly
"delve[d] into the various church constitutional provisions" pertaining to "a
matter of internal church government, an issue at the core of ecclesiastical
191. Id.at445-47.
192. Id. at 449.
193. 426 U.S, 696 (1976).
194. Id. at 709, 713, 720-21. In Milivojevich, there was no dispute between the parties that
the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church was a hierarchical church and that the sole power to
remove clerics rested with the ecclesiastical body that had decided the bishop's case. Id. at 715.
Nor was there any question that the matter at issue was a religious dispute. Id. at 709.
195. Id. at 708.
196. Id. at 712-13. When the issue is within the sphere of church autonomy, there may be
no examination by civil courts into whether the highest ecclesiastical adjudicatory body prop-
erly followed its own rules of procedure. Id. at 713. For a civil court to accept jurisdiction over
such subject matters is not "consistent with the constitutional mandate that [the] civil courts
are bound to accept the decisions of the highest judicatories of a religious organization of
hierarchical polity on matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule,
custom, or law." Id.
197. Id. at 714-15. In reasoning similar to Watson, the Court also explained that the basis
for a First Amendment prohibition to jurisdiction is that civil courts cannot delve into canon
law or church documents. Id. These matters are too sensitive to permit any civil probing be-
cause inquiry may prove entangling, and thus have the court "taking sides" in a manner "es-
tablishing" the prevailing party. Moreover, civil judges have no training in canonical law and
theological interpretation. Id. at 714 n.8.
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affairs."'
198
The jurisdictional bar to deciding intrachurch disputes is not limited
to conflicts over church property. The bar extends to all civil litigation
whenever a dispute arises over religious doctrine, including torts," con-
tracts,"' civil rights nondiscrimination legislation,2"' the extent of religious
198. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 721. The Supreme Court has since held that states are per-
mitted, in limited instances, to devise "neutral principles of law" that when properly followed
permit the adjudication of intrachurch disputes affecting property. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S.
595, 602-06 (1979). As the Court said, examining church charters, constitutions, deeds, and
trusts to resolve property disputes allowed courts to use "objective, well-established concepts of
trust and property law familiar to lawyers and judges." Id. at 603.
The advantage of the neutral-principles approach is that it "obviates entirely the need
for an analysis or examination of ecclesiastical polity or doctrine in settling church property
disputes." Id. at 605. However, the neutral-principles approach may never be used in a man-
ner that transgresses into the sphere of church autonomy. Id. at 602 ("It is... clear ... that
'the First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving
church property disputes."'); see also id. at 604 ("[Tlhere may be cases where the deed, the
corporate charter, or the constitution of the general church incorporates religious concepts in
the provisions relating to the ownership of property. If in such a case the interpretation of the
instruments of ownership would require the civil court to resolve a religious controversy, then
the court must defer to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical
body."); Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 712-13 ("[Tlhat the decisions of the Mother Church were
'arbitrary' was grounded upon an inquiry that persuaded the Illinois Supreme Court that the
Mother Church had not followed its own laws and procedures" and that is an inquiry prohib-
ited by the First Amendment.); Maryland & Va. Eldership v. Church of God, 396 U.S. 367, 369
(1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("To permit civil courts to probe deeply enough into the
allocation of power within a church so as to decide where religious law places control over the
use of church property would violate the First Amendment in much the same manner as civil
determination of religious doctrine."); id. at 369 n.2 ("Only express conditions [in a church
document] that may be effected without consideration of doctrine are civilly enforceable" in a
state court.). In other words, an adjudication concerning property is not "neutral" unless it
avoids interference with doctrine, polity, the church-clergy relationship, and church member-
ship.
199. See, e.g., Farley v. Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod, 821 F. Supp. 1286, 1290 (D.
Minn. 1993) (dismissing defamation action against church where the offensive statements
arose otrut of church controversy); Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1997) (dismissing
claim against Roman Catholic Diocese for negligent supervision of priest); LL.N. v. Clauder,
563 N.W.2d 434, 440-41 (Wis. 1997) (holding that the First Amendment prohibited negligent
supervision claim); Downs v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 683 A.2d 808, 810-12 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1996) (holding that trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over defamation
claim against church hierarchy); Korean Presbyterian Church v. Lee, 880 P.2d 565 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1994) (holding that ecclesiastical abstention doctrine precluded recovery for tort of out-
rage).
200. See, e.g., Bell v. Presbyterian Church, 126 F.3d 328 (4th Cir. 1997) (affirming lower
court dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over contract and other claims brought by
former director of parachurch ministry); Gabriel v. Immanuel Evangelical Lutheran Church,
Inc., 640 N.E.2d 681, 683-84 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (holding that breach of contract complaint
was properly dismissed on First Amendment grounds because the matter of whether to employ
plaintiff as a parochial school teacher was an ecclesiastical issue into which civil court may not
inquire); Basich v. Board of Pensions, 540 N.W.2d 82 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that
First Amendment prevented district court from exercising jurisdiction over action for breach
of a pension contract and breach of fiduciary duty); Pearson v. Church of God, 458 S.E.2d 68,
71 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that trial court did not have constitutional authority to decide
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use of real estate to obtain a tax exemption,20 2 and criminal fraud.203
When abstaining from intrachurch dispute cases, the Supreme Court
references the First Amendment generally, not expressly singling out either
the Establishment Clause or Free Exercise Clause. 20 This has puzzled aca-
demics. 25 Indeed, legal commentators often regard this line of cases as a
discrete and archaic backwater of First Amendment law,2'a and one not
easily classifiable under either of the Religion Clauses. 27 This is a mis-
claim for breach of contract).
201. See, e.g., EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 464-65 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (find-
ing EEOC investigation into Catholic nun's gender discrimination claim was barred by Estab-
lishment Clause); Bollard v. California Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, No. C 97-3006 SI, 1998
WL 273011, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 1998) (dismissing Title VII sexual harassment claim
against religious organization because, under Establishment Clause, court lacked subject mat-
ter jurisdiction); Himaka v. Buddhist Churches of Am., 917 F. Supp. 698, 707-09 (N.D. Cal.
1995) (holding that minister's Title VII retaliation claim should be dismissed based upon
excessive government entanglement with religion in violation of Establishment Clause); Van
Osdol v. Vogt, 908 P.2d 1122, 1130-32 (Colo. 1990) (holding that Establishment Clause insu-
lated a religious institution's choice of minister from judicial review; Title VII claim against
church was properly dismissed), Geraci v. Eckankar, 526 N.W.2d 391, 399-400 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995) (gender discrimination claim against church is barred by Establishment Clause).
202. See, e.g., Roman Catholic Archdiocese v. City of East Orange, 17 N.J. Tax 298, 309,
312-13 (Tax Ct. 1998) (rejecting rigorous examination of either the amount or nature of re-
ligious use of property as condition of receiving tax exemption because of desire to avoid
conflict with First Amendment); Institute in Basic Life Principles, Inc. v. Watersmeet Town-
ship, 551 N.W.2d 199, 205 (Mich. App. 1996) (same).
203. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 (1944) (stating that in trial for mail fraud,
the truth or falsity of a religious belief or profession may not be subject to scrutiny by ajury).
204. Kedroffv. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952), is the possible exception. The
"free exercise of religion" is mentioned, but not specifically the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at
116. Although other intrachurch dispute cases do not explicitly tie the holding to the Estab-
lishment Clause, its equivalent formulation (the "separation between church and state") is
mentioned as the rule of decision, including by the Kedroff Court. Id. at 110.
205. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 182, at 1395 n.176.
206. See MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR
BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 177 (1986) ("[Ihe Supreme Court's deferential attitude to the
autonomy of religious organizations" serves as the lone example of"neo-feudalist influence on
constitutional thinking."). By "neo-feudalist" influence, Professor Dan-Cohen had reference to
the jurisdictional division extant in the Middle Ages aptly described by Dean Roscoe Pound:
In the politics and law of the Middle Ages the distinction between the
spiritual and the temporal, between the jurisdiction of religiously organized
Christendom and the jurisdiction of the temporal sovereign, that is, of a
politically organized society, was fundamental. It seemed as natural and in-
evitable to have church courts and state courts, each with their own field of
action and each, perhaps, tending to encroach on the other's domain, but
each having their own province in which they were paramount, as it seems to
Americans to have two sets of courts, federal courts and state courts, oper-
ating side by side in the same territory, each supreme in their own province.
Roscoe Pound, A Comparison of Ideals of Lan,, 47 HARV. L REV. 1, 6 (1933).
207. Compare CHEMERINSKY, supra note 133, at 1035 n. 113 (organizing church autonomy
cases under the Free Exercise Clause), uith TRIBE, supra note 2, § 14-11, at 1231-42 (classifying
church autonomy cases as one of five different types of excessive entanglement, a factor in
Establishment Clause analysis).
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take.2"' The cases are far more a consequence of conceptualizing the Estab-
lishment Clause as structural than they are a result of the Court's concern
for individual free exercise rights.2"
2. Group Rights
Commentators have, with some sophistication, sought to attribute this
church autonomy line of cases to the Court's concern for the rights of re-
ligious groups (e.g., churches, synagogues, mosques), 210 hence casting the
holdings in terms cognizable under the Free Exercise Clause. The argu-
ment is that there are two types of constitutional rights that can be consid-
ered "group rights." The first type consists of rights that individuals have
vis-A-vis the government because the individuals are members of a particu-
lar group. The second type consists of rights that the group qua group has
vis-a-vis the government and that the group can enforce even to the detri-
ment of dissenting members of the group.
The first type of group right consists of rights the deprivation of which
an individual member suffers in common with all other members, and a
member can choose to enforce the right regardless of what other members
choose to do. Moreover, the group hds associational standing to assert
these rights on behalf of the members if the group is itself injured in some
tangible way.2 ' The second type of group right does not give members the
same choices. Indeed, the group can use these rights to "oppress" dissident
members. That is, the second type may require dissenting members to bow
to the wishes of the group because of the belief that the group has interests
separate from and superior to those of its members.
Group rights of the first type would be implicated, for example, if a
law banning all automobile travel on Sunday morning was enacted with the
object of conserving petroleum. An individual requiring travel by car to
attend worship services on Sunday morning could sue (alone or as one of
several joined in a single lawsuit), averring a burden on religious practice
and claiming a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. 12 A church could also
208. It must be conceded that in one small respect the rationale behind these cases is tied
to individual free exercise rights. Specifically, the Court implies that when an individual first
joins a church, the membership arrangement is somewhat like a contract. See supra note 182
(explaining the three rationales for the Watson decision). An implied term of that contract is
consent to the resolution of any religious disputes that should arise by the highest ecclesiastical
adjudicatory. Therefore, the Court reasons, the dissenting member's religious rights are not
violated when the internal resolution of a dispute goes against that member. In all other re-
spects, the Court's rationale is structural.
209. Legal historian Mark DeWolfe Howe correctly suggests a historical linkage between
the Protestant pietistic view of church-state relations in 1789-1791 and the Court's church
autonomy decisions in cases such as Watson and Kedroff. HOWE, supra note 77, at 90.
210. See, e.g., JOHN H. GARvEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 139 (1996); Mark DeWolfe
Howe, Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARv. L. REV. 91, 92 n.3 (1953); Laycock,
supra note 152, at 28; Laycock, supra note 182, at 1389, 1392-98.
211. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 80-81.
212. This is not a prediction that the claimant will ultimately succeed on the merits, see
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sue, for it would be regarded as sharing with its members an associational
right. The church here would be asserting a group right of the first type.
The group right is the equivalent of the aggregated rights of the church
members.
By way of contrast, intrachurch dispute cases, contend these commen-
tators, vindicate group rights of the second type.213 The trouble with this
construct is that a decision in favor of church autonomy is reached only
after pitting one rights claim against another (a majority of members versus
a minority of members joined by the institutional church) and then ration-
alizing (as a matter of policy preference) the elevation of group rights of
the second type over the individual religious rights of the majority faction
of the membership." 4 By way of illustration, consider a nondenominational
Protestant church first organized and incorporated in the 1950s. The
church has a long-standing practice of not employing women in the role of
pastor. All agree that the practice is doctrinal, having been part of the
Confession of Faith set out in the original charter and bylaws. The charter
and bylaws also provide that the final authority in all matters of doctrine
and practice rests in a five-member Board of Deacons. That board is self-
perpetuating. Accordingly, when a vacancy occurs on the board the re-
maining deacons choose the successor.
Assume the office of pastor becomes vacant in the late 1990s. A
woman, otherwise qualified in all respects, applies for the position. A con-
gregational meeting is convened to consider the applicant, at which 65% of
the quorum cast ballots to "call" the applicant as the new pastor. The appli-
cant is not hired, however, because the Board of Deacons-adhering to the
Confession of Faith-declines to hire a female in the pastorate role. The
membership thereafter divides, with a majority still wanting to hire the
applicant. A lawsuit is filed against the church, a nonprofit corporation.
One claimant is the female applicant. She alleges gender discrimination
and cites various civil rights statutes. She is joined by the church members
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (rejecting a free exercise exemption from
generally applicable, neutral legislation), just that the plaintiff has stated a colorable claim on
behalf of First Amendment religious liberty.
213. See infra text accompanying notes 216-18.
214. The recognition of this second type of group rights is also inconsistent with liberal
theory, which elevates the individual as the sole moral unit in society. Liberalism reduces
religion to a private and purely individual matter. See, e.g., Gail Merel, The Protection of Indi-
vidual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of Religion Under the First Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L
REv. 805, 810-11 (1978). Churches and the like are regarded as mere voluntary associations
with no more rights than the Rotary Club. See, e.g., Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary
Constitutional Value: The Case for Appling Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 1049, 1126-28 (1996) (urging that federal courts subordinate both free exer-
cise rights and the institutional autonomy of religious organizations to a rule of individual
equality). Accordingly, the policy preferences of liberalism cut against recognizing group
rights of the second type. This would put the Court's intrachurch dispute cases (assuming the
cases affirm group rights of the second type) at odds with liberalism. And to the degree the
Court's future direction is influenced by liberal individualism, it diminishes the likelihood that
group rights of the second type will continue to be recognized.
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from the majority faction. These members, along with the applicant, seek
an order to the effect that they should prevail on the hiring issue.215
Those making the argument on behalf of group rights of the second
type typically have the civil courts weigh the combined gender-equality
interests of the applicant and the religious-liberty interests of the majority
faction against the religious rights of the church qua church." 6 The balance
should tip in favor of the rights of the church, they argue, for two rea-
sons.217 The first reason is utilitarian: religious groups are seedbeds of civic
virtue, educating citizens in life's duties and moral responsibilities and ex-
panding society's pluralism while serving as mediating institutions that
buffer the individual from a powerful and impersonal state. The second
reason is religious: almost all religious experience in the Western tradition
has a large communal component. Moreover, these religious communities
(churches, synagogues, and the like, which administer these communal
religious practices) each perceive of themselves as one body, ontological
entities that exist apart from their individual members." 8
The problems with the utilitarian reason are two-fold: the benefits of
associations are not unique to religious organizations, and equally powerful
social-utility arguments can be made on behalf of gender equality and the
religious liberty interests of the majority faction. Moreover, it conceives of
religion as a handmaid in service of the good society, a rationale that ig-
nores why religious people say they are religious, namely, they believe as
they do because it is true. As to the religious reason, modem secularists
reject the rationale because it is religious. There is a third objection,
namely, balancing the conflicting claims of religious factions is itself viola-
tive of the Court's First Amendment cases.
219
The argument of this Article is that there are no First Amendment
group rights of the second type. Other than the aggregate religious rights
of the members (rights of the first type), there is no Free Exercise Clause
right vested in a religious group that supersedes the religious rights of the
dissident majority faction. However, if the Establishment Clause is struc-
tural, thereby limiting the power of government over the internal opera-
tions of religious groups, then the autonomy of the group is nonetheless
215. The argument by the suing members is that the court should adopt a fairness stan-
dard as the rule of law. Arguments from "fairness" usually reduce to the majority rules or to a
rule of equality. The latter is decided upon by way of representative democracy, i.e., by the
legislature in the form of civil rights legislation. To impose "fairness" standards of this sort will
irrevocably alter, if not destroy, the institutional integrity of churches. This does not trouble
liberal theory, of course, as such a result is consistent with its policy preferences.
216. GARVEY, supra note 210, at 139-40, 149-52.
217. Id. at 150-54; see also Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90
MICH. L. REV. 477, 543-47 (1991) (arguing that churches may be seen as laboratories of civic
virtue and mediating institutions).
218. See, e.g., Richard W. Duesenberg, Jurisdiction of Civil Courts over Religious Issues, 20
OHio ST. L.J. 508,526 (1959); O'Brien & O'Brien, Freedom, supra note 164, at 510-11; O'Brien
& O'Brien, Separation, supra note 164, at 276-78.
219. See infra notes 230-34 and accompanying text.
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protected from interference by whatever value preferences that modem
society seeks to impose (e.g., majority rule or gender equality).
Conceptualizing the Establishment Clause as structural allows the
same result as the proponents of group rights of the second type advocate,
but it does so without the problems. No-establishment seen as a power-
limiting clause only requires a civil court to determine whether the dispute
is within the jurisdiction of government or if the dispute falls into that
sphere reserved to the prerogatives of religion.22 Clearly the employment
of ecclesiastics is within the sphere of religion; thus in the illustration a
court should summarily dismiss the claim against the corporate church.
22'
Moreover, this approach to the problem is descriptive of what courts actu-
ally do in intrachurch dispute cases: judicial deference is given to the deci-
sions of the highest ecclesiastical adjudicatory.222 Courts do not balance
conflicting religious rights claims. Rather, they abstain from reaching the
merits altogether, citing their lack of competence, or jurisdiction, or using
words to that effect.223 This behavior by the judiciary makes sense only if
the Establishment Clause is a limitation on governmental power.
3. Juridical Status of Churches
From Watson to Milivojevich, it is clear that the Supreme Court does
not view the autonomy of religious organizations as proceeding from their
members as a result of any jural theory of contract or implied trust. The
logic of the Court's opinions inexorably leads to the conclusion that relig-
ious organizations have an institutional character distinct from other vol-
untary organizations and, hence, a unique institutional competency, not the
mere sum of the derivative rights of their individual members. 24 Leading
scholars agree that this is the Court's logic, variously describing the cases as
granting churches "some of the prerogatives of sovereignty, ' 225 affording
220. Discussion of the task of locating the boundary between the sphere of civil govern-
ment and the sphere reserved for religion appears infra Part VII.B.
221. See supra note 174 (listing cases in which courts abstained from civil adjudication
involving selection, discipline, and terms of employment for clerics).
222. If plaintiffs in the illustration will not accede to the decision of the Board of Deacons,
and they refuse to vacate the church building in protest, the civil courts are able to bring about
compliance by issuing an injunction ordering plaintiffs to leave the premises. See, e.g., Reor-
ganized Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Thomas, 758 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1988) (stating that civil courts must respect, and where appropriate will enforce, the final
adjudications of the highest church tribunal).
223. GARVEY, supra note 210, at 148.
224. Howe, supra note 210, at 92-93.
225. Id. at 92-95 (identifying church autonomy as giving religious bodies some of the
"prerogatives of sovereignty"); Note, supra 164, at 1185 (arguing that Watson is "grounded...
in a notion that religious associations should be accorded certain prerogatives of sovereignty").
Writing shortly after the decision in Kedroff, Mark DeWolfe Howe noted that the Court "seems
to apply the principle of pluralism to the relationships of Church and State." Howe, supra note
210, at 93. By "principle of pluralism," Howe meant "the conviction that government must
recognize that it is not the sole possessor of sovereignty," and that the churches are "entitled
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ecclesiastical entities a status "distinguishable from other types of voluntary
associations," '226 and as "spiritual bodies . . . requir[ing] distinct constitu-
tional protection." '227 This line of reasoning coincides with the churches'
historic claims that they are notjural entities, and not mere creatures of the
law deriving their existence from the state. Rather, churches preexisted the
state, are transnational, and would continue to exist if the state were sud-
denly dissolved or destroyed.' The authors of the Establishment Clause
acknowledged this unique character and thus the necessity of keeping re-
ligion and government in the proper relationship. If the law is to order two
entities ( "separation of church and state"), the law must first recognize the
existence of both entities. The juridical consequence is that the status of
to lead their own free lives and exercise within the area of their competence an authority so
effective as to justify labeling it a sovereign authority." Id. at 91. What Howe described as
cosovereigns should not be understood to mean competing civil powers. Rather, government-
religion relations means that because there is an area beyond civil affairs, such territory is
reserved to the churches. Similarly, when the Court says that government has no competence
to determine any one system of belief as religious truth or to be the judge of orthodoxy, see
infra notes 230-34 and accompanying text, the Court is acknowledging limits to its juridical or
civil authority.
226. Paul G. Kauper, Church Autonomy and the First Amendment: The Presbyterian Church
Case, in CHURCH AND STATE: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRSTAMENDMENT 67, 95 (Philip
B. Kurland ed., 1975) ("[I]n the Court's view voluntary religious associations are constitution-
ally distinguishable from other types of voluntary associations.").
227. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1236 ("Whe Supreme Court has recognized for nearly a
quarter-century that, whatever may be true of other private associations, religious organiza-
tions as spiritual bodies have rights which require distinct constitutional protection."); see also
HOWE, supra note 77, at 12 ("From time to time the justices [of the Supreme Court] have ex-
plicitly acknowledged.., that their insistence on total separation promotes the best interests
of religion .... lhat is, that they have reached the result in question in order that they may,
like Roger Williams, protect the garden from the intrusion of the wilderness."); David Little,
The Reformed Tradition and the First Amendment, in THE FIRST FREEDOM: RELIGION & THE BILL
OF RIGHTS, supra note 73, at 17, 27 ("If the spiritual order was not coterminous with the civil
order.., then the way was clear for a new independent sphere of authority set alongside civil
authority."); Herbert Richardson, Civil Religion in Theological Perspective, in AMERICAN CIVIL
RELIGION 161, 178-80 (Russell E. Richey & Donald G. Jones eds., 1974) ("[T]he church cannot
acquiesce in the notion that it is a mere congregation or voluntary association established by
the authority of its members.").
228. John Courtney Murray states the Establishment Clause principle as follows:
The juridical result of the American limitation of governmental powers is
the guarantee to the Church of a stable condition of freedom .... It should
be added that this guarantee is made not only to the individual ... but to
the Church as an organized society with its own law and jurisdiction ...
The United States has a government, or better, a structure of governments
operating on different levels .... Within society, as distinct from the state,
there is room for the independent exercise of an authority which is not that
of the state. This principle has more than once been affirmed by American
courts, most recently by the Supreme Court in the Kedroff case.
MURRAY, TRUTHS, supra note 101, at 78-79; see also Clancy, supra note 34, at 27 ("What we
have constitutionally is ... a logical distinction between two orders of competence. Caesar
recognizes that he is only Caesar and forswears any attempt to demand what is God's."); Due-
senberg, supra note 218, at 526 n.59; O'Brien & O'Brien, Freedom, supra note 164, at 510-11;
O'Brien & O'Brien, Separation, supra note 164, at 276-77; Stackhouse, supra note 34, at 111.
84 IOWA LAW REVIEW [1998]
religious entities is acknowledged by the Establishment Clause, and a
sphere is reserved in which religious entities may operate unhindered by
government in accordance with their own understanding of divine origin
and mission. 29
This restraint on governmental power also arises in First Amendment
cases other than those concerning disputes between factions within a
church. For example, the Court has held that a religious belief or practice
need not be "central" to a claimant's religion as a prerequisite to receiving
the protection of the Free Exercise Clause. Government is prohibited from
deciding which practices are at the core of (and therefore more important
to) a given religion and which are peripheral to faithful practice.3 Moreo-
ver, a claimant may disagree with coreligionists or be unsure or wavering
and still receive full free exercise protection.3 t
The Court states the foregoing rules, not as a personal right, but in
terms of a negative on the Court's power: "[I]t is not within the judicial
function and judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or his
fellow worker more correctly perceived the commands of their common
faith."2 2 The same concern over restraining governmental power is behind
229. Religious autonomy is served by adherence to the church-state settlement of 1789-
1791. This secular liberalism opposes. See supra note 214, and infra note 465. However, liber-
alism is well served because the founding constitutional settlement works in two directions.
That is, while the integrity of religion is served by cases such as Kedroff and Milivojevich that
protect church autonomy, liberalism's aim to keep religious strife from tearing apart the body
politic is served by the bar on the government propagating religion. So long as liberal theory
receives its half of the bargain, it must accept the whole bargain. Cf. infra note 472.
230. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) ("Judging the centrality of dif-
ferent religious practices is akin to the unacceptable business of evaluating the relative merits
of differing religious claims."); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S.
439, 449-51, 457-58 (1988) (rejecting Free Exercise Clause test that "depend(s] on measuring
the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual development"); United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982) (rejecting government's argument that free exercise
claim does not lie unless "payment of social security taxes will... threaten the integrity of the
Amish religious belief or observance").
This rule was recently reaffirmed in City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2161
(1997), in explaining, inter alia, the decision in Smith. The compelling-interest balancing test,
abandoned in Smith, required ajudge to weigh the importance of a religious practice against a
state's interest in applying a neutral law without any exceptions. Although this Article need not
take a position on whether Smith was correctly decided, supra note 31, a compelling-interest
test can be formulated without violating the rule against weighing the importance of a relig-
ious practice. All that need be done is to instruct judges to assess the "compellingness" of the
state's claim for uniform enforcement of the law in question without any reference to the
claimant's religious practice.
231. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981) ("Courts are not arbiters of re-
ligious interpretation.").
232. Id. at 716; see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 616-17 (1992) (Souter, J., concur-
ring) (rejecting nonpreferentialism because its application "invite[s] the courts to engage in
comparative theology"); Smith, 494 U.S. at 887; County of Allegheny v. Greater Pittsburgh
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 678 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part) ("This Court is ill equipped to sit as a national theology board."); Lyng, 485
U.S. at 457-58; Lee, 455 U.S. at 257.
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the Court's refusal to make detailed inquiries into religious doctrine as well
as its resistance to probing the significance of religious words, practices, or
events.233 Importantly, the argument is not that this probing by the courts is
in some sense an invasion of ecclesiastical "privacy," that such oversight is
"excessively entangling," or that judicial review "chills" associational rights.
Rather, the objection is that government has no competence in making
decisions that are in the purview of religion. The Court has additionally
held that legislative classifications based on denominational or sectarian
affiliation are to be avoided. The idea is to not attach to denominational
membership ajural consequence, whether advantagious or burdensome.a
Each of these Court-made rules of law is far easier to explain when at-
tributed to constitutional structure (i.e., the Establishment Clause) rather
than to individual religious rights (i.e., the Free Exercise Clause). Indeed,
233. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 844-45 (1995)
(cautioning a state university to avoid distinguishing between evangelism, on the one hand,
and the expression of ideas merely approved by a given religion); Corporation of the Presid-
ing Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336 (1987); id. at 344-45 (Brennan, J., concurring) (recog-
nizing a problem when government attempts to divine which ecclesiastical appointments are
sufficiently related to the core of a religious organization to merit exemption from statutory
duties); BobJones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 n.30 (1983) (stating that avoiding
potentially entangling inquiry into religious practice is desirable); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263, 269 n.6, 272 n.11 (1981) (holding that inquiries into significance of religious words or
events are to be avoided); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (holding that it is
desirable to avoid entanglement that would follow should tax authorities evaluate the temporal
worth of religious social welfare programs.); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305-07
(1940) (stating that petty officials are not to be given discretion to determine what is a legiti-
mate "religion" for purposes of issuing permit); see also Espinosa v. Rusk, 456 U.S. 951 (1982)
(mem.) (striking down a charitable solicitation ordinance that required officials to distinguish
between "spiritual" and secular purposes underlying solicitation by religious organizations);
United States v. Christian Echoes Ministry, 404 U.S. 561, 564-65 (1972) (per curiam) (holding
that the IRS could not appeal directly to the Supreme Court the ruling of a federal district
court to the effect that the IRS's redetermination of § 501(c)(3) exempt status was done in a
manner violative of the rights of an admittedly religious organization; the IRS had sought to
examine all of the religious organization's activities and to characterize them as either "relig-
ious" or "political" and, if political, then "non-religious").
234. Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 702-08 (1994); Gillette v. United States, 401
U.S. 437, 449-51 (1971); see also Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 n.23 (1982) (distin-
guishing and explaining Gillette). The rationale, in part, is that the Court wants to avoid mak-
ing membership in a denomination of legal advantage or other significance. If the rule stated
in the text was not the law, then merely holding religious membership would result in the
availability of a civil advantage. For example, it would violate the rule stated in the text if
Congress were to confer conscientious objector draft status "on all Quakers," for that may
induce conversions (real or pseudo) to Quakerism. On the other hand, the government pur-
posefully may utilize classifications based on a person's religious belief or practice-as distinct
from denominational affiliation-to lift civil burdens from those individuals. For example,
Congress may confer conscience objector draft status on religious pacifists who oppose war in
any form. See Grumet, 512 U.S. at 715-16 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); Gillette, 401 U.S. at 448-60. This is consistent with the rule that government
can either treat all alike, not concerning itself with unintended effects, or government can
purposefully lift civic burdens from individuals based on their religious practices. What is
impermissible is to lift such burdens based on an. individual's denominational or religious
affiliation.
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in some cases it is the religious rights claimant inviting the Court to make
the inquiry into religious doctrine, and it is the Court refusing to do so.2
35
Thus, the rule could not be vindicating a free exercise right.-3 Some would
even expand the concept ofjurisdictional dismissals and dual sovereigns as




Viewing church autonomy cases as a structural bar to a court's subject
matter jurisdiction is yet another way of demonstrating that the Establish-
ment Clause is power limiting. And, of course, it buttresses this Article's
thesis for why a clearer understanding of the cases follows when the Estab-
lishment Clause is openly acknowledged as structural in character.
D. THE RULE OF NONDELEGATION
In cases such as Kedroff and Milivojevich, the Establishment Clause kept
the prerogatives vested in religion from being undermined by the govern-
ment's interference with a church's affairs. The rule of nondelegation that
emerges from Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc. 2 11 is the logical corollary to the
foregoing rule. In Larkin, the Establishment Clause operated to keep coer-
cive power traditionally vested in government from being transferred to a
church.
In Larkin, a state enacted a zoning statute that sought to protect
houses of worship, schools, and hospitals from the tumult of close proxim-
ity to taverns and bars. Under the statute, when a proprietor applying for a
liquor license selected a site within 500 feet of a house of worship, the
church or synagogue affected was notified and permitted to veto the li-
cense's issuance.239 The Supreme Court overturned the statute as exceeding
the no-establishment restraint.
421
The Larkin Court first noted the mutual objectives internal to the Es-
tablishment Clause. One objective is to prohibit government from propa-
gating religion or sponsoring its sacerdotal activities. The complimentary
objective is to prohibit government from intruding into the precincts of the
church.241' Both objectives require vigilant boundary keeping. The statute in
235. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 604 n.30 (stating that a uniform rule denying all
tax exemptions to racially discriminatory schools avoids entanglement).
236. A free exercise right could be waived by the claimant. But if the operative principle is
a constitutional limit on the Court's power, then the objection to judicial inquiry into religious
doctrine cannot be waived. Thus, it can be inferred that the rule of law in these cases is struc-
tural in origin.
237. See, e.g., O'Brien & O'Brien, Separation, supra note 164, at 259. The O'Briens quote
James Madison on several occasions writing about church-state relations in terms of govern-
inent lacking jurisdiction over ecclesiastical matters. They also briefly explicate the common
law in England and a few states that regard matters of church-state relations as jurisdictional.
238. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
239. Id. at 117-19.
240. Id. at 123.
241. The Larkin Court stated:
[T]he objective is to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either
Church or State into the precincts of the other ....
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Larkin violated the first objective. The Court held that the sovereign power
ordinarily vested exclusively in the agencies of government could not be
delegated to a religious organization, as was done by the zoning legislation
in assigning to churches a standardless veto power over licenses. 2 The
Court stated the prohibited relationship in terms of forbidden "en-
mesh[ment], 243 "fusion,"244 or "union"245 of religion and government.
These characterizations alone are insufficient. A better understanding fol-
lows from the Court's explication of the harm that the nondelegation rule is
designed to prevent: "At the time of the Revolution, Americans feared...
the danger of political oppression through a union of civil and ecclesiastical
control. '24 In Larkin, the political oppression took the form of ecclesiastical
control over a valuable business license. Matters of commerce are for regu-
lation by the states pursuant to their police power. Ordinary commerce is
not in the jurisdiction of the church.247
The rule in Larkin is that sovereign power ordinarily vested exclusively
in government cannot be delegated to a religious organization. When
Larkin is combined with cases such as Kedroff and Milivojevich, the Estab-
lishment Clause must be seen as a power-limiting clause that arrests abuses
running in either direction: government delegating away an exclusive
authority to religion, or government intruding into matters that are in re-
ligion's exclusive purview. These two types of abuses result in two different
kinds of harm: the political oppression (hence, harm to the body politic or
civitas) that follows when government assists religion in aggrandizing
power; and the undermining of religion and religious groups (reli-
gare/ekklesia) that follows from government's overinvolvement in religious
• . . The structure of our government has, for the preservation of civil
liberty, rescued the temporal institutions from religious interference. On the
other hand, it has secured religious liberty from the invasion of the civil
authority.
Id. at 126 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
242. Id. at 127 ("The Framers did not set up a system of government in which important,
discretionary governmental powers would be delegated to or shared with religious institu-
tions."). Moreover, the manner of a church's exercise of the veto power was wholly discretion-
ary, for there were no standards to which the church was to conform. Id. at 125; see also id. at
127 ("The veto] substitutes the unilateral and absolute power of a church for the reasoned
decisionmaking of a public legislative body acting on evidence and guided by standards.").
243. Larkin, 459 U.S. at 126, 127.
244. Id. at 126.
245. Id. at 127 n.1O.
246. Id.
247. A violation of the nondelegation rule is infrequent because it is uncharacteristic for
government (or any entity or individual for that matter) to attempt to give away its power.
Hence, at the Supreme Court level only one case besides Larkin had nondelegation as a prob-
lem. See Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 689-702 (1994) (plurality opinion) (holding
a state's creation of a public school district coterminous with the boundaries of a Jewish sect's
village enclave is "tantamount to an allocation of political power on a religious criterion").
Additional examples of the violation of the nondelegation rule might include government
transfers to a church of the power to tax or the power of eminent domain.
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affairs. These reciprocal boundary-keeping objectives necessarily entail
regarding the Establishment Clause as structural.
Part IV has shown that the Supreme Court views the Establishment
Clause as a structural restraint. This is evident from its standing cases and
its awarding of class-wide relief in successful Establishment Clause cases, as
well as from its jurisdictional dismissals, its way of conceptualizing the ju-
ridical status of churches, and its application of the nondelegation rule.
These multiple lines of analysis force to the surface the non-Hohfeldian
character of Establishment Clause injuries and, hence, the application of
the Establishment Clause as a power-limiting clause. Just how the Estab-
lishment Clause protects religion from government-a function that many
conceive as a task for the Free Exercise Clause-is the topic of the next
Part.
V. TWIN AIMS: TO AVOID GOVERNMENT INDUCING RELIGIOUS FACTION INTO
THE BODY POLITIC AND GOVERNMENT UNDERMINING RELIGION
Since the Everson decision in 1947, the Justices of the Supreme Court
have proposed all manner of verbal formulae in their attempts to give
greater specificity to the scope of the Establishment Clause. Most promi-
nent are the two-prong purpose-effect test first set down by Justice Clark in
School Dislrict of Abington Township v. Schempp,24 with later accretion of an
"entanglement" prong by Chief Justice Burger writing in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man,249 and the "no endorsement" test first propounded by Justice
O'Connor in Lynch v. Donnelly.20 Both the Lemon and "no endorsement"
tests conceptualize the Establishment Clause as having two tasks, that is, as
248. The purpose-effect test was twice stated in School District of Abington Township. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963): "[T]o withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there
must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion." Id. at 222. Furthermore:
The place of religion in our society is an exalted one, achieved through a
long tradition of reliance on the home, the church and the inviolable citadel
of the individual heart and mind. We have come to recognize through bitter
experience that it is not within the power of government to invade that cita-
del, whether its purpose or effect be to aid or oppose, to advance or retard.
Id. at 226.
249. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The Court's Lemon test with the added entanglement prong is as
follows: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must
not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion." Id. at 612-13 (internal quota-
tion and citation omitted). Recently the Court appears to have absorbed the entanglement
prong back into the effect prong, explaining that entanglement analysis requires an examina-
tion of the same evidence as that sifted under the effect prong. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203, 234-36 (1997). This is a minor but sensible development.
250. 465 U.S. 668, 690-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor expanded
upon and explained her "no endorsement" test in Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69-79 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) and sought to defend it against criticism in Capitol Square Review &
Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 773-83 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
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restraining the government from projecting its power in either of two di-
rections.2"'
The first of these tasks is the obvious one of preventing government
from singling out religion for special promotion or official sponsorship.
The Clause's second task is far more curious to the modem jurist. The Su-
preme Court's premise is that certain forms of governmental support for
religion are ultimately bad for religion. Justice Rutledge, writing in Everson,
described this dual role of the Establishment Clause, emphasizing that for
the sake of religion (at least religion that hopes to maintain its integrity)
there should not be too close an embrace by government or a resulting
dependence on its treasury:
Now as when it was adopted the price of religious freedom is
double. It is that the church and religion shall live both within
and upon that freedom. There cannot be freedom of religion,
safeguarded by the state, and intervention by the church or its
agencies in the state's domain or dependency on its largesse. The
great condition of religious liberty is that it be maintained free
from sustenance, as also from other interferences, by the state.
For when it comes to rest upon that secular foundation it vanishes
with the resting.252
Justice Souter, writing in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of
Virginia,25 likewise noted this double restraint in the interstices of the no-
establishment principle: "TIlhe dual objectives of the Establishment Clause
[are] ... to protect individuals and their republics from the destructive con-
sequences of mixing government and religion [and] ... to protect religion
from a corrupting dependence on support from the Government.""
It does not surprise us modems when the Supreme Court announces
that certain governmental attempts to advance religion will result in harm
251. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (stating that the Clause was meant to prevent the perception of
endorsement or disapproval of religion); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (approving an effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222 (stating that the Establish-
ment Clause neither advances nor inhibits religion); id. at 226 (stating that it is not within
government power to aid or oppose, to advance or retard religion).
252. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 53 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
253. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
254. Id. at 891 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan had earlier acknowledged this
double aspect to the Establishment Clause:
It has rightly been said of the history of the Establishment Clause that "our
tradition of civil liberty rests not only on the secularism of a Thomas Jeffer-
son but also on the fervent sectarianism ... of a Roger Williams."
Our decisions on questions of religious education or exercises in the pub-
lic schools have consistently reflected this dual aspect of the Establishment
Clause.
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 259-60 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting PAUL A. FREUND, THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS BUSINESS, PURPOSES, AND PERFORMANCE 84
(1961)).
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to the body politic (the civitas) in the form of religious factionalism within
the republic.25 5 The Court's collateral proposition, however, that certain
forms of governmental aid can be corrupting or otherwise harmful to re-
ligious faith (religare) or religious organizations (the ekklesia), is-at least to
the novice-counterintuitive. This latter proposition is that religion is not
only free from governmental interference, but also free from those forms of
governmental aid that in practice work to undermine its integrity.
Consider how the Court's premise-that certain attempts by the gov-
ernment to aid religion will end up undermining religion-works in prac-
tice. Assume Riverside Church is offered a federal grant to expand its cleri-
cal staff and construct an addition to its house of worship, thereby increas-
ing the number of parishioners it can serve. The Parish Council, following
protracted and careful consideration, votes unanimously to accept the
money. The Council promptly embarks on a new hiring and building pro-
gram. If challenged as unconstitutional, should a court deny the grant out
of a constitutional requirement to protect Riverside Church from the unto-
ward consequences that accompany government support of religious min-
istries? Although advantageous in the short term, perhaps taking the
money will over time prove harmful to Riverside Church in terms of lQss of
autonomy or timidity in its critique of the government's latest policy initia-
tive. On the other hand, should not each religion or local church be able to
judge for itself whether taking the grant compromises its message or mis-
sion? How does the Establishment Clause divine which public benefit pro-
grams will bring injury to a religious community such as Riverside Church
that, having carefully deliberated the matter, believes itself more helped
than hindered by the proffered grant?
Commentators have puzzled over the Supreme Court's invocation of
the Establishment Clause to protect religious organizations from their own
decisions to seek governmental aid.2 56 This puzzlement is based on a two-
fold assumption: the task of safeguarding religion from harmful govern-
ment actions is that of the Free Exercise Clause, whereas the task of the
Establishment Clause is to keep government from supporting the cause of
religion.257 However,.when the Establishment Clause is viewed as a struc-
tural restraint the juridical task of confining government to the civil sphere
also keeps government from being involved with inherently religious mat-
ters.25 This in turn prevents government invasion into the sphere reserved
255. The government-induced harm to the body politic that the Establishment Clause is
designed to prevent is discussed infra notes 400-11.
256. E.g., Laycock, supra note 182, at 1378-88, 1416;.Robert E. Riggs,Judicial Doublethink
and the Establishment Clause: The Fallacy of Establishment by Inhibition, 18 VAL U. L REv. 285
(1984). But cf Laycock, supra note 75, at 380 ("The other set of harms from noncoercive es-
tablishments is to the religious majority.").
257. See Laycock, supra note 182, at 1384 ("Government support for religion is an element
of every establishment claim.").
258. See infra notes 329-63 and accompanying text (discussing regulatory burden on, and
exemptions for, religious organizations).
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for religion, including government-proposed forms of financial aid that
may ultimately compromise religion. Moreover, this protection of religion
from seemingly benign assistance is one of the Establishment Clause's twin
objectives, not just an incidental effect of the Clause's operation.
A structuralist view of the Establishment Clause thus explains how the
no-establishment principle comes to protect religion even from a govern-
ment's well-meaning attempt to support it, solving yet another doctrinal
riddle. It makes sense that within the constitutional scheme for the Estab-
lishment Clause, one of its two tasks is to protect religion from govern-
ment.259 Safeguarding individual religious belief and practice is the object
of the Free Exercise Clause, and no one seriously doubts the appropriate-
ness of secular government protecting the free exercise of its citizens. If the
Establishment Clause has as one of its two objects the avoidance of in-
volvement with that sphere of activity reserved to religion, that too is a
secular objective." At times various religions will, of course, make decisions
that result in harm to themselves. That is not the concern of the Establish-
ment Clause. Rather, the aim of the Clause is for government to avoid activi-
ties that harm the integrity of religion (religare) or religious organizations
(the ekklesia).
The Clause thereby has the ironic twist, on more than just a few occa-
sions, of protecting religion from its own bad choices. In the illustration,
the Establishment Clause would prohibit the federal grant to Riverside
Church, and the rationale, inter alia, is that aid of that nature would be
detrimental to religious organizations. But how is it that the no-
establishment principle presumes to tell the church what is best for the
church?
A. VOLUNTARISTIC RELIGION
Precursors to the separate ordering of government and religion, and
259. The rejection of a vigorous protection for "church autonomy," insofar as the Clause's
protection of religion is justified by religious thought, is just prejudice against religious epis-
temology (and favoritism toward secular liberalism). See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty
as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 313, 324 (1996) ("These religious beliefs are consistent
with the Constitution, and they are among multiple reasons that motivated a broad coalition to
enact constitutional guarantees of religious liberty. But these religious beliefs cannot be im-
puted to the Constitution without abandoning governmental neutrality on religious ques-
tions."). This is the sort of discrimination that these selfsame scholars have rightly condemned
in others. The Constitution, however, is an open book; its interpretation allows for drawing
upon both secular and religious thought, or whatever else influenced the Framers. In this
instance, some of the best justifications for the Establishment Clause include religious thought.
See Berg, supra note 69, at 732-33 (agreeing with Professor Laycock's theory but allowing for
its justification in religious terms); see also Stephen L Carter, The Free Exercise Thereof, 38 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1627, 1640-41 (1997) (arguing that state interests are inferior to free exercise
interests because the struggle to know God is the purpose of human existence); Michael Stokes
Paulsen, God Is Great, Garvey Is Good: Making Sense of Religious Freedom, 72 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1597, 1598, 1606 (1997) (arguing that protecting free exercise only makes sense if God
exists).
260. See infra notes 282-92 and accompanying text.
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the view that such ordering is best for religion, are found in developments
in the sixteenth century. With the Reformation, there began to evolve in
the Western world an understanding that authentic religion presupposes
adherents coming to their faith free of state coercion.26' Two and a half
centuries later, the Enlightenment, with its celebration of reason and the
individual, routed the remaining vestiges of Constantinianism. 26 2 In Amer-
ica, unlike Great Britain and the European Continent, this resulted in more
than mere official toleration of dissenting religions. Developments in po-
litical theory on these shores took a unique turn resulting in religious vol-
untarism: the juridical stance that beliefs and practices that are inherent to
religious faith are not to be the intentional object of governmental influ-
ence.263 Government could, of course, continue to legislate about morality,
but it was to refrain from matters inherently religious.2 That uncommon
turn of events is today reflected in the strictures laid down by the Estab-
lishment Clause. It accounts for why the government is restrained from
involvement with prayer, devotional Bible reading, the teaching of religious
doctrine, veneration of the Ten Commandments, 265 and similar practices
that are inherently religious.
21
Voluntarism is not merely the.absence of official coercion. It is also the
absence of the government's influence concerning inherently religious be-
liefs and practices. Official coercion of religiously informed conscience can
(and often will) result in individual religious injury. Such injury or harm is a
matter to be addressed by the Free Exercise Clause.2 67 But government can
261. Winthrop S. Hudson, The Theological Basis For Religious Freedom, 3J. CHURCH & STATE
130, 134-35 (1961); David Little, The Reformed Tradition and the First Amendment, in THE FIRST
FREEDOM: RELIGION & THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 73, at 17, 28, 34-35.
262. See supra note 75 (citing authorities summarizing the alliance between pietists and
rationalists in the effort to achieve disestablishment).
263. The term "voluntarism" can be confusing because it is not used narrowly in the sense
of uncoerced belief or practice. Voluntarism means that government is restrained from active
and intentional involvement in inherently religious affairs. Historically the term referred to
"the voluntary church," meaning that a church is most genuine when it draws support from
responding hearts and minds entirely unassisted (as well as undeterred) by government. See
TRIBE, supra note 2, § 14-3, at 1160 (Voluntarism means "that the advancement of a church
would come only from the voluntary support of its followers and not from the political support
of the state.").
Because the term "voluntaristic" is confusing, perhaps its use ought to be abandoned.
Indeed, that may already be taking place. The principle that government should act, either
when imposing burdens or extending benefits, so as to influence as little as possible individual
religious choices in the newer literature is being called "substantive neutrality," see Douglas
Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L REV.
993 (1990), or simply "neutrality theory," see Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for Govern-
mental Cooperation with Faith-Based Social Service Providers, 46 EMORy LJ. 1, 4-5, 20-22 (1997).
264. See infra notes 468-70 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 20 (describing restrictions on governmental actions).
266. Further discussion concerning the Supreme Court's distinction between laws touching
on practices that are "inherently religious" and laws that have a basis in societal mores appears
infra notes 451-61,478 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 436 and accompanying text.
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act in ways that shape people's religious choices, albeit its acts fall short of
coercion. For example, a public school teacher who, at the close of each
school day in December, urges her students to "remember to keep Christ in
Christmas," does not force anyone to do anything and erects no official
barriers to the religious observance (or nonobservance) of her students.28
Yet, it is these more furtive influences that undermine religious voluntarism
and therefore are prohibited. 9 The Supreme Court accomplishes this task
through the restraint on government built into the Establishment Clause.270
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in Wallace v. Jaffree,271 ac-
knowledged that voluntarism, as a step beyond preventing coercion of con-
science, has been recognized by the Court as part of the government-re-
ligion settlement in the First Amendment:
[Jihe Court has unambiguously concluded that the individual
freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment em-
braces the right to select any religious faith or none at all. This
conclusion derives support not only from the interest in respect-
ing the individual's freedom of conscience, but also from the con-
viction that religious beliefs worthy of respect are the product of
free and voluntary choice by the faithful. .272
From the perspective of constitutional law, then, religions of integrity
("worthy of respect") are those religions subscribed to and held wholly
apart from the government's influence. Justice Blackmun has likewise ob-
served that one idea underlying no-establishment is that "religion flour-
ishes in greater purity, without than with the aid of Government."
273
Therefore, so as to abound ("flourish") and avoid corruption ("purity"), by
law religions may not depend on certain forms of governmental aid. For
religious belief to be genuine it must be the product of ecclesial institutions
with integrity and vitality.274 The Court's position is a religious proposition
268. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 233 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("[Ilt maybe doubted whether the
Constitution which, of course, protects the right to dissent, can be construed also to protect
one from the embarrassment that always attends nonconformity, whether in religion, politics,
behavior or dress.").
269. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 606 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Our decisions have gone be-
yond prohibiting coercion.., because the Court has recognized that the fullest possible scope
of religious liberty... entails more than freedom from coercion.") (quotation and citation
omitted).
270. In the example of the public school teacher, the Establishment Clause restraint is
exceeded as a result of the teacher's remark regardless of whether some or all students are
Christians, some or all subscribed to a non-Christian religion, or some or all hold no religion.
See infra notes 420-21, 425, 440 and accompanying text. The no-establishment restraint being
transgressed quite independent of any individual harm is, of course, indicative of its structural
character.
271. 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (overturning a state law requiring a moment of silence in public
schools for prayer or meditation).
272. Id. at 52-53 (footnotes omitted).
273. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 608 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (internal quotation and citation
omitted).
274. See Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development:
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that overlaps with a secular one. This constitutional settlement was born, in
part, of the untoward experience that "any religion that had relied upon
the support of government to spread its faith"27 lost the people's respect.
Religious persecution has brought eventual ruin to the cause of the domi-
nant faith. 76
Looking back over half a century of public life, James Madison ob-
served that the improvement of religion following disestablishment in Vir-
ginia and elsewhere in the South was proof that the experiment with vol-
untarism was good for religion:
And if we turn to the Southern States where there was, previous to
the Declaration of Independence, a legal provision for the sup-
port of Religion; and since that event a surrender of it to a spon-
taneous support by the people, it may be said that the difference
amounts nearly to a contrast in the greater purity & industry of
the Pastors and in the greater devotion of their flocks, in the lat-
ter period than in the former .... [Ihe existing character, dis-
tinguished as it is by its religious features, and the lapse of time
now more than 50 years since the legal support of Religion was
withdrawn sufficiently prove that it does not need the support of
Govt .... 277
When James Madison wrote that conditions in the states had favored relig-
ion, he meant conditions favored voluntaristic religion, that is, religion
untainted by the government's purposeful favortism.
27s
Part II. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L REV. 513, 517 (1968) ("Institutional inde-
pendence of churches is thought to guarantee the purity and vigor of their role in society, and
the free competition of faiths and ideas is expected to guarantee their excellence and vitality
to the benefit of the entire society.") (footnotes omitted).
275. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,431 (1962).
276. Theologian and Union Seminary professor, Robert L Dabney, observed over a cen-
tury ago:
The history is, that no communion ever persecuted which did not cut its own
throat thereby .... The persecuting communion dies, either by the hand of
the outraged and irresistible reaction it produces; or if the persecution is
thorough, by the syncope and atrophy of a spiritual stagnation, that leaves it
a religious communion only in name.
ROBERT LEWIS DABNEY, Religious Liberty and Church and State, in LECTURES IN SYSTEMATIC
THEOLOGY 873, 877 (Zondervan Pub. House ed., 1972) (1878).
277. Letter from James Madison to Rev. Adams (1832), in WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON,
supra note 67, at 484, 486.
278. In 1822, James Madison, now an elder statesman, wrote to Edward Livingston:
lI]t is impossible to deny that [in Virginia] Religion prevails with more zeal,
and a more exemplary priesthood than it ever did when established and pa-
tronized by Public authority. We are teaching the world the great truth that
Govts. do better without Kings & Nobles than with them. The merit will be
doubled by the other lesson that Religion flourishes in greater purity, with-
out than with the aid of Govt.
Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in XI WRITING OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 67, at 98, 102-03.
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Although formal alliances between government and church yielded
grudgingly in America, genuine religious faith is now presumed (from the
perspective of the First Amendment) to be a matter of personal inquiry and
persuasion 279 rather than official privilege or juridical status. Influenced as
it was by the common cause of Protestant pietists and devotees of the En-
lightenment, 20 the constitutional settlement now lodged in the Establish-
ment Clause leaves religious communities to attract members by force of
their doctrine and appeal of their beneficence, not by the imprimatur of
officialdom. Most certainly, then, the government should not become an
agent for achieving religious propagation. The Establishment Clause, ap-
plied by a Supreme Court that presumes voluntarism, now restrains gov-
ernment when its actions involve the civic arm in inherently religious mat-
ters. And the Clause does so, in part, to protect religion-that is, voluntar-
istic religion. 8
B. A LIMITED STATE
A natural correlative to the first principle-voluntarism-is that relig-
ions that point to a transcendent authority help check the power of the
modern nation-state. This is because such religions refuse to recognize the
state's sovereignty as absolute. Transcendent religions posit another sover-
eignty-a God (or gods)-that is (are) beyond, before, and superior to the
state. Indeed, theistic religion posits a Sovereignty that sits in judgment
over the state, its ambitions to temporal power, and its pretensions of infal-
libility. It is for this reason that at crucial points in Western history the in-
stitutional church had a "pivotal role in guarding against political absolut-
"0282ism.
279. Gerard V. Bradley, Church Autonomy in the Constitutional Order: The End of Church and
State, 49 LA. L. REV. 1057, 1059 (1989); Garvey, supra note 35, at 285-86.
280. See SMrrH, supra note 108, at 15-26 (explicating the role of Isaac Backus, a New Eng-
land pastor, as a type representing the evangelical theory of church-state relations); supra note
75. See also supra note 254 in which Justice Brennan, concurring in Schempp, acknowledged
that history shows that both Protestant pietism and Enlightenment rationalism gave rise to the
Establishment Clause.
281. Given this very Protestant perspective of government-religion relations, especially the
individualistic view that religious faith is genuine only if the product of free will, it is little
wonder that some non-Protestants chafed at Everson's extension of voluntaristic religion to
state and local governments. Consider, for example, the Roman Catholicism of John Courmey
Murray, supra notes 10 1-12 and accompanying text, and Richard John Neuhaus, supra note
112 and infra note 476, as well as the Judaism of Stephen Feldman, infa note 476.
282. Bradley, supra note 279, at 1072. When individuals in a society believe that human
rights are derived from an authority higher than the state, it invites self-criticism of the acts of
state. This renders the totalitarian state illegitimate and places religo-moral restraints an the
use of political power. See ALDOUS HUXLEY, Politics and Religion, in GREY EIlNENCE: A STUDY
IN RELIGION AND POLrrIcs 288 (3d ed. 1941):
Totalitarian politicians demand obedience and conformity in every sphere
of life, including, of course, the religious .... [T]he only kind of religion
they favour is strictly anthropocentric, exclusive and nationalistic. Theocen-
tric religion, involving the worship of God for his own sake, is inadmissible
in a totalitarian state. All the contemporary dictators, Russian, Turkish,
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Religare ("to bind") and the ekklesia (churches) are realities that carry
major political implications. Transcendent religion is indeed too powerful
to allow politics to control it, and thus the Constitution disestablished it.
The complete opposite-the privatization of religion-is equally in error.
With privatization, politics has the field to itself and becomes paramount.
This is the twentieth century error on both the right and the left, Fascism
and Communism, respectively.283 By being the guardian of absolute truths,
religion, to its followers, relativitizes all else. By asserting absolutes, which is
what religion does, the contingency of truths that are of lessee order (politi-
cal truths) are blocked from their totalitarian impulse. Those members of
society holding the most raw power-those with control of government's
machinery-cannot, via their raw power, become absolute. Relativizing the
political operates to expand that social space that is nongovernmental, and
in turn to give breathing room to individuals, families, neighborhoods,
schools, and other mediating groups.
Sociologist Peter L. Berger has explained how theism works to the
benefit of democracy and of the state. When the state understands itself as
limited, it will not attempt to provide the ultimate meanings to life that
people find within religiol. In totalitarian experiments, the state over-
reached and sought to fill the people's spiritual needs. This the state is in-
capable of doing. Berger began by observing that "a state that guarantees
religious liberty" thereby "acknowledges, perhaps without knowing it, that
its power is less than ultimate."2"4 Berger then tied in how the government-
religion separation is crucial to this role of restraining the nation-state. It is
"an intriguing paradox," noted Berger, that if the church is to do this
"secular service" of enhancing democracy and expanding human liberties,
the church's contribution "is possible only if religion itself remains other-
worldly. 285 Religion, here, intends transcendence; it points to realities be-
yond the world of the ordinary and everyday life. This otherworldliness is
Italian and German, have either discouraged or actively persecuted any re-
ligious organization whose members advocate the worship of God, rather
than the worship of the deified state or the local political boss.
Id. at 309.
283. This is also the postmodernist error. Because postmodernists believe that there are no
immutable principles to guide the nation, all societal decisions are relegated to the democratic
political process. See Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling the Just Bounds Between Church and
State, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2255, 2330-33 (1997) (presenting an impressive postmodernistjere-
miad against the feigned neutrality of liberalism). But if there are no fixed truths to precondi-
tion politics, then there is no reason to be tolerant of others. Why then should those in politi-
cal power bind themselves to the means and ends of democratic processes? Everything be-
comes possible. In the end, postmodernism ends up cannibalizing the culture that gave rise to
it.
284. Peter L. Berger, The Serendipity of Liberties, in THE STRUCTURE OF FREEDOM:
CORRELATIONS, CAUSES & CAUTIONS 1, 15 (Richard John Neuhaus ed., 1991); see also supra
note 34 (quoting William Clancy and Max L Stackhouse).
285. Berger, supra note 284, at 16; see HUXLEY, supra note 282, at 315-21 (giving an ac-




intrinsic to the very definition of most Western systems of religion (and
many outside the West), and it is why religion attracts human interest in the
spiritual and, for many, inspires ultimate allegiance."
When religions, or their institutions, abandon this focus on the "wholly
other" and embark on mimicking organizations with trendy social or politi-
cal agendas, then people, maintained Berger, lose interest in those relig-
ions.287 This worldly use of religion to limit the state, he argued,
[W]ill diminish to precisely the degree that religious institutions
themselves become more worldly .... The religious institution
that becomes indistinguishable from other institutions, such as
political lobbies or therapeutic agencies or radical caucuses (or,
needless to add, conservative caucuses), in very short order has
great difficulty answering the question of why it should exist as a
separate institution at all.288
The numbers indicate that people lose interest in religion when churches
let the things of this world set their agenda. Churches making primary their
"social relevance" to the here-and-now are in decline, whereas those that
keep central their focus on the transcendent are growing.289 This is not to
say that religious organizations should eschew engagement in social work
or oppose official injustice as they see it. If led in those directions, religious
communities should pursue the prophet's call. But when political activism
becomes their overweening preoccupation, then the observed pattern is
that such religious organizations wither.29 If that development comes to
pass, such churches are too weak to serve as a counterweight to the modern
affirmative state.
For both secular and religious reasons, then, care should be taken so
that governmental programs do not transform ecclesiastical organizations
into little more than societies for social betterment. Justice Blackmun, con-
curring in Lee v. Weisman,29' linked the vitality of religion and democracy
with these words:
The Establishment Clause protects religious liberty on a grand
scale; it is a social compact that guarantees for generations a de-
mocracy and a strong religious community-both essential to
safeguarding religious liberty. Our fathers seem to have been
perfectly sincere in their belief that the members of the Church
would be more patriotic, and the citizens of the State more relig-
286. Berger, supra note 284, at 14-15; see also Carter, supra note 259, at 1637-38.
287. Berger, supra note 284, at 16.
288. Id.
289. DEAN M. KELLEY, WHY CONSERVATIVE CHURCHES ARE GROWING: A STUDY IN
SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 20-35, 87-153 (1962).
290. HUXLEY, supra note 282, at 298-321 (observing that the spiritual authority of a church
leader dissolved with his new focus on political concerns); Carter, supra note 259, at 1636-37,
1660 (drawing on the writings of Soren Kierkegaard).
291. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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ious, by keeping their respective functions entirely separate.29
Out of concern for religion, the Establishment Clause has a role in pre-
venting those forms of governmental sponsorship that may turn churches
into mere franchises for implementing the current social agenda of the
state. In turn, democracy has a stake in the Establishment Clause protecting
religion from its own bad choices, to the end that religion-at least religion
that intends transcendence and calls its followers to ultimate allegiance-
thereby has the vitality to limit the state.
C. CIVIL RELIGION
In addition to voluntarism and the notion of a limited state is the haz-
ard of cultural religion. 3 Cultural religion is the confusion of genuine re-
ligious faith with one's pride in tradition, love of country, and the badge of
having entered into full acceptance as a citizen of a nation. It is the eleva-
tion of certain ceremonies, holidays, and other habits of a nation, all good
in themselves, to the level of the sacred. Concomitantly, certain sacraments
and holy days of the church come to be regarded as rites of passage in
proper civic life. In this blurring of the line between religion and civic cul-
ture, it is genuine religion, observed Justice Brennan, that is the likely
loser: "It is not only the nonbeliever who fears the injection of sectarian
doctrines and controversies into the civil polity, but in as high degree it is
the devout believer who fears the secularization of a creed which becomes
too deeply involved with and dependent upon the government."2 Cultural
religion, then, is the conflating of religious piety with sentimentality for the
nation. In its extreme, sociologists term this phenomenon "civil religion,"
which comes about when the predominant religion is so closely merged
with national self-identity that patriotism and nationalism march hand in
hand with spirituality.29 5 Garry Wills, in a biting commentary that leaves no
292. Id. at 606 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
293. See PETER L. BERGER, THE NOISE OF SOLEMN ASSEMBLIES: CHRISTIAN COMMITMENT
AND THE RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT IN AMERICA 39-57 (1961) (describing cultural religion of
late 1950s American Protestantism); John A. Lapp, Civil Religion Is But Old Establishment Writ
Large, in KINGDOM, CROSS AND COMMUNITY 196 (John Richard Burkholder & Calvin Redekop
eds., 1976) (discussing Anabaptist concern with civil religion as shaping their view of church-
state relations). See generally AMERICA, CHRISTIAN OR SECULAR? READINGS IN AMERICAN
CHRISTIAN HISTORY AND CIVIL RELIGION (Jerry S. Herbert ed., 1984); ROBERT LINDER &
RICHIARD PIERARD, TWILIGHT OF THE SAINTS: BIBLICAL CHRISTIANITY & CIVIL RELIGION IN
AMERICA (1978).
294. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 259 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring); see also Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 804 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("(One] purpose of separation and neutrality is to prevent the trivialization and degradation of
religion by too close an attachment to the organs of government.")
295. Wilber G. Katz & Harold P. Southerland, Religious Pluralism and the Supreme Court, in
RELIGION IN AMERICA 269, 273-74 (William G. McLoughlin & Robert N. Bellah eds., 1968);
Frank Staff, Rendering to Caesar What Belongs to Caesar: Christian Engagement with the World, 18J.
CHURCH & ST. 95 (1976) (Civil religion's "primary reference is to the state which assumes
properties, functions, or claims of religion, but it applies also to religion which knowingly or
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doubt that in his view the church has sold out, surveyed the American land-
scape in these words:
[R]eligion plays a very political role here. By acquiescing in the
standards of our rulers, the churches give them tacit endorsement
... Thus is religion trapped, frozen, in its perpetual de facto ac-
commodation of power. It becomes a social ornament and but-
tress, not changing men's lives, only blessing them .... Religion
is invited in on sufferance, to praise our country, our rulers, our
past and present, our goals and pretensions, under the polite fic-
tion of praying for them all. The divine is subordinated to the
human-God serves Caesar. This is what Americans quaintly call
"freedom of religion," and what the Bible calls idolatry.2"
As the author of Schempp, Justice Clark faced a firestorm of criticism
from short-sighted religionists. His response was that the critics ought not
to be dismayed but relieved, for it is religion that "gets hurt when there is a
confusion of patriotism with genuine religion."297 Thus, Justice Clark de-
fended Schempp not in terms of the result being good for nonreligiofis peo-
ple or those of minority faiths, but as being good for mainline religions that
hope to retain their integrity.
Civil religion is used to rationalize away as not "inherently religious"
what are otherwise clear violations of the Establishment Clause. For exam-
ple, the Court has passed off prayers by legislative chaplains29 and gov-
ernmental displays depicting the birth of Jesus Christ as practices that
are not religious. Civil religion is the culprit and authentic religion the in-
evitable victim.
The chaplaincy and Christmas-display cases were decided over dis-
sents by Justices that saw the long-term consequence of mistaking religion
for agreeable traditions. In Marsh v. Chambers,s°° a case challenging the con-
stitutionality of using prayer to open state legislative sessions, Justice Bren-
nan said that one of the purposes of the Establishment Clause "is to prevent
the trivialization and degradation of religion by too close an attachment to
unknowingly worships the state or accords to it status, function, or authority beyond the
proper limits of [the] state."). A renewed interest in civil religion was initiated by Robert N.
Bellah's essay Civil Religion in America, which is reprinted, together with chapters both for and
against it, in AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION, supra note 227.
296. GARRY WILLS, BARE RUINED CHOIRS: DOUBT, PROPHECY, AND RADICAL RELIGION
259-60 (1972).
297. Tom C. Clark, Religion and the Law, 15 S.C. L REv. 855, 863-64 (1963).
298. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791 (upholding practice of hiring chaplain for the offering of
prayers in the state legislature).
299. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding government display of
the nativity of Christ as part of larger holiday display); cf, e.g., County of Allegheny v. Greater
Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 620-21 (1989) (upholding public display of menorah but
disallowing nativity of Christ).
300. 463 U.S. 783.
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the organs of government."' ' Others on the Court have opposed Decem-
ber holiday displays, inter alia, out of concern for protecting religion from
acculturation. 2 In the context of disputes over religious symbols, the fear
was the exploitation of a nativity of Jesus for the purpose of Christmas re-
tail marketing. The degradation of the nativity was compounded when the
Court majority characterized the Christian symbol as little more than an
agreeable tradition indistinguishable from a Santa house, a reindeer-drawn
sleigh, or a talking wishing well. 33
Vibrant religion often defines itself in opposition to culture. Indeed,
sociologists have observed that in certain respects religion needs to be in
tension with or resistant to the prevailing course of culture.?° When a re-
ligion assumes the role of a political party or takes up the reins of civil
power, it loses its energizing distinctiveness and apartness. Tocqueville had
seen this happen with Christianity in his native France:
[I]n forming an alliance with a political power, religion augments
its authority over a few and forfeits the hope of reigning over all.
The unbelievers of Europe attack the Christians as their political
opponents rather than as their religious adversaries; they hate the
Christian religion as the opinion of a party much more than as an
error of belief; and they reject the clergy less because they are
representative of the Deity than because they are the allies of
government. 05
To become wholly comfortable with the culture is to threaten the long-term
survival of the religion. A right ordering of government and religion can
avoid a civil religion that anesthetizes individuals from the felt urgency of
making religious decisions.0" In short, the Establishment Clause works on
301. Id. at 804-05 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
302. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 643-44 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
id. at 650-51 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 712,
725 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 727 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
303. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 712 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 725 ("[T]he Framers of
the Establishment Clause understood that religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy to
permit its unhallowed perversion by civil authorities.") (citation and internal quotations omit-
ted); id. at 727 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[The nativity scene] has been relegated to the role
of a neutral harbinger of the holiday season, useful for commercial purposes, but devoid of
any inherent meaning and incapable of enhancing the religious tenor of a display."); Laycock,
supra note 75, at 380 ("Government by its sheer size and prominence will have a dispro-
portionate influence on the kinds of rituals .that are exercised and on public percep-
tion of what are appropriate rituals .... Government-sponsored religion is theologi-
cally and liturgically thin. It is politically compliant. It is supportive of incumbent
administrations .... In tolerant communities, efforts to be all-inclusive inevitably
lead to desacralization .... ).
304. Carter, supra note 259, at 1636-39.
305. ToCQUEVILLE, supra note 85, at 310-14.
306. Civil religion can also be harmful to voluntary faith when it tries to move outside the
favoring nation. Religious bodies claim to be universal; thus they make appeals to potential
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behalf of voluntary religion."7
D. A CAPTIVE CHURCH
The final reason government-religion separation is good for religion
is that it forstalls a loss of control by churches over their schools and social
welfare ministries. A church that receives government sponsorship is vul-
nerable to having its ministries redirected to ends dictated by government
policy and enforced by regulatory controls attached to the state funding.0"
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 9 the Court warned what can happen if a church-
related school indiscriminately enters into a partnership with government:
[-fhe program [being reviewed] requires the government to ex-
amine the school's records in order to determine how much of
the total expenditure is attributable to secular education and how
much to religious activity. This kind of state inspection and
evaluation of the religious content of a religious organization is
fraught with the sort of entanglement that the Constitution for-
bids. It is a relationship pregnant with dangers of excessive gov-
ernment direction of church schools and hence of churches. The
Court noted "the hazards of government supporting churches" in
Walz v. Tax Commission ... and we cannot ignore here the danger
that pervasive modem governmental power will ultimately in-
trude on religion and thus conflict with Religion Clauses.
The history of government grants of a continuing cash subsidy
indicates that such programs have almost always been accompa-
nied by varying measures of control and surveillance. The gov-
ernment cash grants before us now provide no basis for predict-
ing that comprehensive measures of surveillance and controls will
not follow. In particular the government's post-audit power to in-
spect and evaluate a church-related school's financial records and
followers that do not stop at national boundaries. But the peoples of other countries under-
standably resist the teachings of the national established church because they mistake it for
either an instrument to advance the cultural hegemony of the nation or as a tool to serve the
foreign policy aims of a colonizing government.
307. See generally JOHN C. BENNETT, CHRISTIANS AND THE STATE 217-25 (1958) (summa-
rizing arguments for why it is better for the churches not to be established as a state church).
308. Congress recognized the importance to religious organizations of limiting hiring to
coreligionists in order to maintain control over the direction of their ministries and remain
faithful to their defining doctrines. See Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S.
327, 335 (1987) ("[Ilt is a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant governmental
interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their missions..
. ."); see also id. at 342-43 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that religious
organizations may condition employment on an applicant's religion).
309. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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to determine which expenditures are religious and which are
secular creates an intimate and continuing relationship between
church and state."1°
This is not to say that all (or even most) governmental funding to faith-
based institutions violates the Establishment Clause. It is to say that the
program, its attendant oversight, and the nature of the aid must be de-
signed to prevent this intrusion by government into religion's sphere.,
n
Religious ministries are often motivated by unselfish love of neighbor,
not a desire to serve the policy aims of government. Churches should be
moved by the promptings of their faith and ennobling self-sacrifice, not
political initiatives by government. Once the church is responding more to
state policy goals than to the teachings of its own lights, spontaneity is
dulled and the fervor and allegiance of its workers wane. s1 2 In turn, as the
Court has observed, those outside the religion respond with disrespect and
derision:
The history of governmentally established religion, both in Eng-
land and in this country, showed that whenever government had
allied itself with one particular form of religion, the inevitable re-
sult had been that it had incurred the liatred, disrespect and even
contempt of those who held contrary beliefs. That same history
showed that many people had lost their respect for any religion
that had relied upon the support of government to spread its
faith.313
310. Id. at 620-22; see Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 803-04 (1983) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) ("[One] purpose of separation and neutrality is to keep the state from interfering in
the essential autonomy of religious life, either by taking upon itself the decision of religious
issues, or by unduly involving itself in the supervision of religious institutions or officials.")
'(footnotes omitted).
Intense monitoring of religious activities by government officials is "excessive entan-
glement" and thereby violative of the Establishment Clause. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,
234-36 (1997) (acknowledging the Clause's prohibition on excessive monitoring, but holding
that evidence of such monitoring in this particular case was absent). For numerous examples
of regulatory entanglement that accompanied governmental benefit programs, see CARL H.
ESBECK, THE REGULATION OF RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AS RECIPIENTS OF GOVERNMENTAL
ASSISTANCE 11-39 (1996); JOE LOCONTE, SEDUCING THE SAMARITAN: HOW GOVERNMENT
CONTRACI'S ARE RESHAPING SOCIAL SERVICES (1997).
311. For an argument concerning permitted and prohibited programs of financial aid, see
ihfra notes 376-411 and accompanying text.
312. See Robert Booth Fowler, A Skeptical Postmodern Defense of Multiestablishment. The Case
for Government Aid to Religious Schools in a Multicultural Age, in EVERSON REVISITED: RELIGION,
EDUCATION, AND LAWATTHE CROSSROADS, supra note 96, at 167, 184:
Even if [complete government control] does not occur, critics fear that as
government assistance grows, the sense of conviction and sacrifice within
communities sustaining religious schools will inevitably ebb. With it may de-
part the very life of the religious community that was the reason for estab-
lishing the parochial school in the first place.
Id.
313. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,431 (1962) (footnote omitted).
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When religious groups enter into partnerships with government, the
relationship, unless properly structured, is inherently unequal. Government
will attempt to dominate the terms of the "cooperation." Churches always
have the option of turning away the money if they think the regulations
become too intrusive. But pulling out of a program is not always feasible if a
ministry has come to depend on the government funding.
Governmental funds are in a sense political monies.' A recipient of
political money may be deterred from acting to undermine the status quo.
Consequently, the churches find themselves posing a diminished counter-
witness to the political standing order. Churches should guard against be-
coming tepid in their critical witness to those in power. In extreme cases
churches have found themselves in complete servility to the state. The
Church of England, for example, used to be mocked as the Tory Party at
prayer. Churches should consider their role, albeit a secondary one, as
champions for justice. If churches are to speak prophetically and thereby
criticize and shape governmental policy, they must remain unshackled from
civic control. Try as they might, institutionally subservient churches inevita-
bly are reduced to mere chaplaincies, echoing the political rhetoric of ei-
ther the left or the right. 15
Constitutional structure, among its other virtues, separates the two
centers of authority and protects the integrity of both. When the Establish-
ment Clause is viewed as structural, it then makes sense that one of its tasks
is to protect the integrity of religion. As discussed in this Part, the no-
establishment principle does so to the benefit of voluntaristic religion and
to the benefit of limited government. Part VI begins to sort out the ramifi-
cations to conventional First Amendment understandings when the Estab-
lishment Clause is applied as a structural restraint.
VI. THE CONSEQUENCES OF REGARDING THE CLAUSE AS STRUCTURAL
Openly applying the Establishment Clause as a structural, rather than
a rights-based, clause would bring about a shift in how judges and litigants
conceptualize problems involving government-religion relations. The
question explored in this Part is whether the Supreme Court's controlling
cases come out any differently as a consequence of this new paradigm.
Given that the principal argument of this Article is that in several instances
the modern Court has sub silentio applied the Establishment Clause as
structural, it would be expected that the number of overall changes in final
314. Justice Jackson, dissenting in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), noted:
Nor should I think that those who have done so well without this aid would
want to see this separation between Church and State broken down. If the
state may aid these religious schools, it may therefore regulate them. Many
groups have sought aid from tax funds only to find that it carried political
controls with it.
Id. at 27.
315. See supra text accompanying notes 277, 288, 294, 296, 297, and 305 (marshalling
views concerning how religion can be hurt by improper relationships with government).
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results (as opposed to expressed rationale) would not be great. That indeed
turns out to be the case. However, the ones that would change are impor-
tant. Moreover, because the Court's First Amendment doctrine has at times
placed the Establishment Clause in conflict with the Free Exercise and Free
Speech Clauses, a most welcomed analytical change flowing from a struc-
turalist view is that the Court would avoid these imagined "tensions" fall
away.3 Finally, in Employment Division v. Smith317 the Supreme Court cut
back on the scope of the Free Exercise Clause, and Congress's legislative
attempt to restore the status quo ante was overturned in City of Boerne v.
Flores.18 With the loss of a vigorous free exercise principle, it is of no small
importance that the Establishment Clause be reclaimed as a robust struc-
tural restraint on government.
A. WEIGHING THE IMPORTANCE OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICES
For reasons of simplicity, it is best to start with some rules of law that
would not change under a structuralist view. The Supreme Court has held
that matters of religious belief or practice need not be "central" to a claim-
ant's faith to be protected by the First Amendment. 19 Indeed, the CQurt
has said that judges have no authority to weigh the relative importance of
religious words, practices, and events, neither against other practices of the
same denomination nor against competing governmental interests. 320 As a
parallel principle, the Court has held that claimants may disagree with
coreligionists or be unsure or wavering, and still have their causes taken up
for free exercise protection.32" ' Additionally, in order not to wrongly attach
juridical significance to an individual's sectarian affiliation, the Court has
said that legislative classifications are not to turn on denominational mem-
bership. 22 The foregoing rules are part of a larger admonition by the
Court that, whenever possible, governmental officials should eschew de-
tailed inquiries into religious doctrine323 and avoid probing the significance
316. See infra notes 361-63, 365-68, 385-87, 414-17 and accompanying text (discussing the
argument that the First Amendment Clauses are in "tension" and why that claim is false).
317. 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see supra note 31 and infra note 435 (discussing Smith).
318. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997) (holding unconstitutional the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994), insofar as it regulated state action, because the
legislation exceeded the power delegated to Congress in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment).
319. See cases cited supra note 230.
320. See supra note 233.
321. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
322. The Supreme Court wants to avoid making church membership of legal significance
for two reasons. First, membership, as well as denial of or removal from membership, are
inherently religious decisions. Second, if this was not the rule of law, merely holding religious
membership could result in a civil advantage. See cases cited supra note 234.
323. See supra notes 172-75, 199-203. The boundary-keeping role of the Establishment
Clause requires that in one important respect the task of differentiating matters in the com-
petence of government from those in the sphere of religion cannot be avoided. See infra Part
VII.B. Indeed, performing that task is required in order to have a boundary at all.
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of religious words, practices, and events. A shift to a structuralist view would
not change these rules of law. The only change would be that the founda-
tion for these rules would be explicitly attributed to the Establishment
Clause.
This Article previously discussed the nondelegation rule, most promi-
nently represented by Larkin,324 the intrachurch dispute cases from Watson
to Milivojevich,325 and the Court's use of two definitions of 'religion,' -  the
latter depending on whether the parties to the dispute invoke the Free Ex-
ercise Clause or Establishment Clause. These three lines of case authority
would not change under a structuralist application. Indeed, as argued pre-
viously, these three clusters of judicial precedent make sense only when no-
establishment is regarded as a structural restraint.
Under the current case law, government cannot penalize sacrilege,
blasphemy, or other activity that does no more than speak ill of another's
religion.327 Additionally, government cannot compel an individual, upon
pain of material penalty, inconvenience, or loss of public benefit or advan-
tage, to profess a religious belief or to observe an inherently religious prac-
tice.32 Once again, these rules of law, long promulgated by the Court,
would not change under a structuralist view. There would be no doubt,
however, that the basis for these rules is the Establishment Clause rather
than the Free Exercise Clause.
B. REGUIATORYBURDENS ON RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
A structuralist perspective would resolve the conflict in the Supreme
Court's cases dealing with generally applicable regulatory legislation, the
burden of which falls on, among others, religious organizations. Given that
a structuralist view reserves a sphere of autonomy for religious groups,329
regulatory burdens that touch on matters in the religious domain (doctrine,
polity, clerics, church membership) violate no-establishment. This is so, not
as a matter of group or associational rights, but as a matter of government
exceeding its jurisdiction as limited by the Establishment ClauseY ° Assume,
324. See supra notes 238-47 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 163-98 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
327. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 506 (1952) (striking down a law
permitting censorship of films that are "sacrilegious"); see also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97, 107 n. 15 (1968) (discussing blasphemy statute in dictum).
328. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961) (overturning oath declaring belief in
God that was required as a prerequisite for public office); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S.
78, 86 (1944) ("Freedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious belief, is basic in a
society of free men."). In the case of compelled profession of faith of an atheist, the purview of
the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses overlap and complement each other. See infra note
425 (discussing how atheists and agnostics are protected by free speech and no-establishment
principles).
329. See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 220-23 and accompanying text (concluding that religious organiza-
tions have no specialized group or associational rights).
84 IOWA LAWREVIEW
for example, that Congress enacts immigration legislation that denies visas
to all nonresident aliens desiring to enter the United States and to secure
permanent employment. On its face, the legislation is unquestionably con-
stitutional as an exercise of power delegated-to the federal government.3"'
Now assume that Riverside Church in New York City wants to "call" as its
new pastor a citizen and resident of England. The act has the effect of pre-
venting Riverside Church from employing the cleric of its choice, hence the
law intrudes into that sphere reserved to religion."3 2 Because the legislation
exceeds the restraint on congressional power set down in the Establishment
Clause, the act, as applied to Riverside Church, should not be enforced.
This was indeed the disposition in Rector of Holy Trinity Church v. United
States,333 albeit the Court devised a most unusual rule of statutory construc-
tion to reach that result rather than relying, as it should have, on the Es-
tablishment Clause.34
The Establishment Clause is never violated merely because a law, neu-
tral in purpose, has an unintended impact on a particular church or relig-
ious practice.3 Accordingly, the immigration legislation in this illustration
does not violate the Establishment Clause because the law has a disparate
effect on Riverside Church. Rather, .the immigration legislation violates the
Establishment Clause because the act interferes with the relationship be-
tween clergy and church. That relationship is in the exclusive sphere of
religion. Moreover, the immigration legislation is not simply unconstitu-
tional as applied to Riverside Church. Rather, the act is unconstitutional as
to all religious organizations desiring to employ clerics not holding U.S.
citizenship. That is how a structural clause operates: it gives class-wide relief
to all religious organizations, in contrast with the victim-specific relief of a
rights-based clause.3 6 The immigration legislation remains enforceable, of
course, as to nonreligious organizations.
3 37
Under a structuralist perspective, then, legislators imposing regulatory
burdens on the private sector must take care not to intrude on religious
organizations' sphere of autonomy. The Supreme Court has reached this
331. See U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cf. 4; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952)
(stating that the Alien Registration Act of 1940 was within the power of Congress).
332. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
333. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
334. Id. at 462 (adopting a rule of statutory construction that assumes, in absence of clear
legislative intent to the contrary, that Congress meant to exempt churches, thereby avoiding
the issue of church autonomy).
335. See supra note 30 (noting that when a secular purpose merely has a disparate effect on
some religions but not others, the Establishment Clause is not violated).
336. See supra notes 154-62 and accompanying text (describing the nature of class-wide
relief granted in Establishment Clause cases).
337. This autonomy is unique to religious organizations because the Establishment Clause
restrains government's power only as to religion. Notwithstanding occasional speculations to
the contrary, see Howe, supra note 210, at 94-95 (extending Kedroff to nonreligious groups),




result in its parochial school cases when adverse effects befell these schools
as a result of unemployment compensation taxes" 8 and mandatory collec-
tive bargaining laws. 39 However, the Court's rationale avoided dealing
frontally with the issue of Congress exceeding its power. These cases would
come out the same under a structuralist application but with ecclesiastical
autonomy protected without any timidity in stating that such a result is re-
quired by the Establishment Clause.
In Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor,4 0 a religious
organization challenged federal maximum hour and minimum wage legis-
lation as applied to the activities of an evangelistic and social welfare min-
istry. Because the legislation applied only to activities undertaken with a
business purpose, the law had no impact on the normative ecclesiastical
activities of a church or evangelistic society."' The U.S. Department of La-
bor sought wage and hour enforcement only for the ministry's far-flung
operations including "service stations, retail clothing and grocery outlets,
hog farms, roofing and electrical construction companies, a recordkeeping
company, a motel, and companies engaged in the production and distribu-
tion of candy." 2 The Supreme Court held that the Establishment Clause
was not violated." 3 That result would be unchanged under a structuralist
application. The boundary-keeping role of the Clause requires the drawing
of a line between church and state-one that is fixed, not adjusted on a
case-by-case basis depending on the vagaries peculiar to the specific relig-
ion in question.144 Because the regulatory burden fell only on the business
operations of a religious organization, matters of ordinary commercial
character, the regulated activities were within the sphere of civil govern-
ment and thus a proper object of legislation.
Unlike Alamo, Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. California Board of Equaliza-
tion"' would be decided differently if no-establishment were viewed as a
structural restraint. Swaggart involved a constitutional challenge to a state
sales tax. The state sought to apply the tax to an evangelistic organization's
sale of religious literature, tapes, and related merchandise" 6 Although the
purchaser paid the tax, the seller (here, the evangelistic ministry) collected
338. St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 780-81
(1981) (applying rule of statutory construction that assumes, in absence of clear legislative
intent to the contrary, that Congress intended to exempt all parochial schools).
339. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (adopting a rule of statutory construc-
tion that assumes, in absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary, that Congress intended
to exempt all parochial schools).
340. 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
341. Id. at 305.
342. Id. at 292.
343. Id. at 305-06 (stating that record-keeping requirements of wage and hour law did not
have the primary effect of inhibiting religion or creating an excessive entanglement between
church and state).
344. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
345. 493 U.S. 378 (1990).
346. Id. at 381-82. There is, of course, no Establishment Clause problem with imposing a
general tax on consumers of goods, some of whom are purchasers of religious goods.
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and remitted the tax to the state. Because the ministry failed to collect the
tax, it was principably liable to the state for the entire amount.
The Swaggert Court first inquired whether collecting the tax was a
burden on the religious beliefs of the ministry, and found that it was not.31
7
That way of framing the issue, as a right to be free of substantial religious
burdens, comports with the Free Exercise Clause test under the case law
before Employment Division v. Smith."' With a structuralist interpretation,
tie proper inquiry is jurisdictional: whether the government has legislative
power over the activity in question. If the nature of the ministry's activity to
which the tax is applicable is inherently religious, then the activity falls
within that sphere reserved to the church-specifically, the communication
of doctrine and other religious teaching directed to the faithful as well as
the would-be proselyte. Because the tax indeed fell on acts of religious
teaching and evangelism," 9 the state's use of its police power against the
ministry invaded that zone of activity that the Establishment Clause re-
serves to religion."s
Refusing to respect the distinction made in Alamo between commercial
and inherently religious activity, 51 the Swaggart Court held that collecting
.the tax from the ministry did not violate the Establishment.Clause. 52 This
was in error. When upholding property tax exemptions for religious groups
in Walz v. Tax Commission,"'5 the Supreme Court correctly said it no more
347. Id. at 384-92.
348. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that generally applicable legislation, neutral as to re-
ligion, does not violate the Free Exercise Clause notwithstanding a disparate effect on the
religious practices of the claimant).
349. See Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (holding that a revenue law
which imposed a tax on resident preachers who sold books of sermons for their support was a
law regulating religious activity and thus violative of First Amendment); Murdock v. Pennsyl-
vania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (holding that sale of books of sermons by itinerant preachers was
religious activity, thus not subject to flat license tax). A three-judge plurality in Texas Monthly,
Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989), sought to "explain" Follett and Murdock by limiting their
scope. Id. at 21-25. The reasoning is specious, but in any event a plurality cannot overrule
Follett and Murdock.
Making an evangelistic association the tax collector for the modem affirmative state,
as the sales tax law did in Swaggart, is also problematic because of the nondelegation rule. See
supra notes 238-47 and accompanying text (discussing the rule of nondelegation).
350. The Establishment Clause is never violated just because a neutral law has a disparate
impact on a religious organization or religious practice. See supra note 30, and text accompa-
nying notes 335 and 344. Accordingly, the sales tax law is not violative of the Establishment
Clause merely because the tax has a disparate effect on the evangelistic ministry in question.
Rather, the sales tax violates the Establishment Clause because, as applied to religious organi-
zations, the law touches upon the inherently religious activities of doctrinal teaching and
evangelism. The tax may, of course, continue to be applied to sales by secular organizations.
351. Swaggart, 493 U.S. at 395. The Federal Unrelated Business Income Tax, 26 U.S.C. §
511 (1994), makes this distinction. Religious activity of religious organizations is not subject to
income tax, but commercial activity of religious organizations is taxable. The issue is not "en-
tanglement" as such, but disallowing intrusion into inherently religious matters while allowing
intrusion into commercial matters.
352. Swaggart, 493 U.S. at 392-97.
353. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
ESTABLISHMENT CLA USE
makes sense for the state to tax the church than it does for the church to
tax the state.3" Each is sovereign within its own sphere. A stucturalist appli-
cation would have had the Swaggart Court following the rationale in Walz
and Alamo.
355
C. EXEMPTIONS FOR RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
The current Supreme Court rule is that the government may refrain
from imposing a regulatory burden on religion, even as it imposes the bur-
den on others similarly situated.15 ' Hence, this type of classification between
religion and nonreligion (or even irreligion) is permitted. A structuralist
perspective would not change that result. Indeed, it would strengthen the
rule by giving the cases a more secure foundation in the power restraints of
the Establishment Clause.
354. Writing for an 8-1 majority, ChiefJustice Burger said:
The hazards of churches supporting government are hardly less in their
potential than the hazards of governments supporting churches; each rela-
tionship carries some involvement rather than the desired insulation and
separation. We cannot ignore the instances in history when church support
of government led to the kind of involvement we seek to avoid.
Id. at 675.
355. Institutional autonomy has its limits, of course, even when a church or other religious
organization is acting on matters at the very core of its jurisdictional sphere. M. SEARLE BATES,
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: AN INQUIRY 301 (1945); Note,Judicial Intervention in Disputes over the Use
of Church Property, 75 HARV. L REV. 1142, 1185 (1962). The oft-used example is of a religion
that is acting on a supposed doctrine of child sacrifice. Other ready examples are fraudulent
schemes promising miracle healings to physical ailments, and exhortations to followers to
assault former members who, having "left the fold," are revealing insider secrets. Obviously,
civil society has the ability to protect the most basic human needs for bodily safety and the
security of property. "[W]ithin the sphere of religious associations' internal affairs, judicial
abstention can never be absolute." BATES, supra, at 1185.
When the acts of the church are malum in se, the government may redress the wrong-
doing by a civil rights prosecution or the imposition of tort liability for the church's intentional
acts. Cf. supra notes 171, 199-201 (dismissing action because the claim is an ordinary tort, not
an intentional tort malum in se).
356. See, e.g., Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (exempting
religious employers from prohibitions on religious discrimination); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 234 n.22 (1972) (describing how exemption for religious organization from compul-
sory education law does not violate Establishment Clause); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S.
437, 460 (1971) (upholding a religious exemption from military draft for those who oppose all
war does not violate Establishment Clause); Walz, 397 U.S. at 673 (upholding a property tax
exemption for religious organizations); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding a
program for student release from compulsory education to attend religious exercises off public
school grounds); Arlan's Dep't Store v. Kentucky, 371 U.S. 218 (1962), Commonwealth v.
Arlan's Dep't Store 357 S.W.2d 708 (app'l dismissed for want of a sub'l fed'l question) (holding
that a religious exemption from a Sunday dosing law is not violative of the Establishment
Clause); The Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1918) (upholding military serv-
ice exemptions for clergy and theology students); cf Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S.
1, 24-25 (1989) (plurality opinion) (striking down a sales tax exemption benefiting the sale of
sacred literature).
84 IOWA LAW REVIEW
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos.5 is the leading case. Amos
upheld an exemption for religious organizations in federal civil rights leg-
islation. The civil rights act in issue prohibited employers generally from
discriminating on the basis of religion, but religious employers were ex-
empt. Rejecting the argument that such exemptions unconstitutionally ad-
vance religion, the Court said it is proper for Congress "to alleviate signifi-
cant governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to
define and carry out their missions."' ' A better definition of a structuralist
view could hardly be written. The rationale in favor of exemptions is two-
fold. First, to have "established" a religion connotes that government must
have played some active role ("Congress shall make no law. .. .") in bring-
ing about that which is forbidden. Conversely, for government to passively
leave religion where it found it logically cannot be "mak[ing]" a law with
respect to religion.359 Second, to enhance the desired separation, reduce
civic-religion tensions, and minimize government-religion interactions are
all justifications that make the boundary-keeping role of the Establishment
Clause easier. These rationales suggest a jurisdictional division between
government and religion of which regulatory exemptions are just the tech-
nical acknowledgement of the prior constitutional settlement.
Some have argued that exemptions from regulatory burdens for re-
ligious organizations3" violate the no-establishment principle by advancing
religion.3"' The argument belies a view of the Establishment Clause either
as requiring government to affirmatively work against religion or as grant-
ing an individual right to be freefrom religion. This makes no sense. Exten-
sion of this line of reasoning culminates in the argument that by protecting
the free exercise of religion the government is advancing religion, thereby
violating the no-establishment principle. That "logic" leads to the Free Ex-
357. 483 U.S. 327.
358. Id. at 335.
359. See Laycock, supra note 182, at 1416 ("The state does not support or establish religion
by leaving it alone."). Amos also makes it clear that for a government to "refrain from imposing
a burden" is logically no different from "lifting a burden" imposed in the past. In Amos, a
burden first imposed in 1964 was lifted in 1972. Amos, 483 U.S. at 335-36; see also Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 83 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (discussing lifting
government-imposed burdens as part of an accommodation analysis).
360. Amos and Walz are most explicit in making the salient distinction between govern-
mental benefits and regulatory burdens. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 327 ("A law is not unconstitu-
tional simply because it allows churches to advance religion." The Lemon test is violated only
when." government itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influence."); Walz,
397 U.S. at 673 ("We cannot read New York's statute as attempting to establish religion; it is
simply sparing the exercise of religion from the burden of property taxation levied on private
profit institutions."). The special availability of a governmental benefit raises a more difficult
Establishment Clause claim than government refraining from the imposition of a burden. See
infra notes 377-411 and accompanying text.
361. See Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary
Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L REv. 555, 592-96, 611-12 (1991); William P. Marshall,
The Case Against Free Exercise Exemptions, 40 CASE W. REs. L REv. 357, 388-94 (1990).
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ercise Clause being violative of the Establishment Clause!3 62 An accurate
statement of the Court's rule is that the government cannot intentionally
discriminate against religion. The rule is not one of blind equality as be-
tween religion and nonreligion, as the Court correctly held in Amos.3 63 To
spare religious organizations regulatory burdens on their ecclesiastical en-
deavors, effectively "leaving the church where the government found it," is
to facilitate the boundary-keeping role of the Establishment Clause. That
role is not one-sided. Half of the reason for the boundary-drawing is to
keep the state out of the church.
D. SPEECH OFRELUGIOUS CONTENT
During the 1980s and 1990s, in an unbroken line of victories for free-
dom of speech, the Supreme Court held that the religious expression of
individuals and religious organizations was entitled to the same high pro-
tection accorded nonreligious expression (e.g., speech of political, artistic,
or educational content)." Although the Free Exercise Clause grants no
preference to private religious expression,365 the Free Speech Clause calls
for equal treatment. No-aid separationists framed their challenge as a clash
of two First Amendment rights: the right under the Free Speech Clause to
freedom of religious expression without discrimination versus an Estab-
lishment Clause right to a government that does not aid religion (the aid
here taking the form of the use of public property to convey a religious
message). With the issue so framed, no-aid separationists invited the Court
to balance the conflicting Clauses hoping to tip the scale in the direction of
their bias for a public square denuded of all religion. They lost. However,
362. Justice White warned against such absurdities when he observed in Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333, 372 (1970) (dissenting opinion), that the Free Exercise Clause is itself a
law that by its express terms exempts religion from certain civic duties. Although the govern-
ment cannot intentionally favor secular activity over religious activity, Church of Lukumi Ba-
balu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), in certain instances government can
choose not to burden religious activity by regulations or taxes when others are so burdened,
Amos, 483 U.S. at 335.
363. Writing for a unanimous Court in Amos, Justice White said: "A law is not unconstitu-
tional simply because it allows churches to advance religion, which is their very purpose. For a
law to have forbidden 'effects' under Lemon, it must be fair to say that the government itself has
advanced religion through its own activities and influence." Amos, 483 U.S. at 337.
364. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (finding
viewpoint discrimination in university's denial of printing costs for student-initiated religious
publication); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (finding
content-based discrimination against religious speech in public forum was not justified by
Establishment Clause); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384
(1993) (finding viewpoint discrimination); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (finding
content discrimination); see Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (upholding Equal
Access Act, legislation that prohibits discrimination against religious speech at public high
schools).
365. Heffron v. International Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 652-53
(1981) (upholding the regulation of solicitation at state fair grounds, including that carried on
by religious organizations).
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as they had urged, the Court did frame the issue in such a way that Estab-
lishment Clause compliance could, in theory at least, supply a "compelling
interest" for subjugating the Free Speech Clause. A structuralist perspective
would reach the same result-namely equal access for religious expres-
sion-but reject framing the issue as a "clash between the Clauses."
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette" is illustrative of the
Supreme Court's analysis creating an unnecessary "tension" between the
Free Speech Clause and the Establishment Clause. In Pinette, a state had
created a public forum in a park by allowing citizens to erect temporary
displays symbolizing their groups' message. But when the Ku Klux Klan
sought permission to erect a Latin cross during the Christmas season, state
officials balked. The Klan then sued for impairment of its free speech rights
and eventually won.
The Supreme Court said that when speech is of religious content or
viewpoint, and hence protected from discrimination by the Free Speech
Clause, compliance with the Establishment Clause could provide a compel-
ling governmental justification for suppressing the speech.36 This makes
no sense. There is nothing in the text of the First Amendment that suggests
that when Clauses ostensibly conflict, the Establishment Clause overrides
the Free Speech Clause. One could just as arbitrarily presume that the Free
Speech Clause preempts the Establishment Clause.36 What the Court ought
to conclude from this apparent "tension" is that it has taken a wrong turn
when interpreting one or both Clauses.
This "battle of the Clauses" goes away when the Establishment Clause
is conceptualized as a structural restraint. If the speaker is private rather
than governmental, then the Free Speech Clause supplies a right of equal
access to the forum, and the expression cannot be suppressed simply be-
cause it is religious. There is never any "tension" with the Establishment
Clause, real or apparent, for that Clause is a restraint on government
rather than on private actors. Hence, a court's task in cases like Pinette is to
first determine if the speaker is private or governmental. If private, then
the Establishment Clause is irrelevant. If governmental, then the individ-
ual-rights orientation of the Free Speech Clause is irrelevant. One First
Amendment Clause is never "balanced" against the other.
There will be cases, of course, in which it is a close call whether the
speech of a private individual is adopted by the government as its own. If
the facts are such that the speaker is private but the government is doing
366. 515 U.S. 753.
367. Id. at 761-62, 783 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). The Pinette Court went
on to hold that on these facts, the Establishment Clause was not violated by the presence of the
Latin cross in the park. Id. at 770. Hence, the state was ordered to permit the display on the
same basis as all other displays permitted in the park. Id.
368. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982)
("[]e know of no principled basis on which to create a hierarchy of constitutional values."). A
wit might suggest to the Court that the Clauses, being equally fundamental, cancel each other
out. That arithmetic leaves the Court with zero law on the subject!
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something to place its power or prestige behind the message, then the no-
establishment restraint still applies.369 The remedy, however, should not
aim to suppress the private speech as such, but instead to enjoin only those
governmental actions that are uniquely endorsing the private religious
message.
The rules are altogether different when the religious speech is not pri-
vate but fairly attributed to government or its officials. The government
itself has no free speech rights.37° Rather, government has a duty to see to it
that its actions conform to the restraints on its power set down in the Estab-
lishment Clause. In accord with this boundary-keeping role, the Supreme
Court has held that government may neither confess inherently religious
beliefs37 nor advocate that individuals profess such beliefs or observe such
practices.372 Government may acknowledge the role of religion in society
and teach about its contributions to, for example, history, literature, music,
and the visual arts. 3  However, the limit imposed by the Establishment
Clause is exceeded when the government's expression places its imprima-
369. See Treen v. Karen B., 653 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1981), affid mem., 455 U.S. 913 (1982)
(holding that statute authorizing student volunteers to lead classroom prayer in public schools
violates Establishment Clause).
370. Nor does the Free Exercise Clause allow the government at the behest of the political
majority to impose religion on all others: "While the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the
use of state action to deny the rights of free exercise to anyone, it has never meant that a ma-
jority could use the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs." School Dist. of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963). Consequently, there is no conflict here be-
tween the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause either.
371. For examples of cases in which government was unconstitutionally confessing inher-
ently religious beliefs, see County of Allegheny v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989)
(dealing with public display of nativity of Jesus as the Messiah); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39
(1980) (per curiam) (dealing with the posting of Ten Commandments in school classrooms).
But compare Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding nativity of Jesus situated
among other holiday displays).
372. For examples of cases in which government was unconstitutionally advocating that
individuals profess inherently religious beliefs or that they observe such practices, see Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (prayer); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (teaching
creationism); Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (encouraging prayer); Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97 (1968) (prohibiting teaching evolution); Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (prayer and dev(,-
tional Bible reading); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (teacher-led prayer); McCollum v.
Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (facilitating the teaching of religion). But compare
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding legislative chaplain and prayer).
There are narrow exceptions to this rule in situations in which government has iso-
lated individuals from their religious community, such as in the armed forces or in prison. In
these "special environments," government may bring religion to individuals because govern-
ment is responsible for the individuals' inability to obtain the requisite religious services at
their own initiative. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 299 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) ('[H]ostility, not
neutrality, would characterize the refusal to provide chaplains and places of worship for pris-
oners and soldiers cut off by the State from all civilian opportunities for public communion.");
Wilber G. Katz & Harold P. Southerland, Religious Pluralism and the Supreme Court, 96
DAEDALUS 180, 186 (1967) (same).
373. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 606-08 (Powell, J., concurring); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225;
McCollum 333 U.S. at 235-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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tur on a religion or on an inherently religious belief or practice. 74 A struc-
turalist view would not change the result in any of these cases.375
E. GOVERNMENTALAID TO RELIGION
Governmental aid to religion takes both direct and indirect forms. The
Supreme Court has analyzed these two forms somewhat differently. With
indirect aid, the government confers a benefit on private individuals who in
turn exercise personal choice in using their governmental benefit at simi-
larly situated organizations, whether public or private, religious or nonre-
ligious. If some individuals choose to "spend" their benefit at a provider of
services that also happens to be religious in character, arguably religion is
thereby advanced. Nevertheless, when this occurs, the Court has deter-
mined that the Establishment Clause is not violated.
76
The rationale for this rule is two-fold. First, the constitutionally salient
cause of any indirect benefit to religion is the self-determination of numer-
ous individuals, not a choice by the government.3 17 Merely enabling private
choice-where individuals may freely choose or not choose services from. a
religious provider-logically cannot be a governmental establishment of
374. The government's imprimatur can, of course, be on symbolic speech such as a relig-
ious display on public property. See supra note 371.
375. Under a structuralist application, then, the Supreme Court's principles of law con-
cerning religious propagation in public schools would not change. Classroom prayer and
devotional Bible reading by school officials would continue to be prohibited. Similarly, al-
though public schools cannot teach religion, they may teach about religion.
376. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (providing special education
services to Catholic student not prohibited by Establishment Clause); Witters v. Washington
Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (upholding a state vocational rehabilitation
grant to disabled student choosing to use grant for training as a cleric); Mueller v. Allen, 463
U.S. 388, 399-400 (1983) (upholding a state income tax deduction for parents paying school
tuition); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (upholding loan of secular textbooks to
parents of school-age children); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding a
state law providing reimbursement to parents for expense of transporting children by bus to
school, including parochial schools); Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370
(1930) (upholding state loan of textbooks to parents with students enrolled in school, public
and private). Even the Justices on the Supreme Court who dissented from its most recent
ruling upholding governmental benefits for religious groups concede that nondiscriminatory
programs of indirect aid do not violate the Establishment Clause. See Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 879-81 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (distinguishing
indirect from direct funding of religious institutions and acceding to the constitutionality of
the former); see also Durham v. McLeod, 192 S.E.2d 202 (S.C. 1972), app'l dismissed for want of a
sub'lfed'l question, 413 U.S. 902 (1973). Durham was dismissed on the same day the Court de-
cided Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (striking down a program
that aided only private schools). In Durham, the state court upheld a student loan program
wherein students could attend the college of their choice, religious or secular, public or pri-
vate. Durham, 182 S.E.2d at 203-04. Similarly, the Court in Nyquist indicated that educational
assistance provisions such as the G.I. Bill do not violate the Establishment Clause even when
some students choose to attend church-affiliated colleges. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782 n.38.
377. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399, 400.
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religion. Second, the indirect nature of the aid reduces government-relig-
ion interaction and government's oversight and regulation of faith-based
service providers. This enhances the institutional separation of government
and religious organizations that is desirable from the perspective of the
boundary-keeping task of the Establishment Clause. 8 Under a structuralist
application, these indirect funding cases would not change.379
Governmental programs that provide direct aid to the private sector
are, in the Court's view, a different matter. A structuralist perspective would
facilitate a change in this case law, as well as much needed clarification and
simplification. Direct-aid programs, funded out of general revenues,
380
must have a secular purpose, typically the improvement of education,
health care, or social welfare. The question is whether faith-based organi-
zations"' can fully participate in such programs on an equal basis with
other providers,382 or if they must be barred from participation because
378. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970).
379. There are numerous familiar programs that illustrate the rule stated in the text. See
e.g., Federal Pell Grants, 20 U.S.C. § 1070a (1994) (providing federal aid to students attending
their college of choice, including those affiliated with a church); 26 U.S.C. §§ 170, 501(c)(3)
(1994) (allowing individual income tax deductions for contributions to charitable organiza-
tions, including those that are religious); Post-Viemam Era Veterans' Educational Assistance,
38 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3243 (1994) (creating the G.I. Bill); Section 104 of the Personal Responsi-
bility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 604a (Supp. 11 1996)
("charitable choice" provision in the recent federal welfare reform legislation permitting
vouchers); The Child Care and Development Block Grant Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9858-
9858q (Supp. II 1996) (providing federal child care certificates for low-income parents en-
rolling their child in preschool).
In the Church Arson Prevention Act, Pub. L 104-155, § I 10 Stat. 1394 (1996), signed
by President Clinton on July 3, 1996, Congress made use of the neutrality principle. Section 5
of the Act provides for nonprofit organizations exempt under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code, who out of racial or religious animus are victims of arson or terrorism, to ob-
tain federally guaranteed loans through private lending institutions. This means churches can
obtain the necessary credit to repair or rebuild their houses of worship, and can do so at re-
duced interest rates. The Act, quite sensibly, treats churches like all similarly situated exempt
nonprofit organizations. The secular purpose is to assist the victims of crime. The federal
guarantee is a form of direct aid to religion, albeit aid neutrally available to all § 501(c)(3)
organizations.
380. There is no dispute over whether the Establishment Clause prohibits a tax or user fee
expressly earmarked for a religious purpose. It clearly does. See Rosenberger 515 U.S. at 853,
857 n. I (Thomas, J., concurring) (suggesting a distinction between tax money earmarked for
religious use and tax money from general revenues being used for a secular purpose by a
religious organization); Laycock, supra note 75, at 376-77 (same). What remains in dispute is
whether using money collected by general taxation and appropriated to support a welfare
program that does not discriminate against the participation of faith-based providers is per-
mitted by the Establishment Clause.
381. It is assumed, of course, that faith-based providers otherwise satisfy all legitimate
eligibility criteria, such as possessing the ability to deliver the secular services with the requisite
proficiency and economy.
382. There is no dispute over whether the Establishment Clause prohibits governmental
programs available solely to faith-based providers. It clearly does. See Board of Educ. v. Gru-
met, 512 U.S. 687, 702-08 (1994) (holding that legislation favoring one particular religious
sect is unconstitutional); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1989) (plurality
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they are religious.
Neutrality... between religion and nonreligion calls for equal treat-
ment of all providers."s Indeed, it would seem that the Free Exercise
Clause prohibits government from designing programs of aid that inten-
tionally discriminate on the basis of religion. 85 By that measure, a rule of
equal treatment of faith-based schools, as well as health care and social
service providers, requires that these religious organizations be fully eligi-
ble for direct programs of aid. Conversely, the no-aid view held by some
separationists would have the Establishment Clause bar religious organiza-
tions from participating in these direct-funding programs.
Once again no-aid separationists frame the issue such that two First
Amendment Clauses are in apparent conflict. The resulting "tension" be-
tween free exercise and no-establishment principles, they propose, is to be
relieved by tipping the balance in the direction of no-aid."s Again, this
makes no sense. It is not consistent with the First Amendment's text be-
cause neither Clause has primacy over the other. Moreover, such conflicts
are not inherent to the Religion Clauses and thereby logically unavoid-
able." 7 From a structuralist view, there is no "battle of the Clauses," as will
be shown below.
The Supreme Court has steered an uneven course between the corn-
opinion) (exempting religious periodicals from sales tax if published for the purpose of prom-
ulgating the faith violates the Establishment Clause); see also Capitol Square Review & Advisory
Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 764 (1995) (arguing, in dicta, to effect that government discrimi-
nation in favor of private religious expression or activity would be violative of Establishment
Clause).
383. There is no claim that the principle of law here is substantively neutral, hence, the
term "neutrality" (also "neutrality principle" and "neutrality theory") is perhaps better de-
scribed as a rule of "equal treatment" or "nondiscrimination." Nonetheless, the Justices of the
Supreme Court are using variations on "neutrality," so I follow their lead.
384. It is within the government's power, of course, to support only its own governmental
schools and welfare agencies. Moreover, supporting government schools alone is not violative
of the Free Exercise Clause rights of parochial school parents. Luetkemeyir v. Kaufmann, 364
F. Supp. 376 (E.D. Mo.), affd mem., 419 U.S. 888 (1974) (upholding free bus transportation for
public school students only); Brusca v. State Bd. of Educ., 332 F. Supp. 275 (E.D. Mo. 1971),
affd mem., 405 U.S. 1050 (1972) (stating that the availability of free public education does not
obligate a state to provide free education to students enrolled in private schools).
385. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); McDaniel
v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
386. For an example of this needless "conflict of the Clauses," see Hartman v. Stone, 68
F.3d 973 (6th Cir. 1995) (striking down, as violative of the Free Exercise Clause, a U.S. Army
regulation that extended benefits to private day care centers but discriminated against faith-
based centers freely chosen by parents; the government's discrimination against religion was
found not required by the Establishment Clause).
387. Liberalism is prone to suppose that the "tension" between the Free Exercise and
Establisment Clauses is intrinsic to the text and thus irreconcilable. See, e.g., Sherry, supra note
42, at 123-25, 129-30 (discussing how a broad interpretation of either Clause directly conflicts
with a broad interpretation of the other). But there is no "conflict" between the Religion
Clauses when the Establishment Clause is viewed as structural. See also supra notes 361-63, 365-
68; infra notes 414-17 and accompanying text. Thus, a structuralist view solves yet another
doctrinal puzzle.
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mand of neutrality and the command of no-aid. Looking only at the results
in its cases, the Court has consistently permitted states to administer neu-
tral programs of direct aid for institutions of higher education, including
assistance to those colleges that are church-affiliated." Additionally, al-
though the cases are few, the Court has rebuffed challenges to neutral pro-
grams of direct aid to health care389 and social services."' The results in
these cases would not change under a structuralist perspective, provided
that any regulatory oversight that came with the governmental funding did
not undermine the religious integrity of the faith-based provider.91
Concerning programs of direct aid to primary and secondary educa-
tion, the Court's case law is far more complex and uneven. Unlike colleges
and social welfare agencies, faith-based primary and secondary schools are
regarded as "pervasively sectarian" by the Court. 92 Where the program of
388. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding a
state's noncategorical grant program for colleges); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (sus-
taining issuance of revenue bonds for colleges); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971)
(upholding state construction grants for college buildings).
389. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (upholding a federal grant for building
construction at church-affiliated hospital).
390. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (upholding, on its face, a federal program
funding church-affiliated counseling centers for teenagers).
391. For a survey of the ways in which regulatory requirements imposed on recipients of
governmental aid can compromise the autonomy of religious organizations, see ESBECK, supra
note 310, at 11-39; STEPHEN V. MONSNIA, WHEN SACRED AND SECULAR Mix: RELIGIOUS
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AND PUBLIC MONEY 109-46 (1996).
392. The meaning of the term "pervasively sectarian" can be gleaned from the cases. In
Roemer, 426 U.S. at 758, the Court turned back a challenge to a state program awarding non-
categorical grants to colleges, including sectarian institutions that offered more than just
seminarian degrees. In its discussion focused on the fostering of religion, the Court said:
[T]he primary-effect question is the substantive one of what private educa-
tional activities, by whatever procedure, may be supported by state funds.
Hunt [v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973)] requires (1) that no state aid at all go
to institutions that are so "pervasively sectarian" that secular activities can-
not be separated from sectarian ones, and (2) that if secular activities can be
separated out, they alone may be funded.
426 U.S. at 755. The Roman Catholic colleges in Roemer were held not to be pervasively sec-
tarian. The record supported findings that the institutions employed chaplains who held wor-
ship services on campus, taught mandatory religious classes, and started some classes with
prayer. However, there was a high degree of autonomy from the Roman Catholic Church, the
faculty was not hired on a religious basis, faculty had complete academic freedom except in
religious classes, and students were chosen without regard to their religion.
A comparison of the colleges in Roemer with the elementary and secondary schools in
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 767-68 (1973), somewhat clarifies the
term "pervasively sectarian." The schools in Nyquist, found to be pervasively sectarian, placed
religious restrictions on student admissions and faculty appointments, they enforced obedi-
ence to religious dogma, they required attendance at religious services, they required religious
or doctrinal study, the schools were an integral part of the mission of the sponsoring church,
they had religious indoctrination as a primary purpose, and they imposed religious restrictions
on how and what the faculty could teach.
Although the definition of a "pervasively sectarian" institution has been stated in
general terms, never has the Court found a faith-based institution attending to the needs of
social welfare, health care, or of higher education to be pervasively sectarian. Only church-
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aid was targeted at private schools alone, including private religious
schools, the legislation was nonneutral and the Court struck it down as vio-
lative of the Establishment Clause. 93 Where the program was directed to-
ward helping all primary and secondary schools, public and private, relig-
ious and nonreligious, the program satisfied the neutrality requirement.'
94
Whether satisfying the neutrality requirement, without more, is suffi-
cient to comply with the Establishment Clause is the question upon which
the Court remains sharply divided. 95 In Agostini v. Felton,3" the Court re-
cently upheld a federal program employing teachers to travel to primary
and secondary schools and provide on-site remedial educational assistance
to low-income, at-risk students. 97 The neutrality of this large federal pro-
gram was a major factor in upholding its constitutionality. 98 Thus, in its
most recent pronouncement on the question, the Court upheld a direct-aid
program that delivers remedial educational services to K-12 school cam-
affiliated primary and secondary schools have ever been found by the Supreme Court to fit the
profile.
393. New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S.
229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 828-33
(1973); Nyquist 413 U.S. at 782 n.38; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Wolman v.
Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. Ohio), affd mem., 409 U.S. 808 (1972).
394. The Supreme Court has upheld neutral programs of direct aid. See Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (upholding a form of direct financial
aid that was available on neutral basis to religious and nonreligious organizations); Witters v.
Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (upholding neutral program of
aid to students attending institutions of higher education).
The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 153 (1996),
directs the Federal Communications Commission to implement a universal service program to
make computer internet and other network services available in libraries and K-12 schools,
including religious schools. 47 U.S.C. § 157; 47 C.F.R §§ 54.5 to 54.516, 69.619. The Act
follows the neutrality principle. Schools must apply to the FCC for a discount. Successful ap-
plicants purchase commercially available network services from private-sector vendors. A
portion of the vendor's bill to the school is discounted. The vendor is reimbursed the differ-
ence by the administrator of a fund raised by a telecommunication tax.
395. Compare Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232 (1997) (upholding direct aid to an
education program because, inter alia, it was neutral), with id. at 2025 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(stating that neutrality "is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for an aid program to
satisfy constitutional scrutiny"). Compare Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839 (noting neutrality is
significant factor in upholding programs), with id. at 852 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating
that the "Court's decision... neither trumpets the supremacy of the neutrality principle nor
signals the demise of the funding prohibition in Establishment Clause jurisprudence").
396. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
397. Id. at 207, 218-36.
398. Id. at 224-26. Lemon, decided in 1971,,was the first case in which the Court found
unconstitutional aid to K-12 schools. The most recent cases by the Court to strike down aid to
K-12 schools came in 1985. School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (striking
down K-12 aid); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (same). But Ball and Aguilar were over-
ruled in Agostini. Thus, the last Supreme Court case to strike down K-12 aid that is still good
law is CathedralAcademy, 434 U.S. 803 (1977). That means the pervasively sectarian test carried
the day for a mere six years, 1971-1977. This is a further indication that the pervasively sec-
tarian test has been replaced by the neutrality principle.
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puses, whether public or private, religious or nonreligious.5 99
A structuralist view would permit neutral programs of direct aid for all
service providers, including faith-based providers. As discussed previously,
the two-fold purpose of this structure is to prevent harm to the civitas and
to the religare/ekklesia, harms that are non-Hohfeldian in nature. 40 Neutral-
ity in the design of a direct-aid program is sufficient to meet the first of
these feared harms, namely government-induced religious factions within
the civitas. The no-aid view of separationism argues that political divisive-
ness along denominational or creedal lines will result unless all aid is de-
nied to religious providers. Typically the point is buttressed by reference to
European religious wars, which were known to the founding generation, as
well as by warnings that point to modem-day Northern Ireland, Bosnia, or
India. These are indeed events and internecine conflicts worthy of avoid-
ance, and the fear of sectarian factions within the civitas has received fre-
quent mention in the Court's opinions.4" But no-aid separationists over-
look an obvious distinction between these instances of denominational fac-
tionalism and their no-aid solution. The religious wars of medieval Europe
were wars for religious monopoly-each side sought to defeat the other in
399. See also Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (holding that the
government's provision of sign language interpreter to student enrolled in Roman Catholic
high school did not violate the Establishment Clause).
400. See supra notes 45-48, 252-60 and accompanying text. Engel v. T'itale, 370 U.S. 421,
431-33 (1962), has the most extended Supreme Court passage on the twin purposes of the
Establishment Clause. Further, there is an oft-quoted passage on the avoidance of sectarian
strife within the body politic in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 430 (1961) ("[Ithe estab-
lishment of a religion was equally feared because of its tendencies to political tyranny and
subversion of civil authority.").
401. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 606 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("The
mixing of government and religion can be a threat to free government, even if no one is
forced to participate."); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 127 n.10 (1982) ("At the
time of the Revolution, Americans feared not only a denial of religious freedom, but also the
danger of political oppression through a union of civil and ecclesiastical control.") (quoting B.
BERNARD BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 98-99 n.3 (1967));
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 642 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Our decisions under
the Establishment Clause ... naturally tend, as they were designed to, to avoid channeling
political activity along religious lines and to reduce any tendency toward religious divisiveness
in society."); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 796 (1973) ("[C]ompetition
among religious sects for political and religious supremacy has occasioned considerable civil
strife."); Walz v. Tax Commr'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("What is at
stake as a matter of policy is preventing that kind and degree of government involvement in
religious life that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and frequently strain a political
system to the breaking point."); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
219 (1963) ("'mhe Constitution ... prohibited the Government common to all from becom-
ing embroiled, however innocently, in the destructive religious conflicts of which the history of
even this country records some dark pages."') (quoting from an earlier concurring opinion by
Frankfurter, J.); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,425-27 (1962) (discussing English struggles over
the contents of The Book of Common Prayer); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 430
(1961) ("mhe Establishment of religion was equally feared because of its tendencies to politi-
cal tyranny and subversion of civil authority.").
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order to impose its own religious hegemony." 2 Neutrality in the design of
financial aid programs has no such goal. Indeed, the goal is just the oppo-
site. If a program of aid is truly neutral, then each individual's religious
choices are maximized while the government's influence over those choices
is minimized. Religious choice is not held up as the ultimate constitutional
value in itself; rather, the value is in each person being free to pursue the
dictates of his or her own worldview. The result is cultural pluralism, the
opposite of religious hegemony. As citizens take control of those life choices
that implicate deeply held beliefs, neutrality in programs of aid leads to a
reduction in factionalism along denominational or creedal lines, and the
unity of the civitas is enhanced.03
It is not political division in the body politic that a structuralist view
was designed to avoid. Nor is it division over moral questions. Such political
and moral divisions are inevitable, and vigorous debate-including debate
over religion as such, and its moral and political implications-is protected
by the Free Speech Clause."° To wield the Establishment Clause as a cen-
sor's pen suppressing any such outbreaks in debate, as no-aid separationists
do, puts the Free Speech Clause in conflict with the Establishment Clause.
Rather, it is the government's, offikial actions causing factional strife along
denominational lines that are subject to examination for having caused
Establishment Clause harm, not the resulting private actions of citizens re-
flecting such divisions or debate.
45
402. Laycock, supra note 45, at 1089-94; Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a
Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L REV. 115, 169 (1992) (stating that for the Founders, "the great threat
to religious pluralism [was] a triumphalist majority religion"). Historically, preventing relig-
ious faction was relevant when Europe had the war of the one against the all, that is, when a
single church with the assistance of the state sought a religious monopoly. Religious monopoly
is not the aim of structuralism. Indeed, it is no-aid separationism that is exacerbating (not
preventing) a culture war along religious lines. See supra note 123; infra note 417. Contrari-
wise, a structuralist view elevates religious choice and thus has the effect of reducing religious
conflict in which government has a role.
403. Fowler, supra note 312, at 182-83 (giving a postmodernist argument for neutrality in
governmental aid to schools as the more sure path to tolerance, civic peace, and social stabil-
ity).
404. See supra Part VI.D.; infra note 440. The Free Speech Clause protects private actions
as citizens make their opinions known in the public square. Justice O'Connor made this help-
ful distinction when she rejected "political divisiveness" as an element of "excessive entangle-
ment," which in turn was one factor in the three-prong Lemon test:
Political divisiveness is admittedly an evil addressed by the Establishment
Clause. Its existence may be evidence that institutional entanglement is ex-
cessive or that a government practice is perceived as an endorsement of re-
ligion. But the constitutional inquiry should focus ultimately on the charac-
ter of the government activity that might cause such divisiveness, not on the
divisiveness itself.
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Jesse H. Cho-
per, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PnTr. L. REV. 673,
683-85 (1980) (rejecting political divisiveness as a value to be judicially enforced by the Estab-
lishment Clause).
405. The Establishment Clause does not restrain private actions of citizens, only govern-
ment actions. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. This is why the Supreme Court has
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The harm to the body politic, or civitas, addressed by a structuralist
perspective is that which results when a government fails to act with a secu-
lar purpose.46 When the government acts, it may not have as its object the
awarding (or burdening) of an inherently religious belief or practice, nor
may it have as its object the awarding (or burdening) of a religious group.
"If politics cannot explicitly favor [in its governmental outputs] one sect
over another, the incentives to organize politically along explicit religious
lines are diminished.
40 7
There will always be religious factions, of course, within any open soci-
ety. This is not the concern of the Establishment Clause. The aim of the
Clause is for government to avoid inducing new religious factions or height-
ening old ones. True, there are situations where no matter what decision
the government makes, old wounds will be inflamed. In such cases, the path
of neutrality promises the least factionalism within the body politic. With
neutrality, the government is least involved in influencing the religious
choices of its citizens.
This fracturing of the civitas is a polity-wide harm, a generalized griev-
ance as opposed to an individualized injury. To such a harm the Establish-
ment Clause gives a non-Hohfeldian remedy." 8 That remedy limits gov-
rightly rejected "political divisiveness" as a separate element of its entanglement prong in the
three-prong Lemon test. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 617 n.14 (1988) (rejecting po-
litical divisiveness, without more, as a basis for invalidating a government's direct aid pro-
gram).
406. Professor Ira C. Lupu, by distinguishing between what he calls "political inputs" by
citizens and "political outputs" by government, is very close to striking the right balance be-
tween protecting the Free Speech Clause right of religious individuals to be politically active
and the no-establishment concern with harm to the body politic:
The secular purpose requirement does not exclude religious actors from
politics, nor does it limit the arguments they may make in their political ef-
forts. The Establishment Clause does not extinguish the political liberty of
religious entities to contend for policies or programs they find most conge-
nial. So long as these arguments must ultimately be connected by the state
to their corresponding secular justifications, however, [religious] entities will
be encouraged to create political alliances outside narrow sectarian bounda-
ries. The [Establishment] Clause thus should be construed to constrain po-
litical outputs (rather than inputs) to those policies that can be justified in
secular terms.
Ira C. Lupu, To Control Faction and Protect Liberty: A General Theory of the Religion Clauses, 7J.
Co'rEI'. LEc;.u. ISSUFS 357, 368 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
407. Id. at 364 (footnote omitted).
408. By denying governmental jurisdiction over inherently religious matters, a structuralist
Establishment Clause has the effect of protecting religious liberty writ large. Thus, the no-
establishment principle is not an individual right from governmental intrusion but a freedom
redounding in favor of the entire body politic to a government that may not meddle in inher-
ently religious matters. This fundamental difference between the individual freedom that
derives from a constitutional right and the polity-wide liberty that derives from constitutional
structure was well stated by Justice Kennedy in the recent line item veto case:
So convinced were the Framers that liberty of the person inheres in struc-
ture that at first they did not consider a Bill of Rights necessary .... In re-
cent years, perhaps, we have come to think of liberty as defined by that word
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emiment by restraining its use of sovereign power in a way that is discrimi-
natory, that is, in a way that supports or awards creedal or ideological he-
gemony. Neutrality in the design of government aid programs promises to
reduce division within the civitas that is the result of governmental bias for
one worldview over others. Contrariwise, continued adherence to the no-
aid view promises only to increase ideological tyranny within the civitas.
Citizens know when a worldview alien to their own is being imposed, and
they will resist.
Consider the problem of funding elementary education. Young chil-
dren are impressionable; hence, education is inevitably parent-directed.4"
Moreover, schooling in the early grades necessarily concerns matters of
foundational beliefs, that is, education entails the authoritative promulga-
tion of first-order values, not just conveying information. Postmodernism
has helped us to an appreciation that even the "information" conveyed in
school curricula is never "hard facts and figures" but screened data pre-
sented from a cultural perspective. Accordingly, when a society educates its
youth, it cannot escape making judgments about the kind of citiiens it
wants its children to become. Education is inevitably about ultimate truths
or perceptions thereof; hence, it essentially involves matters of religious
concern. It follows that these are the matters that parents will have strong
convictions about and thus deem worth fighting for on behalf of their chil-
dren. How, then, is a society to deal with the twin facts that education in-
evitably and deeply implicates ultimate concerns, and that various groups
of citizens hold quite different ideas about how to educate their young?
One solution is for the majority to impose, by control of the political
apparatus, its vision of education and beliefs of ultimate concern on all oth-
ers. But this approach politicizes education and fractures the civitas along
lines of "imposers" versus "resisters" of a creedal hegemony, essentially
creating competing systems for perceiving reality. If those not in control of
the political machinery are to resist this education for their children, then
private schools are available-but at a price not affordable by most parents.
A more just resolution, one that avoids politicizing education and fractur-
in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and as illuminated by the other
provisions of the Bill of Rights. The conception of liberty embraced by the
Framers was not so confined. They used the principles of separation of pow-
ers and federalism to secure liberty in the fundamental political sense of the
term, quite in addition to the idea of freedom from intrusive governmental
acts. The idea and the promise were that when the people delegate some
degree of control to a remote central authority, one branch of government
ought not possess the power to shape their destiny without a sufficient check
from the other two. In this vision, liberty demands limits on the ability of
any one branch to influence basic political decisions.
Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2109 (1998) (KennedyJ., concurring).
409. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that parents have a sub-
stantive due process right to direct the upbringing of their children, including a child's relig-
ious training); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (same); see also Farrington v. Toku-
shige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927) (same, only school was private nonsectarian).
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ing the civitas along essentially ideological lines, is to pursue pluralism. By
stopping the all-or-nothing battles over who will control the school monop-
oly, and permitting evenhanded funding of a diversity of schools, governed
in various ways, serving up a variety of curricular offerings and ultimate
visions of reality, neutrality diffuses the need to quarrel and contend. In the
end, then, neutrality in school funding promotes unity within the civitas,
which is one of the two aims of the Establishment Clause.
No-aid separationism was plausible when government was small, taxes
were low, and most education and social welfare was privately funded. It
was plausible when America was more homogeneous, more Protestant, and
more Northern European in national origin. In the present age of the af-
firmative state, when government monopolizes most of the available re-
sources for education and social services, private funding as the sole source
of aid for independent schools and welfare services is no longer a sustain-
able alternative.410 Not only has the no-aid view led to an inequitable divi-
sion of limited resources, but the lack of evenhandedness has stifled the
parental role in choosing and directing the education of children. The
same is true with social services, where lack of neutrality in funding ham-
pers the poor and needy from choosing the service provider that will best
meet their needs for job training, child care, rehabilitation from drug de-
pendencies, and other social services."
In addition to protecting the civitas, the structuralist view is concerned
with avoiding harm to religare/ekklesia.412 From the perspective of neutrality,
when government provides benefits such as education, health care, or social
welfare to promote the public good, there should be no exclusionary crite-
ria requiring faith-based providers to engage in self-censorship, or to oth-
erwise water down their religious identity as a condition of program par-
410. FREDERICK M. GEDICKS & ROGER HENDRIX, CHOOSING THE DREAM: THE FUTURE OF
RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 168-89 (1991); Berg, supra note 69, at 740; John H. Gar-
vey, What's Next After Separationism?, 46 EMORY L J. 75, 80-81 (1997); Giannella, supra note
274, at 554-60; Laycock, supra note 45, at 1089-94.
411. In neutrality theory, the activities of "government" do not monopolize the "public."
The voluntary sector, including religious groups, also does the "public's" work. At present-as
well as historically-faith-based charities comprise a large number of the available voluntary
sector social service providers, and they operate many of the most efficient and successful
programs. ESBECK, supra note 310, at 3-7. So long as the government's welfare program fur-
thers the secular purpose of society's betterment-that is, help for the poor and needy-it is
neutral as to religion if the program involves faith-based providers on an equal basis with all
others. Lupu, supra note 406, at 369, 371-73 (embracing neutrality theory).
Additionally, the voluntary sector providers of social services who opt to participate in
a government's welfare program are not in any primary sense "beneficiaries" of the govern-
ment's assistance. As they deliver services to those in need, faith-based providers add far more
in value measured in societal betterment than they ever possibly receive as an incident of their
expanded responsibilities under the program of aid.
412. See supra notes 252-60 and accompanying text. The ekk/esia is undermined by, inter
alia, compromising regulatory "strings" attached to the monies in the government's program
of aid. ESBECK, supra note 310, at 11-39, 49-51; MONSMA, supra note 391, at 109-46.
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ticipation. 13 If neutrality is to succeed, faith-based providers must not be
forced to shed or disguise their religious character and suppress their
spiritual voice, all to appear "secular enough" to be eligible for the needed
funding. Unless the ekklesia is protected along with the civitas, the goal of
pluralism will be frustrated, and the state-sanctioned dominance of a single
worldview will continue.
The structuralist view has the added advantage over a strict rule of no-
aid in that it eliminates unnecessary "tensions" among the Clauses of the
First Amendment. By not discriminating in favor of secular providers over
faith-based providers of education, health care, and social services, the Free
Exercise Clause is not brought into conflict with the Establishment
Clause.14 The structuralist perspective would also do away with the Su-
preme Court's cases denying direct aid to "pervasively sectarian" providers
while allowing aid to nonpervasively sectarian organizations." 5 In singling
out "pervasively sectarian" organizations,416 the Court has set up an aid/no-
aid test that violates two of the Court's other principles of law, namely, its
rule against government favoring one religious organization over another,
and its rule against delving into the nature of religious doctrine and prac-
tices.41 By abandoning the "pervasively sectarian" category and allowing
413. Self-censorship as a condition on the receipt of a governmental benefit is not only
contrary to structuralism but may also violate freedom of speech and association. See Hsu v.
Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist., 85 F.3d 839 (2d Cir. 1996). In Hsu, a student religious club
claimed the right to meet on the campus of a public high school on the same basis as other
noncurricular student organizations. The religious club had a right of access to the school
facilities under federal statutory law and the Free Speech Clause. However, when it came to its
election of leaders, the school prohibited the club from selecting only Christians. The club
then brought suit. The appeals court held that the club indeed had a right to be relieved of the
school's nondiscrimination regulation when filling offices requiring spiritual functions. Elec-.
tion of leaders sharing the same faith was essential to the club's character or self-defmition, as
well as the maintenance of its associational character and continued expression as a Christian
club. Id. at 856-62. Logically, the same result would be reached under a structuralist view, for
the Establishment Clause denies to government any power over the selection of spiritual lead-
ers. See supra note 174.
414. To design a program of aid that intentionally excludes religion is a prima facie viola-
tion of the Free Exercise Clause. See infra note 435; see also supra note 40 (discussing Hartman
v. Stone, 68 F.3d 973 (6th Cir. 1995)). Because the program of aid at issue in Hartman was
neutral, under structuralism the Establishment Clause would permit the aid to parents desir-
ing faith.based child care. Accordingly, there would be no "tension" between no-establishment
and the parents' right to be free of religious discrimination under the Free Exercise Clause.
415. See supra note 392 and accompanying text.
416. The category "pervasively sectarian" first surfaced in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
615-19 (1971); see also Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 681-82 (1971) (stating that religios-
ity in parochial elementary and secondary schools does not ordinarily permeate the education
provided to college students).
417. See supra notes 230-34 and accompanying text.
The sectarian division is no longer along the old alignments of Protestant versus
Catholic versus Jew. The realignment is now orthodox (Protestant, Catholic, and Jew) versus
progressive (Protestant, Catholic, and Jew). HUNTER, supra note 123, at 42-46. Professor
Hunter, a sociologist of religion, has identified the pervasively sectarian groups as "orthodox,"
and the acculturated as religious "progressives." Hunter explains that the religious orthodox
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neutral programs of aid, the Court's case law would no longer be conflicted.
VII. LOCATING THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT
What remains in question is not so much the existence of a "wall of
separation" as it is the question of where civil and religious authorities say
the boundary between religion and government lies and what people can
do on the ecclesiastical side of the boundary free from governmental inter-
ference, as well as free from government's over-involvement. This Part
marshals the cases that indicate where the Supreme Court has located that
boundary. First, however, the unnecessary confusion concerning the place
of the Free Exercise Clause needs to be addressed.
A. DIFFERENTIATING THE FREE EXERCISE AND ESTABLISHMENT CLA USES
As a structural restraint, the purpose of the Establishment Clause is
not to safeguard individual religious rights. That is the role of the Free
Exercise Clause, indeed its singular role. Even in archetypal no-
establishment cases as those concerning religion in public schools, such as
Engel v. Vitale418 and McCollum v. Board of Education,419 the Court has ap-
plied the Establishment Clause not to relieve individual complainants of
religious coercion or religious harm,4 2' but to keep in proper relationship
are devoted "to an essential, definable, and transcendent authority," whereas progressives
"resymbolize historic faiths according to the prevailing assumptions of contemporary life."
Religious organizations most willing to conform to contemporary culture will appear to the
government as less sectarian. Conversely, those organizations more conservative in theology
and that have resisted acculturation will inevitably appear to civil courts as more sectarian. To
exclude from public aid those groups that are more sectarian is to punish those religions that
resist conformity to culture while favoring those groups willing to secularize. Hence, the "per-
vasively sectarian" text is facially discriminatory against the religiously orthodox.
418. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). In Engel, the Supreme Court considered a state program of daily
classroom prayer in the public schools. Students not wanting to participate were excused with-
out penalty. Id. at 423 n.2. The program was struck down despite the absence of legal compul-
sion or religion being imposed. Id. at 430-31.
419. 333 U.S. 203 (1948). In McCollum, the Supreme Court considered a program that
permitted persons from the community to come onto the public school campus and conduct
elective classes in religion. Student enrollment was optional and required parental permission.
Id. at 207 n.2. The program was struck down despite the absence of legal compulsion or re-
ligion being imposed. Id. at 232-33 (Jackson, J., concurring).
420. Legal historian Mark DeWolfe Howe states the matter this way:
The First Amendment . . . interpreted [through Jefferson and Madison]
would serve two purposes .... In the second place, it would impose a dis-
ability upon the national government to adopt laws with respect to estab-
lishments whether or not their consequence would be to infringe individual
rights of conscience.
To find this second purpose in the First Amendment involves, necessarily
I think, the admission that the Amendment is something more than a char-
ter of individual liberties.
Howe, supra note 54, at 51, 55.
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two centers of authority: government and religion.421 This is why in popular
discourse it is said that the Establishment Clause is about "church-state re-
lations" or the "separation of church and state." It is in this primary role-
when invoked to keep the spheres of government and religion in the right
relationship to each other-that the Establishment Clause broke free from
older European patterns and made its most unique and celebrated contri-
bution to the American constitutional settlement. 22
The Establishment Clause can be a means of redress for personal
harms, but only when the injury is other than religious in nature, such as
economic harm or damage to property, 423 constraints on academic inquiry
421. As the Supreme Court put it in McCollum, "Tihe First Amendment rests on the
premise that both religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is
left free from the other within its respective sphere." McCollum, 333 U.S. at 212. In reference
to the Establishment Clause, the Court in Engel said that its "first and most immediate purpose
rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and
to degrade religion." Engel, 370 U.S. at 431.
Some will be dismayed at the thought that the Establishment Clause does not have
the object of protecting individual religious rights. But consider Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577
(1992), and County ofAllegheny v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). In Weisman, the
Court found violative of the Establishment Clause prayer offered at public school commence-
ment ceremonies. Attendance was voluntary as was participation in the prayer. Complainants
claimed neither awiolation of their religiously informed conscience nor other religious burden
on their own religious belief or practice. In Allegheny, the Court found a display on public
property of a Christmas nativity scene depicting the birth of Jesus Christ violative of the Es-
tablishment Clause. Viewing the display was, of course, a voluntary act. Once again the com-
plainants claimed no coercion of conscience or other individual burden on their own religious
practices as a result of the display. Professor McConnell criticized the Court for these decisions
because "they have nothing to do with freedom of religion. There is not a single person in
these cases who has been hindered or discouraged by government action from following a
religious practice or way of life." Michael McConnell, Freedom From Religion?, AM. ENTER'RISE,
Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 34, 36. Professor McConnell is surely correct in observing that no one in
Weisman or Allegheny had his or her personal religious rights violated. But McConnell wrongly
assumes that a violation of an individual's religious freedom is requisite to a violation of the
Establishment Clause. The Clause, as applied by the Supreme Court, is about something alto-
gether different: limiting governmental power so as to keep in appropriate relationship relig-
ion and government. Thus, to understand Weisman and Allegheny, the cases must be viewed as
structural determinations by the Court that government exceeded its power by involving itself
in a matter beyond its authority.
422. Historian Stanford Cobb has observed that America's solution to the "world-old
problem of Church and State" was "so unique, so far-reaching, and so markedly diverse from
European principles as to constitute the most striking contribution of America to the science of
government." STANFORD COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIoUs LIBERTY IN AMERICA at vii (1902).
Republican government, being self-government of the masses, requires a virtuous and self-
disciplined people. Because survival of the state depends on civic virtue, government may
assume a role in promoting that virtue. However, notwithstanding that religion plays a vital
role in informing the people in virtuous living, the American constitutional settlement was to
deny to the national government a role in promoting religion. Genuine religion was not to be
a tool of statecraft. Rather, religion was left to individual choice and voluntary faith. Only in
this manner, the American solution had it, could religion remain uncorrupted as well as the
government undivided by sectarian ambitions to wield civil power. McConnell, supra note 77,
at 1442.
423. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (upholding claim of de-
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by teachers and students,424 or restraints on free-thinking atheists." 5 Even
in these situations, however, the no-establishment principle is not trans-
formed into an individual rights clause with the assigned task of protecting,
respectively, property, academic freedom, and freedom from religion.
Rather, these injuries are remedied only consequentially to the Establish-
ment Clause as it fulfills its structuralist role.26
From time to time religious claimants have sought to enlist the Estab-
lishment Clause into serving as a rights clause, but the Supreme Court has
only once followed that course. In Larson v. Valente,4 27 the Court applied the
no-establishment principle to entertain a claim involving discrimination
among religious groups and thus redressed allegations of religious harm.428
partment store against labor law); Larkin v. Grenders Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (up-
holding claim of tavern seeking issuance of a liquor license); cf Two Guys from Harrison
Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961) (permitting claim of economic harm by retail
stores to be free of Sunday dosing law, but ultimately ruling against the stores on the merits);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,430-31 (1961) (same).
424. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (striking down a state law that required
teaching of creation in public school science classes if evolution is taught); Epperson v. Arkan-
sas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (striking down a state prohibition on teaching evolution in public
school science classes).
425. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). In Torcaso, an atheist who otherwise
qualified for a public office refused to take a required oath that professed belief in God. The
Court held the oath requirement violative of the First Amendment without specifying either
Religion Clause. If an individual objects to the oath out of a religious belief that forbids taking
oaths, then he has a valid claim under the Free Exercise Clause. As an atheist, however, the
claimant in Torcaso did not (indeed, by definition could not) suffer a religious injury as he
professed to have no religious beliefs. Nevertheless, for a state to mandate taking of the oath
would be a violation of the Establishment Clause as to all office seekers, including atheists,
because confession of belief in a deity is a subject that remains in the realm of religion.
Atheists and agnostics are sensibly protected as well by the Free Speech Clause, for
the rights implicated are freedom to believe and freedom to refrain from speaking. HOWE,
supra note 77, at 156-57. InJoseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), the Court found
violative of free speech rights a law permitting censorship of films found to be "sacrilegious."
The Court could have reached the same result under the Free Exercise Clause if the film
producer sought to convey a religious belief, either about his own faith or a theological criti-
cism of the faith of others. Additionally, the Court could have struck down the censorship law
under the Establishment Clause and done so regardless of whether the film producer sought
to convey a religious message, for a no-establishment violation does not have as its object the
redress of personal religious injury.
426. The structuralist role in the three cases of Thornton, Edwards, and Torcaso is to restrain
government from preferring particular religious practices over secular concerns in the spheres
of commerce, science, and qualifications for government office. Preferences of this sort, if
allowed to multiply without bound, can lead to a convergence of political factions and religious
denominations. See supra notes 406, 408.
427. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
428. In Larson, state charitable solicitation legislation distinguished between religious
groups that received over half their revenues from their membership and those that did not.
The law thereby favored long-founded churches over new religious movements. The Court
held that for government to intentionally discriminate on the basis of religious affiliation is a
violation of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 244-56. The Court assumed the complainant was a
church subscribing to a bona fide religion. Id. at 244 n.16.
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But this was highly unusual12 9 and probably wrongheaded, for Larson could
just as easily-and more sensibly-have been grounded in the Free Exer-
cise Clause."' To illustrate, if Congress in 1789 had not submitted to the
states an Establishment Clause for enumeration in the Bill of Rights, a Lar-
son-type claimant still could have secured relief from religious persecution
by filing suit under the Free Exercise Clause. But numerous other claim-
ants, such as the department store in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,43' the
tavern in Larkin v. Grendel's Den, In., 432 and the public school teacher de-
sirous of expanding the science curriculum in Epperson v. Arkansas,33 could
not have plead successfully a free exercise claim because they suffered no
religious harm. Absent an Establishment Clause, these three claimants
would have been unable to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.
The literature is often uneven when using the terms "religious free-
dom," "religious liberty," and "religious rights."4" This Article equates all
429. The only other Supreme Court case willing to entertain the Establishment Clause as a
source of redress for personal religious injury is Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). In
Gillette, the Court held that exemptions from the military draft for those religiously opposed to
all war but not for those willing to fight in a 'just war" were not intentionally discriminatory on
the basis of religious affiliation and thus did not violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 450-
54, Hence, Gillette acknowledged no-establishment as a potential source of redress for religious
harm caused by religious discrimination but then went on to hold that this particular claim was
without merit. Larson is thus the only Supreme Court case where personal religious injury
actually found redress pursuant to the Establishment Clause.
430. It is more sensible to conceptualize a government's intentional discrimination be-
tween two religious groups as injurious to the disfavored religion. If that had been done in
Larson, the Court could have decided the case under the Free Exercise Clause. In order to
resolve Larson under the Establishment Clause, as the Court did, one has to envision the gov-
ernment's discrimination as unconstitutional not because it hindered the disfavored religion,
but because the discrimination effected a preference for competing religions. This framing of
the claimants' injury is conceptually awkward. Official discrimination against a religion does
have the potential of helping other religions, but then again it may turn out to be of no benefit
to the competition. It would be better for the Court to focus on the harm to the victimized
religion rather than to speculate about benefits to competing religions. The Court did proceed
in the more logical fashion suggested here in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (holding ordinances that ostensibly regulated the ritual sacrifice
of animals but whose real object was to inhibit the practices of a particular church as violative
of the Free Exercise Clause).
431. 472 U.S. 703 (1985). In Thornton, a department store chain successfully sued to over-
turn a state law giving employees an unyielding right to be excused from work on an em-
ployee's Sabbath.
432. 459 U.S. 116 (1982). In Larkin, the owner of a bar was denied a municipal liquor
license. The relevant ordinance permitted churches within 500 feet of an applicant to veto the
issuance of a license. Alleging pecuniary harm as a result of the denial, the owner successfully
overturned the ordinance as an unconstitutional delegation of sovereign power to a religious
organization. Id. at 122-27.
433. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). In Epperson, a high school biology teacher successfully sued to
overturn a state law that prohibited the teaching of Darwin's theory of evolution in the public
schools.
434. There are no Free Exercise Clause rights for a religious group over and above the
aggregated individual rights of the entity's membership. However, the Establishment Clause in
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three, and the terms are used in the sense of an individual right that pro-
tects against personal religious burdens or harms. Such a right is secured by
the Free Exercise Clause. 35 Moreover, the redressing of personal harm to
an individual's religious belief or practice is the Free Exercise Clause's only
function.43 This makes sense because the Clause is, by its terms, about pro-
hibiting the free exercise of religion rather than unbelief.4 .. The Free Exer-
its role as a limit on governmental power does afford religious groups institutional autonomy
when acting on matters reserved to the sphere of religion. See supra Part IV.C.2. (discussing
church autonomy).
Some may be dismayed that the Free Exercise Clause does not protect religious or-
ganizations (beyond the aggregated rights of their members) in preserving the group's auton-
omy and religious character in the face of governmental intrusion. But, again, as seen supra
Part P1.C.2., religious organizations have such safeguards, but they are secured by the Estab-
lishment Clause rather than the Free Exercise Clause. The well-meaning project to force such
safeguards into the scope of the Free Exercise Clause under the banner of "accommodation-
ism" has caused all manner of doctrinal confusion.
435. The Free Exercise Clause is violated when government enforces a restriction that
intentionally discriminates against religion, religious practice, or against an individual because
of his or her religion. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 520. However, a law's unintended discriminatory
effect adverse to a religious belief'or practice is not, without more, a free exercise violation.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
A persistent minority of the Justices on the Supreme Court indicate that they would
go further and recognize Free Exercise Clause protection for disparate effects on religion.
Compare City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2176-85 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Smith should be reconsidered), with id. at 2172-76 (Scalia, J., concurring) (de-
fending Smith decision); see also Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 570-71 (Souter, J., concurring) (arguing
that Smith should be reconsidered). Whatever the proper scope of the Free Exercise Clause,
the injury it redresses is in the nature of personal religious harm and nothing more. However,
some critics of Smith, seemingly reeling from their loss, are forgetting that a structuralist Es-
tablishment Clause also affords considerable autonomy to religion and religious organizations.
436. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 320 (1980) (denying standing to bring free exercise
claim in absence of alleged religious compulsion); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689
(1971) (rejecting free exercise claim because there was no evidence of impact on claimants'
religious belief or practice); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (holding free
exercise claim without merit in absence of religious burden); School Dist. of Abington Town-
ship v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 221, 223 (1963) (holding that in a free exercise claim it is
necessary to show governmental coercion on the practice of religion); id. at 224 n.9 ("[Tihe
requirements for standing to challenge state action under the Establishment Clause, unlike
those relating to the Free Exercise Clause, do not include proof that particular religious free-
doms are infringed."); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,431 (1962) (stating that the Establishment
Clause goes much further than to relieve coercive pressure on religious belief and practice);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429 (1961) (denying standing to plead free exercise
claim when alleged damages were economic rather than religious).
Some may object because this reading of the Religion Clauses leaves too little work for
the Free Exercise Clause. I have two responses. First, the work of prohibiting intentional dis-
crimination on the basis of religion is important work indeed. Second, if the reader believes
stopping intentional discrimination is still too little scope for this venerable Clause, then that
is not my doing but the doing of the Supreme Court in its controversial Smith decision. See
supra notes 31,435.
437. See John H. Garvey, An Anti-Liberal Argument for Religious Freedom, 7 J. CONTEMP.
LEcAL IssuEs 275 (1996) (addressing the contention that the Free Exercise Clause protects
unbelief as well as religious belief: "This conclusion is hard to square with the language of the
first amendment, which protects only the free exercise 'of religion.' Rejecting religion is an
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cise Clause says nothing about other injuries such as protecting against en-
cumbrances on the use of one's property (Thornton) or removing hindrances
to academic inquiry (Epperson). Nor does the Free Exercise Clause prohibit
the forced taking of oaths by free-thinking atheists (Torcaso).'3 The latter is
true because to suffer a personal religious harm an individual must first
profess a religion. It follows that the Free Exercise Clause is not an all-
purpose conscience Clause.439 It protects religiously informed belief and
practice, nothing more. People can incur injuries other than religious
harms, as in economic harm, loss of academic freedom, or compulsion to
profess a religious belief when they are agnostic or atheistic. These are in-
dividual harms, to be sure, but not religious harms.4 They are left to be
exercise of freedom, but it is not an exercise of religion. (Amputation is not a way of exercising
my foot.)." Id. at 276. It might be argued that liberty in religious matters cannot end with
freedom to embrace and practice one's faith, for liberty also indudes freedom to reject and
refuse to practice the faith of others. And that would indeed be so if the Clause read, "Con-
gress shall make no law... prohibiting religious freedom." But that is not the text. Rather, the
text reaches out to individuals who have a religion, assuring their exercise thereof. Professor
Garvey is right: an individual must first have a faith to exercise before its exercise can be un-
constitutionally prohibited. I personally would prefer a broader text, but must work with the
text as given. And that more narrow Free Exercise Clause explains why the Supreme Court
decides cases devoid of religious harm, such as McCollum, McGowan, Engel, Schempp, and
Thornton, under the Establishment Clause.
438. See supra note 425 (discussing Torcaso).
439. See Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 833 (1989) (noting that
only beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause; secular views will not
suffice); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713-14 (1981) (noting that only beliefs rooted in
religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16
(1972) (identifying claims that are "personal and philosophical" and those "merely a matter of
personal preference" as "not risfing] to the demands of the Religion Clauses"); cf. Welsh v.
United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (plurality opinion) (holding that conscientious objector
status, as conferred by federal legislation, did not require those claiming draft deferment to
hold beliefs based on traditional religious views). Welsh does not undermine the point decided
in Frazee, Thomas, and Yoder. First, Welsh involved the definition of religion for purposes of
legislation rather than for the First Amendment, Second, because there was no majority opin-
ion, Welsh is binding only on the narrow issue decided. Third, the plurality in Welsh was, sub
silentio, rejected by majorities in Frazee, Thomas,'and Yoder.
440. When the religious harm is to speech of religious content or to associations formed by
religious individuals, it has long been the practice of the Court to protect the free exercise of
religion under the Free Speech and Free Press Clauses. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263 (1981) (striking down restrictions on student religious groups wanting to meet in state
university buildings designated as limited public fora as violating the Free Speech Clause);
West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that compulsory flag
salute at public school denies freedom of speech and freedom of belief as applied to Jehovah's
Witnesses); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (overturning ordinance prohibiting
distribution of literature of any kind as abridging the right ofJehovah's Witnesses to freedom
of the press). By subsuming where possible protection from religious harm under the Free
Speech and Free Press Clauses, the Court has given religious rights a broader and hence more
secure base. The constitutional protection for speech and press from content-based and view-
point-based discrimination by governmental officials is well settled in the courts and widely
accepted at the popular level.
The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses are unable, of course, to protect religious
activity that has no appreciable expressional content. Concerning such activity, the Free Exer-
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remedied, if at all, as a by-product of the Establishment Clause's ordering
of the respective competencies of government and religion.
In the hands of the Supreme Court, then, the task of the Establish-
ment Clause is independent of the Free Exercise Clause. Neither Clause is
subordinate or instrumental to the other.44 This is not to say that the Es-
tablishment Clause has nothing to do with religious liberty writ large.442 By
delimiting and qualifying governmental sovereignty, structure often re-
dounds to further secure individual rights. Conversely, although rights
clauses have as their immediate purpose the protection of individual free-
dom,44 they have a consequential impact on governmental power. But this
happy symmetry between structure and rights is no reason to conflate the
two.444 The object of a structural clause is to set compensating checks on the
cise Clause alone must be looked to as the source of constitutional protection from personal
religious injury. Justice White, dissenting in Welsh, 398 U.S. at 333, stated the matter well:
It cannot be ignored that the First Amendment itself contains a religious
classification. The Amendment protects belief and speech, but as a general
proposition, the free speech provisions stop short of immunizing conduct
from official regulation. The Free Exercise Clause, however, has a deeper
cut: it protects conduct as well as religious belief and speech.
Id. at 372.
441. Grammatically there is but one First Amendment Clause (with two prepositional
phrases) that explicitly concerns religion. The existence of a single Clause has been turned
into an argument that one Religion Clause has but one meaning, and that meaning is the
protection of individual religious freedom. Thus, it is argued, the no-establishment phrase is
but a means to serve the free exercise phrase. The consequence, should the argument prevail,
is that no-establishment becomes a tool in aid of free exercise. See Neuhaus, supra note 44, at
1; RichardJohn Neuhaus, The Most Neu, Thing in the Novus Ordo Seclorum, 85 FIRST THINGS 75-
78 (1998) [hereinafter The Most New Thing].
That the principle of no-establishment does not operate separate and independent of
free exercise is not just misguided, but-as implied in the text-has profound consequences.
The argumenes adoption would lead notjust to conflation of an individual right with a struc-
tural restraint, but to destruction of the structuralist meaning of no-establishment. Notwith-
standing this small grammatical correction, the single Religion Clause consists of two preposi-
tional phrases. Historically each prepositional phrase carried its own operative meaning, for
both the Senate and House in the First Congress debated and amended the text of the first
Clause of the First Amendment as having two phrases each with its own purpose. The current
style is to refer to two Religion Clauses and that practice is followed in this Article. But to
discarded that style and substitute the "Establishment Phrase" and the "Free Exercise Phrase"
still leaves us with two legal principles of independent reach, neither dependent on the other.
442. This Article distinguishes between, on the one hand, religious rights personal to
individuals and groups of individuals, see supra note 3, and, on the other hand, religious liberty
writ large, see supra notes 406, 408. The latter is a liberty that is best described as class-wide,
collective, or in the interest of the larger civil society. The Establishment Clause has the object
of protecting not individuals qua individuals, but two large bodies in civil society: the body
politic (the civitas), on the one hand, and religion and religious organizations (the reli-
gare/ekilesia), on the other. The nature of the injury to these respective spheres of competence
are explored supra in notes 45-48, 252-60,400-13 and accompanying text.
443. The Free Exercise Clause, as well as the four expressional Clauses in the First
Amendment (speech, press, petition, and assembly), are all of this ilk. Their object is to protect
individual rights. They work only indirectly to limit the power of the sovereign state.
444. Cf Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991).
Professor Amar argues that constitutional rights also impose an organizational structure on
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powers of a modern nation-state, checks that must be honored whether or
not individual complainants suffer concrete "injury in fact." '445 Because the
Establishment Clause is a structural clause rather than a rights clause, it is
vital that it be understood as such and be so applied.446
B. A MATER OFBOUNDARYKEEPING
Proper relations between religion and government (or "church and
state") are codified in the words "make no law respecting an establishment
of religion." A structuralist view casts this Clause in the role of boundary
keeper. In setting out to locate that boundary, it is a useful reminder that
the "keeper's" task is to restrain government, not private individuals, not
churches, and not religion.4
Identification of the precise topics that fall within the meaning of the
words "make no law respecting an establishment of religion"-hence sub-
ject matter placed beyond the reach of governmental authority-necessarily
entails substantive choices. That boundary has been disputed for over two
thousand years,448 so it would be naive to suppose that there is an easy for-
government. Id. at 1132-33. I agree. The point in this Article, however, is that the structuring
of government that comes from the enforcement of a rights clause is not the immediate object
of the clause but derivative of it. Conversely, the protection of individual rights that comes
from the enforcement of a structural clause is not the immediate object of the clause but de-
rivative of it. Hence, the immediate object of enforcement of the Establishment Clause is not
religious freedom, but religious freedom is derivative of it.
445. This is why federal taxpayers, unable to show any personal "injury in fact," have to be
granted special standing to pursue Establishment Clause claims challenging spending pro-
grams. See supra text accompanying notes 134-38.
446. There are going to be a few occurrences where a single harm can properly give rise to
a claim under the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. To illustrate, assume a
public school adopted a regulation requiring that the Lord's Prayer be recited by students at
the beginning of each classroom day. A third-grade Muslim student is compelled to recite the
prayer. As a Muslim, the student has suffered a religious harm for which the Free Exercise
Clause gives individuated relief. The student could also claim under the Establishment Clause,
leading to both individuated relief and an injunction against school-wide enforcement of the
prayer regulation.
447. The Establishment Clause, indeed the entire Bill of Rights, is a check on government
alone. Hence, the Establishment Clause can only be transgressed by government. See supra
note 44. It does not protect people from other people. It does not protect minority religions
from majority religions. It does not protect the nonreligious from the religious. Secular mod-
ernists are prone to assume that religious ideologies are more intolerant and violent than
secular ideologies; thus they assume that the Establishment Clause is there to protect them
from the excesses of religion. But it can protect them from only the excesses of government.
Secularists have a blind spot. They believe sectarian conflicts are usually violent. But in the
twentieth century, secular ideologies have proven every bit as violent as the sectarianisms of
the Middle Ages. Laycock, supra note 45, at 1048, 1089-95, 1102.
448. Professor Duesenberg has observed:
Civil church law is in essence a study of the relationship between competing
powers .... The word competition is chosen to denote the active interplay
between church government and civil government which flows from the in-
decision existing within and between them as to the proper scope of their
respective domains. There is not, now nor has there ever been, in the two
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mula for determining "what is Caesar's and what is God's." From the per-
spective of an elder statesman after a full life of public service, James Madi-
son said, "I must admit moreover that it may not be easy, in every possible
case, to trace the line of separation between the rights of religion and the
Civil authority with such distinctness as to avoid collision & doubts on unes-
sential points.
'449
On the other hand, the difficulty should not be exaggerated. The dif-
ferences are often, as Madison said, on "unessential points." In the vast
number of cases, a ready reference to the Western tradition as received on
this side of the Atlantic450 will yield a result on which there is an under-
standing of what is right. It is the hard cases that get most of the attention,
thereby leaving the impression that the overall task of boundary keeping is
hopelessly conflicted. Moreover, that factions are forever struggling over
the location of the boundary actually confirms the central point-it is pre-
sumed that there are two spheres of competency and, hence, a religious
sphere in which the state is not sovereign.
The Supreme Court has not left lower courts, legislators, and litigants
without guidance on this all-important question. The cases indicate that
government does, not exceed the restraints of the Establishment Clause
unless it is acting on topics that are "inherently religious." The Supreme
Court has found that prayer,4"' devotional Bible reading,452 veneration of
the Ten Commandments,453 classes in confessional religion, 4  and the bib-
thousand year history of the Christian church common agreement over
where to draw the line.
Duesenberg, supra note 218, at 508.
449. Letter from James Madison to Rev. Adams (1832), IX WRMNGS OFJAMES MADISON,
supra note 67, at 484, 487.
450. It should come as no surprise that a structuralist perspective looks to the historic
Western tradition. It could hardly look elsewhere. The Founders (as well as the Constitution
they wrote) were immersed in Western thought, and America's unique arrangement of gov-
ernment-religion separation comes out of an alliance of two threads within that Western tradi-
tion. See supra note 75 (discussing disestablishment as the common cause of the Enlightenment
rationalists and the Protestant pietists). Indeed, the First Amendment's regard for religious
freedom and no-establishment cannot be understood apart from their religious justifications.
Carter, supra note 259, at 1632-33; Steven Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Con-
stitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 149, 154-66 (1991). Secular modernists are surprised
(or offended) by this, but common sense would indicate that reference to the Western tradition
as received in the American colonies should be expected. Any other path would be a deviation
from the intent and context of the Framers. Clifford Goldstein, The Theology Of A Godless Con-
stitution, 93 LIBERTY 30-31 (May/June 1998). That there are those outside the Protestant-
Western tradition displeased with this location of the church-state boundary is cause for sensi-
tivity and (when prudent) accommodation. But it is not a reason to relocate that boundary
under the guise ofjudicial "updating" of the Establishment Clause. Any shifting of the church-
state boundary will just create new grievants, for, again, there is no substantively neutral loca-
tion for the boundary between church and state.
451. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); School
Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
452. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203.
453. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
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lical story of creation taught as science455 are all inherently religious.
Hence, by virtue of the Establishment Clause, these topics are off limits as
objects of legislation or any other purposeful government action. Closely
related to these case-by-case designations of what is inherently religious and
what is "arguably non-religious"4 6 is the rule that the Establishment Clause
is not violated when a governmental restriction (or social welfare program)
merely reflects a moral judgment, shared by some religions, about conduct
thought harmful (or beneficial) to society.4" Accordingly, overlap between a
law's purpose and the mores and ethics of a well-known religion does not,
without more, render the law one "respecting an establishment of religion."
Sunday closing laws,45 teenage sexuality counseling,459 the availability of
abortion,4" and interracial dating and civil marriage46" ' are subject matters
that the Court has deemed not inherently religious. Hence, so far as the
Establishment Clause is concerned, these are appropriate topics for legisla-
tion.
1
454. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
455. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
456. As one commentator put it, albeit in the context of discussing a different but related
problem, topics of legislation can be described as "arguably religious" for free exercise pur-
poses but "arguably non-religious" for no-establishment purposes. TRIBE, supra note 25, § 14-
6, at 828-33.
457. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 604 n.8, 613 (1988) (counseling teenagers con-
cerning sexuality is not inherently religious); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,
604 n.30 (1983) (holding a tax regulation prohibiting racial discrimination in education is not
inherently religious); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980) (having a restriction on
funding abortions is not inherently religious); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366
U.S, 617, 624-30 (1961) (holding a Sunday closing law is not inherently religious); Two Guys
from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 592-98 (1961) (same); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 431-49 (1961) (same); Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299, 306-07
(1896) (having a prohibition on the Sunday operation of trains is not inherently religious).
458. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582; McGouan, 366 U.S. 420.
459. Bowen, 487 U.S. 589.
460. Harris, 448 U.S. 297.
461. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 604 n.30 (concerning interracial dating); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162-67 (1879) (allowing antipolygamy law to override religious
beliefs to the contrary in regulating the civil law of marriage).
462. By way of illustration, Clifford R. Goldstein wrestles with how the boundary-keeping
task sorts out moral-based legislation, which is permitted by the Establishment Clause, from
legislation on an inherently religious matter, which is not permitted. Consider the following
excerpt:
[Tlo believe not only that moral absolutes exist, but that we can know what
those absolutes are, isn't synonymous with the assumption that government
should enforce them .... In ... closed totalitarian societies-believing that
they possess absolute truth ... [they] must oppress the masses into confor-
mity with that truth. In contrast, an open, free society, recognizing the elu-
siveness of these absolutes (or at least the subjectivity in which they're indi-
vidually perceived and processed) builds institutions and laws designed to
protect different concepts of truth. And in the United States, an expression
of these laws occurs in the religion clauses of the First Amendment, which
ensure that no religious truth will-politically-dominate the rest.
Yet an open society's stance that any truth, or even The Truth, shouldn't
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The Supreme Court has successfully avoided two mistakes when
drawing the line between government and religion. First, the Court has not
identified churches and other religious institutions (e.g., educational,
charitable, and mission organizations) and then assumed that religion is
actually confined to those institutions. Churches and their affiliated minis-
tries (ekklesia) do not monopolize religion (religare). Religiously grounded
convictions and obligations show their influence in every area of life, not
merely in church affairs. Hence, Establishment Clause violations can occur
notwithstanding the complete absence of any involvement by churches,
mission societies, religious schools, and the like.4"3
Second, the Court has not set out to separate government from all that
could be said to be religious. Rather, the separation is of government from
matters inherently religious. A separation of government from all that is
religion or religious would result in a secular public square, one hostile to
the public face of religion. The Founders intended no such regime."'
oppress opposing "truth" or even untruth doesn't mean that it should act as
if there is no truth. Law, implicitly or explicitly, implies morality, which re-
flects various concepts of "truth."....
But can this be done without breaching the wall of separation? That all
depends, of course, on how high and impregnable that wall is. A wall that
separates church and state is fine; one that separates morality from law isn't.
When, in the name of separation, a school protects a child from govern-
ment-sponsored religious exercises, it's defending the [wall] .... [O]n the
other hand, when, in the name of separation, a school teaches condom use
instead of abstinence, it's violating principles of that same moral universe.
Clifford P. Goldstein, Getting Reality Right, 92 LIBERTY 30-31 (May/June 1997). In his essay,
Goldstein goes on to locate the government-religion boundary such that school-sponsored
religious exercises are in the exclusive sphere of religion, whereas a law concerning adolescent
condom use is properly a subject of governmental regulation. Accordingly, citizens may exer-
cise their political rights-without violating the Establishment Clause-to urge that the gov-
ernment adopt a law that embodies the morality of sexual abstinence.
463. See, e.g., Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (striking down state
labor law that guaranteed private sector employees a right not to work on Sabbath); Stone v.
Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (disallowing posting of Ten Commandments in
public school classrooms for veneration); Epperson, 393 U.S. 97 (striking down a state law
prohibiting the teaching of evolution in public schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)
(disallowing a state program of classroom prayer in public school).
464. Historian Mark A. Noll writes:
[T]he founders' desire for the separation of the institutions of church and
state reflected a desire to respect not only religion but also the moral choice
of citizens. It was not a provision to remove religion as such from public life.
In the context of the times it was more a device for purifying the religious
impact on politics than removing it.
The authors of the [Constitution] seemed to be saying that religion and
politics occupied two different "spheres." This was not secular in the mod-
ern sense. As we have seen, there was every expectation that Christian prin-
ciples would continue to play a large role in strengthening the population
and even in providing a moral context for legislation. Yet the Constitution,
without ever spelling it out precisely, nonetheless still acknowledges that the
functions of government in society have a different role than the functions
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There are extreme voices claiming for the Establishment Clause the estab-
lishment of a secular regime,46 one that would thereby force religion into
the "private" spaces of home and house of worship.46 Still others lament
that the Court has promulgated a right to "freedom from religion."467 But
the cases will not bear either of these readings.
Various Justices of the Supreme Court, in short statements, have
sought to encapsule a definition of the boundary between government and
the "inherently religious." Justice Brennan wrote that the common thread
in the Court's analysis of whether legislation transgresses the Establishment
Clause restraint "is whether the statutes involve government in the 'essen-
tially religious activities' of religious institutions. 468 Just a few years earlier,
Justice Harlan wrote "that where the contested governmental activity is
calculated to achieve nonreligious purposes otherwise within the compe-
tence of the State, and where the activity does not involve the State so sig-
nificantly and directly in the realm of the sectarian, 4 6 then the constitu-
tional restraints are not exceeded. As a final example, Justice Frankfurter
set the no-establishment boundary in structuralist terms with these words:
The Establishment Clause withdrew from the sphere of legitimate
legislative concern and competence a specific, but comprehen-
of religion. Both are important, and important to each other. But they are
different.
NOLL, supra note 77, at 67-69.
465. See Suzanna Sherry, Enlightening the Religion Clauses, 7J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 473,
483-89 (1996) (arguing that rationalism is constitutionally preferred over religion); Kathleen
M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CH. L. REV. 195, 197-214, 222 (1992) (con-
tending that the First Amendment's negative bar against an establishment of religion implies
an affirmative establishment of a secular public order); see also Bradley, supra note 279, at 1059
(referencing projects born of secular liberalism, such as those ofJohn Rawls, Bruce Ackerman,
and Richard Rorty, to "privatize" religion). The multicentury tradition of American politics
being rooted in contrasting theological persuasions is so well documented as to make silly
revisionists claims that the Establishment Clause rendered religion of persuasive force only in
the "privacy" of home and church. See, e.g., JAMES L GUTH ET AL, THE BULLY PULPIT: THE
POLITICS OF PROTESTANT CLERGY (1997).
466. Robert Booth Fowler contrasts these extremists with the more numerous and tolerant
skeptics:
[Present are] those who are ideological secularists, devoted to promoting
secularism as a kind of antireligion for everyone. Such individuals or or-
ganizations-for example, the aptly named Freedom from Religion Founda-
tion-are as militant in their convictions and as sure of their truth as relig-
ious fundamentalists. But for more skeptical secularists, pragmatic adjust-
ment to reality in one's environment in an atmosphere of tolerance is what
makes sense .... [P]ragmatism in this situation suggests accepting reality
and cooperating with it to a degree. This is the way pluralist politics works
in the United States now. It is simply practical to suggest that a live-and-let-
live attitude prevail as much as possible.
Fowler, supra note 312, at 171.
467. See McConnell, supra note 421, at 34, 36.
468. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 658 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
469. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (internal
quotation omitted).
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sive, area of human conduct: man's belief or disbelief in the verity
of some transcendental idea and man's expression in action of
that belief or disbelief. Congress may not make these matters, as
such, the subject of legislation, nor, now, may any legislature in
this country.47°
Each of these formulations points to the same basic distinction between
subjects that are "inherently religious" and subjects that can be justified as
arising from the mores and culture of the body politic. This approach, of
course, unapologetically draws from the Western tradition as received in
the American colonies, as already conceded and to which I return below.47
"Inherently religious," then, means those exclusively religious activities
of worship and the propagation or inculcation of the sort of tenets that
comprise confessional statements or creeds common to many religions. The
term includes, as well, the supernatural claims of churches, mosques, syna-
gogues, temples, and other houses of worship, using those words not to
identify buildings, but to describe the confessional community (the ekklesia)
around which a religion (religare) identifies and defines itself, conducts its
collective worship, divines and teaches doctrine, and propagates the faith to
children and adult converts. A structuralist view places these matters-be-
ing in the exclusive sphere of religion-beyond the government's jurisdic-
tion.
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470. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 465-66 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in
the judgment); see also id. at 465 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("The purpose of the
Establishment Clause was to assure that the national legislature would not exert its power in
the service of any purely religious end; that it would not, as Virginia and virtually all of the
Colonies had done, make of religion, as religion, an object of legislation."); Laycock, supra
note 75, at 381 (stating that "the Establishment Clause separates from government... theol-
ogy, worship, and ritual, the aspects of religion that relate only to things outside the jurisdic-
tion of government. Questions of morality, of right conduct, of proper treatment of our fellow
humans, are questions to which both church and state have historically spoken.").
471. See supra note 450; infra notes 473, 475-76.
472. An unintended consequence of structuralism is that it can place the historic World
religions at a disadvantage in comparison to new religious movements as well as newer accul-
turated religious systems. For example, in drawing the government-religion boundary, theistic
religions familiar to Western civilization (e.g., Christianity, Judaism, Islam) have tenets and
sacerdotal practices that naturally "look" inherently religious to the Western mind. Contrari-
wise, religious movements that adopt aspects of contemporary culture for their own belief
systems do not "look" inherently religious. Consequently, government is restrained from pro-
moting the beliefs of traditional religions but not restrained from involvement with the beliefs
of newer religions or religions evolving with the culture.
The case of Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284 (D.NJ. 1977), affd, 592 F.2d 197 (3d
Cir. 1979), is illustrative. Five public high schools initiated an elective course entitled Science
of Creative Intelligence-Transcendental Meditation. Parents of some students brought suit
claiming that the course was teaching religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. School
authorities contended the course was not religious but involved meditation and other exercises
that explored each student's human potential. The distributor of the course textbook, World
Plan Executive Council, also presented evidence supportive of the claim that the course was
not religious. Ultimately the trial and appellate courts recognized the content of the course as
religious and sustained the plaintiffs' claim. However, this result was reached only with consid-
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VIII. CONCLUSION
None of the foregoing claims that the Supreme Court has resolved all
of the problems in defining the boundary between religion and govern-
ment by relegating the no-establishment restraint to governmental actions
on matters inherently religious. There will always be boundary disputes, for
the task of determining what is "inherently religious" is not substantively
neutral.7 3 In the main, the Court's decisions have favored the government-
erable difficulty as to whether SCI-TM was a religion, Malnak, 592 F.2d at 200, 213-14 (Ad-
ams, J., concurring), and provided one of those rare instances when a court has deemed a
belief system to be religious over the objection of its devotees.
Circuit Judge Arlin Adams raised the concern that practices considered secular in
Western culture, such as meditation, do not receive an easy pass under the Establishment
Clause whereas practices such as Bible reading and prayer are summarily assumed to be re-
ligious and hence tossed out of the schools. Id. at 212-13 (claiming that newer belief systems
such as SCI-TM would be advantaged over older ones such as Roman Catholicism). The
problem again arose when fundamentalist Christians with children in public school sued edu-
cational authorities claiming that the curriculum was promoting the religion of secular hu-
manism. Smith v. Board of Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala.), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684 (11th
Cir. 1987). The case created a nationwide stir when the parents were successful in having the
trial court enjoin the use of textbooks which taught that moral values were wholly relativistic.
However, the conclusion that the texts "established" the philosophy of secular humanism was
overturned on appeal.
In addition to Judge Adams' thoughtful opinion in Malnak, others have argued that
courts must be careful lest the beliefs of acculturated religious systems be unthinkingly pro-
moted by government. SeeJesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U.
ILL L. REv. 579, 610-12 (1982) (arguing that the First Amendment's more general freedom
from government-imposed beliefs concerning truth claims, whether religious or nonreligious,
serves to restrain government); Phillip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment
Religious Doctrine, 72 CAL L. REv. 817, 834-35 (1984) (arguing that nontheistic religious ide-
ologies "could have it both ways" if the Establishment Clause is applicable to practices thought
inherently religious by traditional standards); cf. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 14-6, at 1187 (opining
that prayer is religiously significant to most people but preservation of eagle feathers is not;
hence, government may promote the latter but not the former).
It is true that in one sense traditional Western notions of religion are at a disadvan-
tage in instances such as Malnak and Smith. There is, however, a compensating protection for
traditional religions; namely, by virtue of a structuralist view government has no jurisdiction
over traditional Western notions of those matters which are inherently in the sphere of relig-
ion (e.g., doctrine, polity, clerics, conditions of church membership). For traditional religions,
then, the trade-off is they receive church autonomy-but not governmental support-for their
inherently religious beliefs and practices.
This is no Faustian bargain. If traditional Western religions are expected to uphold
their end of this bargain, howev-, secularists must honor their side of the deal. That is why
the argument that the "wall of sep.ration" screens out abuses from one side only, see Sherry,
supra note 465, at 493, 495; supra note 360-61 and accompanying text, would have such disas-
trous consequences. If adherents of traditional religions see that their benefit in the bargain
(i.e., ekkiesia autonomy) is not being realized, then all bets will be off. To be true to the Estab-
lishment Clause, the Court must be as zealous about enforcing ekidesia autonomy as it is about
striking down governmental support for inherently religious practices.
473. At bottom, all claims of neutrality are a mask. See SMrrH, supra note 50, at 68 ("A
different religion or a secular viewpoint will support different background beliefs that logically
generate different views or theories of religious freedom."); Garvey, supra note 437, at 290-91
(stating that liberalism is not neutral, but makes "assumptions about human nature (the unen-
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religion settlement advanced by the allied efforts of the Enlightenment
rationalists and Protestant pietists.474 Accordingly, those who disagree with
this constitutional settlement will be aggrieved." 5 The validity of these
grievances is beyond the scope of this Article.476 It suffices here to candidly
cumbered self, the value of authenticity) that are inconsistent with convictions that many re-
ligious people hold"). Professor Smith argues that a truly neutral theory is impossible. I agree.
He goes on to assume neutrality is essential to have a modem legal theory. SMITH, supra note
50, at 68-71. I disagree. One can have a theory that "takes sides" in the dispute over govern-
ment-religion relations and still have a theory. One may believe there is a single correct (or, at
least better) position and the law should aspire to it. Neutrality is such a theory. Berg, supra
note 69, at 728. Professor Smith also argues that there is no way of choosing the "better" or
"truer" or "preferred" position. SMITH, supra note 50, at 71-75. I again disagree. The Court
should choose a theory that allows maximum freedom for voluntary religion. What makes it
"better" is that it maximizes individual religious choice, safeguards institutional integrity for
religious bodies, and minimizes religious factionalism in the body politic. See Berg, supra note
69, at 732-34 (arguing that "neutrality" fosters freedom for voluntary religion). To maximize
freedom of religious choice is not a good in itself, but freedom is good because then each
individual is free to do God's will as he understands his God or gods.
474. See supra note 75. Historically the structuralist view was the product of Enlightenment
rationalism and Protestant pietism, brought together by compromise and pragmatism. But it is
in no sense the inevitable product of pure reason unadulterated by ideological commitment. It
does not stand outside of the political and religious milieu from which it emerged. See supra
note 473. To demand that the structuralist perspective or any other theory of government-
religion relations transcend its pedigree and become in some sense substantively "neutral" is
to ask the impossible. To call a structuralist view compelling in its fairness and wisdom, or the
original intent of the Founders, is valid argument. But to call the view truly "neutral" is at best
naive and at worse a scam.
475. The structuralist church-state boundary will generate differences between the Western
tradition as received and later altered in the American colonies and deeply held beliefs of
some Americans, secular and religious. John Courtney Murray, of course, is an example of one
such grievant. See supra notes 101-12 and accompanying text. Murray was instrumental in
bringing the Catholic Church via Vatican II far in the direction of the American view of indi-
vidual free exercise, but fell short when it comes to the no-establishment principle. See
NOONAN, supra note 75, at 331-53.
Polar opposites of Murray, such as Professors Sherry and Sullivan, are also grievants.
See Sherry, supra note 465, at 483-89 (arguing that rationalism is constitutionally preferred
over religion); Sullivan, supra note 465, at 197-214, 222 (contending that the First Amend-
ment's negative bar against an establishment of religion implies an affirmative establishment
of a secular public order). There are those outside the Western tradition as received in Amer-
ica at its founding, and they are displeased with this location of the church-state boundary.
That is cause for sensitivity and (when prudent) accommodation; but it is not a reason to relo-
cate that boundary under the guise of judicial "up dating" of the Establishment Clause. Any
judicial shifting of the church-state boundary will just create new grievants, for, again, there is
no substantively neutral location for the boundary between church and state.
476. In a review of a recent book by law professor Stephen Feldman, Father Neuhaus duly
acknowledges the Western-Protestant bias of the First Amendment, as well as points the way
toward how (and how not) to begin to assess these grievances:
[T]rue is the claim that, in American law, the separation of church and state
has been interpreted in very Protestant terms, reflecting the individualistic
view that religion is a matter of personal decision or preference. Feldman
notes that this is not fair to the Jewish understanding of Judaism, and he is
right about that. He fails to appreciate the extent to which it is also unfair to
the Catholic and Orthodox understanding of Christianity.
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acknowledge that a structuralist view is not substantively neutral;47 indeed,
substantive neutrality is impossible because every theory of government-
religion relations necessarily takes a position on the nature and contempo-
rary value of organized religion and the purpose and direction of modem
government. One positive bias of the structuralist view is that it places a
great deal of importance on the autonomy of the religious community (the
ekklesia). A second affirmative bias is that the view minimizes government's
role in influencing the spiritual impulse of humankind (religare) by leaving
members of the political community (the civitas) free to make these choices
for themselves.
It is tempting to label the accommodationists and liberal secularists as
partisans in the culture war and to characterize the Supreme Court's fixing
the government-religion boundary where it does as symbolizing the DMZ
between these warring factions. In candor, however, the Supreme Court's
position is not a neutral zone either. Its first line of defense is that the
Court's government-religion boundary is the original constitutional settle-
ment. It is not to be tampered with by latter-day judge-made law. In the
end, however, if the Court's government-religion boundary is to have stay-
ing power it has to be defended not because it is neutral or noncontrover-
sial, but because it is good. Indeed, it is a three-fold good: it maximizes
individual religious choice, protects the institutional integrity of the ekklesia,
and minimizes government-induced religious factionalism within the civitas.
Under the structuralist settlement, then, the Establishment Clause is
not a silver bullet for winning (or ending) the culture war.7 Although the
government-religion boundary policed by the no-establishment principle
keeps government from taking sides on confessional and other inherently
religious matters, moral and ethical questions are still proper objects of
Richard John Neuhaus, On Not Permitting the Other to Be Other, 79 FIRSTTHINGs 62 (Jan. 1998)
(reviewing STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE DON'T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS: A CRITICAL
HISTORY OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1996)).
477. A structuralist perspective is a formal legal rule, but it is not substantively neutral. See
supra note 474. If it is objective law-making that is desired, the best a legal system can do is to
pick a formal legal rule and then rigorously and dispassionately apply it without regard to the
winners and losers in any fact-specific case that should later come before a judge. Such formal
rules provide clarity and reduce judicial subjectivity. But the initial choice of a particular for-
mal rule, necessarily rejecting competing rules, is a value-laden judgment that is in no sense
substantively "neutral." Professor Laycock labels his position "substantive neutrality." Laycock,
supra note 259, at 313-52. In the end, however, his view favors minimizing governmental
influence over religion so as to avoid distorting private religious choices and commitments. Id.
at 349. This is not substantively neutral. The view is biased toward one of many possible views
on the role of government and the nature and importance of religion. It is a view I share, but
it is not neutral.
478. Laycock, supra note 259, at 327; see Goldstein, supra note 462, at 31 ("A wall that
separates church and state is fine; one that separates morality from law isn't.").
[1998]
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legislation. Whose morality will dominate the Republic at any point in time,
and hence gets to be reflected in the positive law of the nation, is not pre-
determined by the Establishment Clause. That determination is left for the
making based on who has the more persuasive argument in the market-
place of ideas, as well as the better organizational acumen to promote it.

